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INTRODUCTION
Must our law be so rigid and our procedural concepts so inflexible that
we render ourselves helpless when the existing methods and the
traditional concepts do not quite fit and do not prove to be entirely
adequate for new issues?
-Sierra Club v. Morton'
For some time, questions about the wisdom and morality of new medical
interventions, such as genetic screening, 2 life-prolonging treatment for
aged adults,3
neonatal therapies, 4 organ transplantation,5
and
reproductive technologies, 6 have been posed as legal, sometimes
constitutional, issues and presented to courts for resolution. On the
twentieth anniversary of Roe v. Wade, this Article uses our experience
with abortion technology to explore the consequences of resolving such
complex social issues through an adversary process in terms of an abstract

1. 405 U.S. 727, 755-56 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
2. See, e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982); Shroeder v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 834 (NJ.

1981). See generallyPRESIDENT'S

COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE

AND BIMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SCREENING AND COUNSELING FOR GENETIC
CONDITIONS (1983).
3. See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), afd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla.
1980); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985). See generally DANIEL CALLAHAN, SETTING LIMrrs
(1987); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, LIFE-SUSTAINING TECHNOLOGIES AND
THE ELDERLY (1987).
4. See, e.g., Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986); lafelice v. Luchs, 501 A.2d 1040
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985), afd, 534 A.2d 417 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987). See generally
Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-Ordered Cesareans,74
CAL. L. REv. 1951 (1986); Nancy K. Rhoden, The New Neonatal Dilemma: Live Birthsfrom Late
Abortions, 72 GEO. L.J. 1451 (1984).
5. See, e.g., Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972); In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185
(La. Ct. App. 1973). See generally GUIDO CALABRESI AND PHILIP BOBBrrr, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).
6. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (holding that exchange of money for surrogacy
services violated state laws prohibiting the sale of babies for adoption). See generally John A.
Robertson, ProcreativeLiberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and Childbirth, 69 VA. L.
REV. 405 (1983) (arguing in favor of procreative freedom for married couples but not single people);
Note, Reproductive Technology and the ProcreationRights of the Unmarried,98 HARV. L. REV. 669
(1985) (arguing that the Constitution requires protection of procreative rights of single people as well
as married people).
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constitutional right to privacy. 7 While the author acknowledges the great
contribution that public law litigation8 has made to the realization of
important values that many people believe to be constitutional, including
privacy, this Article takes no position on the merits of the abortion debate
as it is posed by Roe v. Wade9 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey.'

7. For a discussion of medical techniques affecting abortion, see Joseph W. Dellapenna, The History
of Abortion: Technology, Morality and Law, 40 U. Prrr. L. REV. 359 (1979). Abortion technology
continues to develop, most notably with the development of abortifacient birth control medications. The
French drug RU 486 can be taken up to the seventh week of pregnancy and causes the lining of the
uterus to be expelled, taking with it any fertilized egg or blastocyst that has evolved. Sarah Ricks, The
New French Abortion Pill: The Moral Property of Women, I YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75 (1989).
Women's rights to abortion have increasingly been conceived as rights to equality with men, rather
than privacy interests. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, RethinkingSex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv.
955 (1984); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED 93-102 (1987); Frances Olsen, Comment, Unraveling Compromise, 103 HARV. L. REV.
105, 117-21 (1989); cf.Drucilla Comell, Sexual Difference, the Feminine, and Equivalency: A Critique
of MacKinnon 's Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, 100 YALE L.J. 2247 (1991) (book review).
8. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1281
(1976). For discussions of the merits of institutional reform litigation as instruments of social change,
see JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND
SOCIAL CHANGE (1978); Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the
Extraordinaryin Institutional Litigation,93 HARV. L. RV. 465 (1980); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme
Court, 1978 Term, Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979); David Rudenstine,
Judicially Ordered Social Reform: Neofederalism and Neonationalism and the Debate Over Political
Structure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 449 (1986).
From 1968 to 1972 and 1976 to 1981, the author of this Article was engaged in public interest
litigation involving class action lawsuits to secure statutory and constitutional rights of hospitalized
mental patients and mentally disabled people, including the framing and implementation of remedial
decrees designed to bring about institutional reform.
9. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe, Justice Blacknun wrote the majority opinion holding that a Texas
statute prohibiting abortion at all stages of pregnancy except to save the life of the mother violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion further held
that in the first trimester of pregnancy, the abortion decision must be left to the pregnant woman and
the medical judgment of her attending physician; that in the second trimester, the state may regulate
abortion in the interest of the mother's health; and that in the third trimeste', the state has a sufficient
interest in the potential human life of the fetus to regulate and even prohibit abortion except where it
is necessary for the preservation of the life or health of the mother. Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Douglas and Stewart filed concurring opinions, and Justices White and Rehnquist dissented.
10. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). In Casey, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter wrote ajoint opinion
in which they upheld provisions of a Pennsylvania statute that (1) required the mother's informed
consent and the provision of certain information twenty-four hours prior to an abortion; (2) required the
informed consent of one parent of a minor seeking abortion unless the minor obtained judicial
authorization; and (3) imposed certain record-keeping requirements on facilities performing abortions.
The Justices held unconstitutional a provision that required a married women to notify her spouse of
her intended abortion, except in certain circumstances. The joint opinion further held that principles of
stare decisis required affirmation of the basic holding in Roe: that a woman has a right to choose to have
an abortion before fetal viability, a right protected against undue burdens of state regulation by the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justices Blackmun and
Stevens wrote concurring opinions, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White, Scalia, and
Thomas, dissented. Justice Scalia wrote a separate dissenting opinion.
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Instead, after examining the problematic theories of judicial review
implicated by Roe and Casey, this Article proposes a reconsideration of
the litigation process that shapes the substance of the debate and raises
difficult foundational issues. Drawing on the experience of alternative
dispute resolution, institutional reform litigation, and negotiated
rulemaking, this Article recommends the utilization of adjudicatory
procedures that permit reflection on the complex personal relationships at
stake, foster reformulation of the substantive issues to be decided, and
promote collaborative solutions to the problems posed. Where parties
cannot provide consensus solutions, this Article advocates that judicial

resolutions be rendered in a more informed, deliberative, and legitimate
way through the implementation of normative procedural principles of
representation and participation that emanate from the Constitution.
The abortion debate in this country has been framed as a conflict
between abstract interests in life and liberty-fetal life, when it is
protected by the state, and the liberty of women to terminate their
pregnancies." In 1973, the abortion conflict was settled legally by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, when the Court balanced the two
conflicting interests and announced a prescription for future
accommodation. 12 However, the Roe decision neither settled the national
dispute about abortion nor provided instruction on the proper role of
courts in the social drama played out around the life and death issues that

advancing medical technology puts in high relief. Instead, the decision
seemed only to fuel the acrimony between pro-life and pro-choice

11. Professor Tribe describes the abortion debate as a "clash of absolutes." LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990). Professor Tribe characterizes the absolutes as "life
against liberty." Id. at 3. These interests are conceived as absolutes in the sense that they are asserted
as being "free from an§ restriction, limitation, or exception." THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE
DICTIONARY (rev. ed. 1984) (defining "absolute"). Indeed, in his opinion in Roe v. Wade, Justice
Blackmun characterizes the plaintiff's claim as arguing "that the woman's right is absolute and that she
is entitled to terminate her pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way, and for whatever reason she
alone chooses. With this we do not agree," he adds. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153; see also Casey, 112 S. Ct.
at 2806 (joint opinion) (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(asserting that due process represents the balance which our nation has struck between liberty and the
demands of organized society)).
12. Roe, 410 U.S. 113. However, in many other countries, legislatures have been the primary
governmental forum in which such debates have been held and for the most part have been the
institutions that have resolved them. MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE INWESTERN LAW:
AMERICAN FAILURES, EUROPEAN CHALLENGES 40 (1987); see also CHRISTOPHER TIETZE & STANLEY
K. HENSHAW, INDUCED ABORTION: A WORLD REVIEW 11-26 (1986); Donald L. Besehle, Judicial
Review and Abortion in Canada:Lessonsfor the United States in the Wake of Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, 61 U. COLO. L. REv. 537 (1990); Andrew Grubb, Abortion Law-An English
Perspective, 20 N.M. L. REV. 649 (1990).
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advocates and to raise serious questions about the function of the Supreme

Court in our constitutional democracy.
The Court recently revisited many of the issues it addressed in Roe in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 3 As this Article's analysis suggests,
differences between the Justices, which are evident in Casey, concerning
the task of constitutional interpretation are bifurcated and exacerbated by
the polarized substantive issues with which they must deal as a result of
Roe. Before analyzing the Justices' opinions on the abortion question in
Casey, which this Article does not undertake to do, we, too, would do
well to revisit Roe in an effort to understand what went wrong. Future
courts will continue to be asked to resolve life and death questions as

advances in medical science present possibilities for individual action
unknown in the past.14 If, in those cases, the court does not perceive its
task as one of balancing abstract interests in life and death, it might
sanction far more creative resolutions of the complex issues posed by our
new-found power to keep life and death at bay than were used in Roe and
5
Casey. 1

13. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (joint opinion).
14. In 1990, for example, the Supreme Court ruled on a state's right to limit a guardian's decision,
made on behalf of a comatose but not terminally ill patient, to reject newly developed, life-prolonging
interventions. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). The Court divided on the
question of whether constitutionally protected privacy includes a fundamental right to refuse lifesustaining medical treatment. Justices Brennan, Blaekmun, Marshall, and Stevens would have held that
Nancy Cr=zan had a fundamental privacy interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment that included
the right to refuse unwanted medical care, including life-sustaining treatments. Id. at 304-05 (Scalia, J.,
concurring); id. at 344-45 (Stevens, J. dissenting). Justice O'Connor found "a protected liberty interest"
to the same effect. Id at 287 (O'Connor, J. concurring). Nevertheless, the Court held that the state may
constitutionally require clear and convincing evidence of the incompetent's preferences, expressed while
still competent, before permitting guardians to refuse treatment on behalf of their wards. Id. at 283. As
in the abortion controversy, the social, economic, religious, and moral implications raised by these
medical procedures have not been fully explored. And again, the issue was posed as a conflict between
polarized, abstract, fundamental interests-the patient's privacy interest in choosing death and the state's
interest in the "protection and preservation of life." Id. at 281. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, set up the dichotomy by hypothetically assuming the Constitution would grant a competent
person a protected right to refuse lifesaving interventions and finding that there is "no gainsaying"
Missouri's interest in the preservation of human life. Id. Compare Justice Brennan's characterization of
the issue before the Court ("The starting point for our legal analysis must be whether a competent
person has a constitutional right to avoid unwanted medical care." Id. at 304 (Brennan, J., dissenting))
with that of Justice Scalia ("Starving oneself to death is no different from putting a gun to one's temple
as far as ... suicide is concerned" Id. at 296 (Scalia, J., concurring)). "[F]or patients like Nancy
Crozan, who have no consciousness and no chance of recovery, there is a serious question as to whether
the mere persistence of their bodies is 'i/' as that word is commonly understood, or as it is used in
both the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence." Id. at 345 (emphasis added) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). "[T]his Court cannot defer to any State policy that drives a
theoretical wedge between a person's life, on the one hand, and that person's liberty or happiness, on
the other." Id. at 355 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
15. See discussion of In re Quinlan, 335 A.2d 647 (NJ. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976),
infra notes 268-73 and accompanying text.
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This Article investigates how the law both defines the issues and is
defined by them. It is about the effect of process on substance and
substance on process in the law. Part I examines the trial record and legal
strategies in Roe v. Wade to demonstrate that, by trying to resolve the
social issues raised by abortion technology through litigation, we have
transformed the real-life, contextual, relational, complex facts about
abortion into a two-sided contest between generalized maternal rights to
privacy and theoretical state interests in potential human life, a process
that teaches us little about the moral and social problems we seek to
resolve.
Part II examines judicial determinations based on constitutional
interpretation, and contrasts this modern law-making process with that of
common law judges. As the Justices' opinions in Casey make clear, the
former raise serious questions about the Court's institutional competence
to do the job it has created for itself, as well as about justifications for
the exercise of judicial review. Part III explores the foundational theories
of judicial review set forth by several prominent legal scholars seeking to
answer the questions posed in Parts I and II, and examines the procedural
mechanisms available for judicial resolution of broad social issues.
Part IV urges an examination of the litigation process through which the
issues are framed as a clash of absolutes, and the development of civil
procedures that better accommodate the many diverse interests at stake.
This examination of the process and developmpnt'of new procedures
should be undertaken before confronting either the substance of the issues
posed by Roe and Casey or the questions of governance they raise. This
plea for a new process in such cases builds on the perceived "weakness"
of older process theory, that is, its inevitable subjectivity. Rather than
deny or embrace that perception, 6 this Article proposes that we seek a
basis for the legitimacy of judicial review that rests not on the validity of
judicial value judgments measured against elusive standards of "wellordered liberty," deep historical traditions, and "undue burdens," but one
that rests instead on procedures that will give effect to the values of those
affected by the Court's action, expressed through a more participatory and
consensual adjudicative process.'" The legitimacy of such an approach
lies not in its substance but in its form-the judgment as a product of a

16. See Allan C. Hutchinson, The Three 'Rs': Reading/RortylRadically, 103 HARV. L. REV. 555
(1989) (reviewing RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY (1989)). "[I]nstead of
chastising courts for their imperial presumption, commentators celebrate them as the preferred forum
for democratic deliberation." Id. at 555 (citing Ronald Dworkin and Laurence Tribe); see RONALD
DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT
(1985).
17. See discussion infra notes 325-39 and accompanying text.
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process that conforms with principles of fairness, representation, and
participation, not propounded as eternal, foundational truths, but as the
fundamental principles expressed in the Constitution.
I. THE ABORTION ISSUE
Abortion is an unique act. It is an act fraught with consequences for
others: for the woman who must live with the implications of her
decision; for the persons who perform and assist in the procedure; for
the spouse, family and society which must confront the knowledge that
these procedures exist ... ; and . . . for the life or potential life that
is aborted.
8
-Planned Parenthoodv. Casey
As some of the Justices recently observed, the abortion debate is an

"intensely divisive controversy" between "contending sides of a national"
dispute.' 9 Thus, the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, which might be

viewed as a compromise recognizing both a woman's privacy interest in
terminating her pregnancy in its early months and the state's compelling
interest in protecting potential fetal life in its later months,20 is usually
regarded only as a victory for abortion rights.2 Responsibility for that
perception has been laid upon the Court itself. Legal scholars criticized
Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe for being unnecessarily divisive and
inflammatory, and for alienating those with a world view that does not

permit abortion.2 2 The presentation of the issues in irreconcilable,

18. 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992) (joint opinion).
19. Id. at 2815; see Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1784 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
20, Olsen, supra note 7, at 107.
21. See, e.g., Abortion: What HappensNow?, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 5, 1973, at 66; A StunningApproval
for Abortion,'TiM , Feb. 5, 1973, at 50; John P. MacKenzie, Supreme Court Allows Early-Stage
Abortions, WASH. POsT, Jan. 23, 1973, at Al; Robert S. McElvaine, A Trucefor the Abortion War: If
Only the Partisanson Both Sides Would Read Roe v. Wade, WASH. POsT, July 5, 1992, at Cl; Warren
Weaver, Jr., High Court Rules Abortions Legal the First Three Months: National GuidelinesSet 1y 7-2
Vote, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 23, 1973, at Al; see also NANTTE J. DAvis, FROM CRIME TO CHOICE: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF ABORTION IN AMERICA (1985); John T. Noonan, Jr., An Almost Absolute Value
in History,in THE MORALITY OF ABORTION: LEGAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 1 (John T. Noonan,
Jr. ed., 1970). Those dissatisfied with the opinion characterized it as "government sponsored mass

killing," tantamount to the Holocaust, and sought a constitutional amendment to overturn the decision.
TRIBE, supranote 11, at 141. On the other hand, those who favored its tolerant policy on abortion hailed
Roe as the final legitimation of their belief that women have an individual privacy right to make
personal reproductive decisions, and sought to implement the decision through the development of
clinics offering low-cost, safe abortions nationwide. Abortion: What Happens Now?, supra, at 66.
22. See ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITTION IN CONFLICT 346-48 (1992); GuIDO CALABRESI,
IDEALs, BELIEFs, ArTruDEs AND THE LAw 92 (1985); Joseph W. Dellapenna, Nor Piety Nor Wit: The
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polarized terms and the Court's resolution of them in those terms, both in
Roe and in Casey,23 have provoked extremist reactions by some members
of the public, who use threats of violence to traumatize pregnant women

entering abortion clinics and who vandalize, bomb, and burn the clinics
themselves.24 The debate continues to rage around the nomination of
Justices to the Supreme Court25 and the provision of abortion information

in federally funded clinics.26 Unless the abortion controversy can be
diffused, we run the risk that it will polarize our thinking on related
issues, widening the national divisions it reflects.27

A. Abortion as a Matter of Relationships
As often observed, form shapes substance. What then is the substance

about abortion that is shaped by the procedural form in which it is
presented to the courts? The real-life emotional, financial, and social
factors that give rise to the demand for abortion, and to which abortion
gives rise, do not pose "either-or" value choices for those involved.
Rather, they present interrelated and indeterminate questions that reflect
larger social and personal issues. One has only to read Kristin Luker's

Supreme Court on Abortion, 6 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 379, 400 (1974-75); Laurence H. Tribe,
Commentary, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties and the
Dilemma ofDependence, 99 HARV. L. REV. 330,342 (1985). See also Justice Scalia's dissent in Casey,
112 S. Ct. at 2873 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
23. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (joint opinion) (discussing "the woman's liberty" and the "state's
interest in life").
24. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1367-68 (E.D. Pa. 1990), af'd, 112
S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Barbara Maddux & Jeannie Ralston, The Great Divide, LIFE, July 1992, at 32.
Between 1977 and 1990, 117 abortion clinics were bombed or set afire by extremists, 231 were invaded,
and 224 were vandalized. TRIBE, supra note 11, at 172; see also Northeast Wcmen's Center, Inc. v.
McMonagle, 665 F. Supp. 1147 (E.D. Pa. 1987), affd in part and remanded, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901; Adam D. Gale, Note, The Use of Civil RICO Against Antiabortion
Protestersand the Economic Motive Requirement, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1341 (1990); Jo Anne Pool,
Note, Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, A Message to PoliticalActivists, 23 AKRON L.
REV. 251 (1989).
25. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2855 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (observing
that the confirmation process for his successor may well focus on the abortion debate). See generally
Symposium, The Bork Nomination, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1987) (a collection of essays and reports on
the nomination of Robert H. Bork to the U.S. Supreme Court).
26. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1766 (1991).
27. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE (1991) (arguing that framing social controversies in terms of individual rights limits public
dialogue and impedes acknowledgement of collective responsibility); James D. Hunter, WhatAmericans
Really Think About Abortion, FIRST THINGS, June-July 1992, at 13 (urging pro-life advocates to view
the abortion controversy as multidimensional and not one in which public opinions lie along a onedimensional continuum).
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book, Taking Chances: Abortion and the Decision Not to Contracept,
written shortly after the Roe decision in 1975, to understand the point."
Luker discounts the theory that abortion is used as a contraceptive
because women have incomplete knowledge about preconception measures
or because of individual intrapsychic conflicts that cannot be fully
understood.29 Instead, she hypothesizes that women engage in a fairly
conscious, rational, though often not express, cost-benefit analysis in
which they weigh the many different relational costs and benefits of
pregnancy against those of contraception and birth." Thus, for example,
many of the women she surveyed found contraception "unnatural" and
"cold blooded," a measure that robbed the sexual act of its warm
intimacy.3" For others, to use a contraceptive, such as the pill, was to
acknowledge to herself and to others that she was available for sex and
thus transgressing the model of a "good girl" in the traditional moral
sense. 2 Some women avoided contraception because they saw in
pregnancy a way to notify parents, husbands, and lovers that they had not
been properly attentive and to ask for help and care.3" Still others
recognized pregnancy as a means of measuring their partner's commitment
to them. Some believed that if they got pregnant, their partners would
marry them or become more loving. 4 Disillusioned in those beliefs after
becoming pregnant, many sought abortions.3 " Finally, some women saw
contraceptives not as a way to control one's body but as a technology that
permitted women to be exploited by their male partners. As one woman
stated:
[If you use a contraceptive,] [h]e's not worrying about what's going to
happen to you. He's only worrying about himself.
...
[Getting birth control pills] worked to where it was a one-way
street for his benefit, not for mine. It would be mine because I
wouldn't get pregnant, but safe for him, too, because I wouldn't put
him on the spot. So I get sick of being used. I'm tired of this same old

28. KRIsTiN LUKER, TAKING CHANCES: ABORTION AND THE DECIsION NOT TO CONTRACEPT (1975).

29. Id. at 18-25.
30. Id. at 34-36. For an interesting analysis of the elasticity of the demand for abortion using an
economic model of the demand for abortion control, see Marshall H. Medoff, An Economic Analysis
of the Demandfor Abortion, 26 ECONOMIC INQUIRY 353 (1988).
31. LUKER, supra note 28, at 42.

32. Id. at 44.
33. Id. at 70-73.
34. Id. at 70.
35. One writer noted that some pregnant women report that they resented the fact that their partner
did not try to talk them out of having an abortion. LINDA B. FRANCKE, THE AMBIVALENCE OF
ABORTION 96, 100, 107 (1978).
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He gets all the

6

Many women choose abortion in order to meet their moral responsibilities
to existing children, or out of a moral concern about bringing a child into
a world of social and financial poverty. Thus, women's relationships
with boyfriends, girlfriends, peers, faithful and unfaithful spouses,
parents, siblings, and children are all affected by the failure to use
contraceptives and the termination of pregnancies through abortion.
Commentators have described the anguish of men who want what they
have helped conceive to be born and become their children, while other
potential fathers are ignorant or uncaring.3" Parents who would be
grandparents grieve the loss of heirs they will never know, while others
are eager to eliminate through abortion the burden and expense of
unwanted future generations. Doctors and other health care professionals
debate their own ethical obligations and the appropriate practice standards
they should follow when asked to advise pregnant women of the medical
implications of their conditions.39 Attitudes about pregnancy and abortion

36. LUKER, supra note 28, at 127-28; see also Cathaxine MacKinnon, The Male Ideology ofPrivacy:
A Feminist Perspectiveon the Right to Abortion, RADICAL AM., July-Aug. 1983, at 23 (suggesting that

polls indicating that men often support abortion rights more than women can be explained by the fact
that abortion makes heterosexual relationships more available and relieves men of the responsibilities
they might otherwise have for sex).
37. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 111-12, 116-17, 120 (1982); Alison Jagger,
Abortion and a Woman's Right to Decide, 5 PHIL. F. 347 (1974); Jean Braucher, Tribal Conflict over

Abortion, 25 GA. L. REV. 595, 599 (1991) (reviewing TRIBE, supra note 11). Some women were
motivated to risk becoming pregnant or to terminate their pregnancies by a number of other factors,
including the expense of contraceptives, the inconvenience of clinic visits, and the desire to preserve
their health.
38. See MARY K. ZIMMERMAN, PASSAGE THROUGH ABORTION: THE PERSONAL AND SOCIAL REALITY
OF WOMEN'S EXPERIENCES 122 (1977) (involving study showing that about one-third of the men

informed of their partner's abortion decision opposed the decision); Elizabeth Kastor, Men Without a
Choice: The Other Side of the Abortion Decision, WASH. POST, July 1, 1992, at Cl; cf. Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976) (recognizing the husband's deep and proper
concern and interest in the fetus); Conn v. Conn, 525 N.E.2d 612, 615-16 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), affd,
526 N.E.2d 958 (Ind. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 995 (1988) (reversing lower court holding that
husband of expectant mother, and father of fetus, had common law and Fourteenth Amendment rights
to fetus which must be balanced against rights of mother). See generally Ruth H. Axelrod, Note, Whose
Womb Is It Anyway: Are ParentalRights Alive and Well Despite Danforth, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 685
(1990) (discussing the parental rights of fathers and balancing those interests against the rights of the
expectant mother). However, polls seem to indicate that more men than women support abortion rights.
HYMAN RODMAN ET AL., THE ABORTION QUESTION 142 (1987); Dan Balz, Poll FindsMajority in U.S.
Back Abortion Rights, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1989, at A6.
39. See generally JOHN KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS AND THE LAW (1988); JAMES C. MOHR,
ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1800-1900 (1978);

Dellapenna, supra note 7.
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reflect shifting relational dynamics through which gender, class, and
generational conflicts are played out.
Hence, as Rosalind Petchesky demonstrates, abortion as a social fact,
like sexuality, is experienced through relationships, not only with sexual
partners, but also with parents, peers, religious figures, and medical
professionals." These relationships are often fraught with conflict,
differences in power, and resistances to power which are as important as
concepts of morality in determining the meanings of sexual encounters and
the demand for abortion.4 Pregnancy can be used by young women as
a way of separating from parents and establishing the boundaries between
childhood and adulthood, particularly where other avenues, such as
educational achievement and employment, are blocked. Abortion permits
the postponement of the completion of that process while warning all that
it is pending. Similarly, abortion permits a young girl to establish her
sexual identity through occasional sexual intercourse without appearing to
be sexually available contrary to traditional family-supported moral
values. 2 But moral traditions are perpetuated by religious traditions, and
many pregnant women who want abortions are paralyzed by religious
beliefs that hold that it is not just a fetus that they carry, but a soul, and
that it is for God, not themselves, to dispatch souls.4 3 Thus, abortion is
not a single abstraction but has different meanings to women in different
social positions and to those in relationships with them. 4
Also like sexuality, the fact of abortion gains meaning from the
historical, technological, and political contexts in which it occurs. 4' The
number of legal abortions increased by more than fifty percent in the six
years following the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade. 46 The rate

40. ROSALIND P. PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE: THE STATE, SEXUALITY, &
REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 221 (rev. ed. 1990).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 222-23. Petchesky notes that no sexual revolution was perceived as long as it was black
women and poor white women whose sexual activity became apparent when they bore illegitimate
children or showed up in hospital emergency rooms after failed illegal abortions. The sexual situations
of white middle class women remained hidden since they could afford better care on the abortion black
market. The advent of legal abortion has equalized the visibility of the sexual activity of young
unmarried women of all races and social classes. Id. at 23 1.
43. While Protestant and Jewish women were less likely to have abortions in 1987 than women as
a whole, Catholic women were about as likely. RACHAEL B. GOLD, ABORTION AND WOMEN'S HEALTH:
A TURNING POINT FOR AMERICA? 19 (Alan Guttmacher Institute ed., 1990).
44. PETCHESKY, supra note 40, at 221-33.
45. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 23-26 (1980).
46. PETCHESKY, supra note 40, at 142. Petchesky notes that at the present time women who seek
abortions are largely young and unmarried. Between 1975 and 1980, about 65% of the women who
obtained abortions were under 24 years old, 75% were unmarried. Id. at 142-43.
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of abortions per 1,000 women increased from about seventeen in 1973 to
twenty-seven in 1988. 4 ' The groups contributing most to the increase
were white teenagers and slightly older, poor, minority women who were
heads of households.4 ' These increases have been attributed to several
factors: a trend toward postponed marriage, in part because recession

precluded male partners from assuming the financial obligations of
marriage; an increase in premarital heterosexual activities; and young
women's increased expectations for education and careers created by the
women's movement as well as an expanding labor market. 49 However,

out-of-wedlock births also rose during this period, particularly among
poor, working-class teenagers, who view childbearing as a mark of
adulthood which will also provide a welfare check to contribute to the
income of an extended family." Importantly, both abortions and out-ofwedlock births "reveal sex," and make pre-marital sexual relations a fact
to be reckoned with."' Abstract concepts of life or liberty fail to
adequately convey the sexual meanings of abortion.

47. Profile of Abortion in the United States, N.Y. TIMEs, July 1, 1992, at A12 (chart) [hereinafter

Profile]. About 40% of the women obtaining abortions were under age 20; 25% to 35% were nonwhite.
The percentage of women obtaining abortions who were unmarried increased from about 73% to 80%
between 1973 and 1988. Id.
48. PETCHESKY, supra note 40, at 155-57. Compared to all women of reproductive age in 1987,
women obtaining abortions were younger, less likely to be married, poorer, and more likely to be in
school or employed. They were also disproportionately black and hispanic. Gold, supra note 43, at 1619. Poor women were three times as likely to get abortions as other women. The average cost of an
abortion in 1989 ranged from as low as $190 in West Virginia to $352 in California and $486 in Alaska.
Profile,supra note 47.

49. A recent study by Johns Hopkins University tracked 360 black, teenage Baltimore women who
had abortions. It found that these women were more likely to have graduated from high school and
continue their education than teenage women in a control groul who either carried their pregnancies to
term or whose pregnancy tests were negative. Laurie S. Zabin et al., When Urban Adolescents Choose
Abortion: Effects on Education,PsychologicalStatus andSubsequent Pregnancy,21 FAM. PLAN. PERSP.
248 (1989). In addition, the study found that the women were not adversely affected psychologically.
Id. For an anecdotal account of women who later regretted their decisions to abort, see DAVID C.
REARDON, ABORTED WOMEN: SILENT No MORE (1987).
50. PETCHESKY, supra note 40, at 144-51. Yet, two-thirds of all sexually active teenagers did not get

pregnant. Id. at 145. Of those who did, two out of three of these pregnancies resulted in miscarriages
or abortions. Id. at 147.
51. Demographic data indicate that in this period, there was a 30% increase in premarital intercourse
among white teenage girls, a lowering of the age at which sex was initiated, and less exclusivity in
partners. Id. at 211. Yet many women were found to be sexually inactive for long periods of time and
thus often unprotected by contraceptive use during sporadic periods of activity. While other sexual
behavior may have been practiced on an equally large scale in the 1950s, the inclusion of actual sexual
intercourse in those activities in the 1970s, and its visible consequence of pregnancy and abortion, left
the false impression that there was a generational sexual revolution occurring. In reality, earlier
generations hid their sexual encounters behind inconclusive but satisfying sexual practices and a facade
of shot gun weddings. See id. at 212-15.
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The AIDS epidemic, too, has added another factor to the abortion
debate.52 Not only has the fear of contracting AIDS modified

heterosexual behavior, the disease has resulted in a significant number of
pregnancies in which the fetus is also infected.53 The prognosis for such
infants is a short life, an expensive illness, and a long, agonizing death.

This new consequence of unprotected sexual intercourse provides an
additional reason why an HIV-infected woman, and those financially and
morally responsible for the fetus after birth, might want to terminate her
pregnancy. At the same time, it raises difficult questions about the value

to*be placed on the quantity and quality of life.
While the authors of the joint opinion in Casey nod in Rosalind
Petchesky's direction when they recognize that women define their lives
and place in society on the basis of their legal abortion prerogatives,5 4
they fail to understand the full implications of that perspective for the
resolution through litigation of questions about the utilization of abortion
techniques. To grasp the relativity of the meaning of abortion and the
complexity of the situations in which abortions are sought-the
contradictory moral values, the complicated psychological processes, the
network of affected social relationships, the effect of financial
consequences of contraception, pregnancy, childbirth, abortion, and
illness-and to understand how a variety of these factors come together

differently for each individual woman and lead her to consider terminating
her pregnancy, is to recognize the poverty of the concept of abortion as

a clash of sterile, generalized, antithetical interests in life and liberty. Yet

52. See generally Michael L. Closen & Scott H. Isaacman, Criminally Pregnant: Are AIDSTransmission Laws EncouragingAbortion?, 76 A.B.A. J. 76 (Dec. 1990).
53. In May, 1990, 10% of all adult AIDS cases reported to the Center for Disease Control were
women, the majority of whom were black and hispanic women of childbearing age. A survey by the
Center showed that nationally, 1.5 women per 1,000 who delivered babies in 1989 were HIV positive.
The rate in New York State was 5.8 per 1,000. Studies show that approximately 30% of babies born
to HIV positive women are infected with the AIDS virus. Other studies show that, nevertheless, in New
York City, women who know they are infected with HIV become pregnant at about the same rates as
women who are not infected. It is speculated that having a baby while infected with the HIV virus may
result from denial, family pressure, a desire to leave a legacy, or religious opposition to abortion. For
some, it is done out of hope for a healthy baby. One infected mother who had lost one child to AIDS
stated she had never considered terminating her second and unplanned pregnancy because that would
have given the baby a zero chance of survival. Mireya Navarro, Women With AIDS Virus: HardChoices
on Motherhood,N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1991, at Al, B4.
54. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2809 (1992) (joint opinion). None of the other
Justices seem to see beyond the abstractions. See the opinions of Justices Stevens, id. at 2839-41
(women v. fetus); Blackmun, id. at 2846-47 (privacy v. the state); Rehnquist, id. at 2859-60 (women
v. fetus); and Scalia, id. at 2874 ("The issue is whether [the power of a woman to abort her unborn
child] is a liberty protected by the Constitution.... I am sure it is not.").
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that is just how abortion issues are framed for decision by customary
litigation procedures.
B. Proceduresthat Polarize
An examination of the use in Roe of traditional procedural doctrines
regarding professional solicitation, standing, mootness, remedies,
intervention, amicus curiae participation, and class representation illustrate
how unsuited these doctrines are to the job presented by litigants seeking
judicial wisdom about the utilization of new medical technology, like
abortion.
1. Solicitation and Representation
Twenty-six-year-old Norma McCorvey, much better known as "Jane
Roe," the plaintiff in Roe v. Wade, discovered in 1969 that she was alone
in a small Texas town, pregnant, penniless, and forsaken. When she could
not find a doctor who would perform an illegal abortion for a fee she
could afford, 5 she was put in touch with attorneys Sarah Weddington
and Linda Coffee, who, although McCorvey did not know it, were
ideologically motivated lawyers looking for a plaintiff to test the
constitutionality of Texas's anti-abortion laws.
One of the threshold issues presented by Norma McCorvey's situation
is whether a court should have entertained a lawsuit brought in an effort
to use the judiciary as an instrument of social change. Out of a concern
that lawyers may stir up unnecessary litigation and engage in
overreaching, misrepresentation, and invasions of privacy, lawyers have
been ethically restrained from making contact with potential plaintiffs no
matter how meritorious the client's unsuspected claim for damages might
be. 6 However, out of deference to the First Amendment rights of
lawyers who have a desire to further civil rights and similar political
objectives, states may not discipline lawyers who take the initiative and
actively solicit clients, like McCorvey, so that they can invoke a right to
judicial resolution of the political questions on their minds. 7 These suits
55. MARIAN FAUX, ROE V. WADE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE LANDMARK SUPREME COURT
DECISION THAT MADE ABORTION LEGAL 7-11 (1988).
56. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103, 2-104 (1980).

57. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (holding that states may not regulate nonprofit organization
engaged in educational lobbying activities and assisting litigation on behalf of unpopular causes and
defendants without establishing a compelling state interest in doing so); cf Shapero v. Kentucky Bar
Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (holding that states may not prohibit attorney advertising that is
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present disputes different in kind from traditional lawsuits involving
private claims put forward by lawyers who act as spokesmen for their
individual clients.5 8
Furthermore, ideologically committed organizations often pay the
attorneys' fees and expenses of such litigation and, in doing so, control
the substantive and the procedural strategies of the litigation.5 9 The point
is that by creating a public interest exception to rules limiting solicitation,
courts themselves have invited, or at least accepted, the task of resolving
complex social and politically important issues like abortion. But they do
so without providing adequate procedures for carrying out the task.6 °

2. The Request for Relief
By the time she interviewed the lawyers who eventually represented her,
Norma McCorvey was about three months pregnant; by the time they filed
her complaint, she was seven months pregnant; by. the time the lower
court heard the case, she had given birth; by the time the U.S. Supreme
Court decided the case, her baby was three years old and living with
adoptive parents. 6' Norma McCorvey already had responsibilities to a
child being raised by her mother, had an unstable family history, had only
a tenth-grade education, had little or no money for medical expenses, was
without the means to support another child, and had no relationship with
the man with whom she had conceived (indeed, for a time she had lied

nondeceptive and truthful); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (holding
that state may not regulate truthful attorney advertising that does not invade state's reasonably related
interest in preventing consumer deception). See generallySTEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHics 829-39 (3d ed. 1992).
58. For instance, Norma McCorvey first spoke with Weddington and Coffee when she was at the end
of the first trimester of her pregnancy. They had been having difficulty finding a pregnant client in the
counseling and referral groups with which they had been in touch because the women who sought such
services knew they were pregnant and wanted abortions and were not willing to incur the increased
medical risk that would be caused by the delay that even brief legal proceedings might require. FAUX,
supra note 55, at 38. The situation poses the ethical question whether Weddington and Coffee should
have referred McCorvey to such a counseling group to receive advice about how to obtain an abortion
in her circumstances, or represent McCorvey as a plaintiff with standing. Furthermore, in conventional
lawsuits, attorneys are paid by their clients on a fixed fee or contingency fee basis, and lawyer and client
generally have the same interest in recovery. In the case of public interest litigation, however, there are
several possible bases upon which a successful plaintiff can claim a right to reimbursement for attorneys
fees from the opposing party. To the extent that clients do not pay fees, they lose some control over
their lawsuits.
59. See generally HERBERT B. NEWBERG, PuBLIc INTEREST PRAcTIcE AND FEE AWARDS (1980).
60. See discussion infra part I.B.4 (noting divergent interests of attorneys and members of the class
they represent in public interest litigation).
61. FAUX, supra note 55, at 7.
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about being gang raped).62 How did the facts of Norma McCorvey's
pregnancy all get reduced to the abstract conflict between a woman's right
of privacy and the unborn's right to life? The litigation distorted the
issues into a polarized dispute because the trial court simplistically treated
McCorvey's request for broad injunctive relief as it would have treated
one for compensatory relief.
The adversarial process, as it is usually applied, bifurcates messy issues
like abortion into two competing camps. 63 Having evolved largely as a
mechanism for providing individual complainants compensatory relief for
past injury, the litigation process necessarily presupposes the existence of
a party who claims injury and seeks damages for a loss for which another
party should be held responsible. The procedures used in law and equity
were designed to assure the participation of suitable litigants, to permit
the presentation of reliable facts relevant to the alleged injury and its
causes, and to limit the court's attention to disputes it had power to
resolve. Norma McCorvey, however, was not seeking damages for losses
she suffered as a result of the application of Texas's unconstitutional
abortion laws, nor was she even seeking an injunction permitting her to
lawfully abort the fetus she carried.6 4 Instead, she sought a declaratory
judgment that the Texas law, duly enacted by a legally constituted
legislature, was unconstitutional on its face, not just as it applied to
her.6 And she sought an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the Texas

62. Id. at 16-21, 328.
63. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 369 (1978) ("The
point is ... that whatever is submitted to [adjudicators] for decision, tends to be converted into a claim
of right or an accusation of fault or guilt.") (emphasis in original): Even chancery courts that granted
prospective remedies designed to prevent the infliction of injury in the future traditionally confined their
adjudication to the particular polarized disputes and equities before them.
64. In her First Amended Complaint, Norma McCorvey alleged that she was "an unmarried pregnant
woman" who "[b]ecause of the economic hardships and social stigmas involved in bearing an
illegitimate child .... wishes to terminate her pregnancy by means of an operation, generally referred
to as an abortion (within the meaning of Article 1191 of the Texas Penal Code), performed by a
competent, licensed physician, under safe, clinical conditions." As plaintiff, McCorvey also alleged that
her life was not threatened by the continuation of her pregnancy, although it did cause her to suffer
emotional trauma; that she was unable to secure a legal abortion; that she could not afford to travel to
another jurisdiction to seek a legal abortion; that an abortion by a competent licensed physician under
hospital conditions was a safe procedure, particularly in the first trimester of pregnancy; and that
abortions outside the clinical setting by unqualified personnel were extremely dangerous and often
resulted in death, maiming, sterility, and serious infection. Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint at 1-2,
Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (No. CA-3-3690-B), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
65. Id.; Roe, 314 F. Supp. at 1220. Exploration of the interesting disagreement between the Justices
concerning the persuasion and production burdens borne by the plaintiff who brings a constitutional
facial challenge is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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statute for as long as the Constitution reigns. As unalike as the objectives
of common law suits and this kind of constitutional litigation may be, the
same adversarial procedures are used in both to select appropriate parties,
distill factual evidence, and shape the issues for decision. The result is
that the untidy issues actually faced by those who are affected by the
utilization of abortion techniques are stripped of their contextual
character, convolution, and relativism, and are presented as simple,

abstract, absolute values in conflict.
3. Standing Requirements
In accordance with this perception, the three-judge district court in Roe
v.
Wade permitted only persons with certain interests
in
abortion-pregnant women and the state-to debate the constitutionality
of the Texas statute. The court was willing to let Norma McCorvey bring
a cause of action to strike down the Texas criminal law despite the fact
that she could not be prosecuted under it. 6 However, the Supreme Court

found that, despite the fact that doctors could be (and were) criminally
prosecuted under the statute, a doctor did not have standing to intervene

in the civil Roe litigation. 67 Ironically, in Griswold v. Connecticut and

66. The statute prohibited any person from procuring an abortion for a pregnant woman, but did not
prohibit a pregnant woman from procuring her own abortion. Roe, 314 F. Supp. at 1219 n.2. The trial
court found that there was a logical nexus between the status McCorvey asserted (pregnant single
woman unable to procure a legal abortion) and the claim sought to be adjudicated (a constitutional right
to choose whether to have children). Roe, 314 F. Supp. at 1220 (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102
(1968)). The plaintiffs' brief in support of their motion for summary judgment based standing on injury
to the class, resulting from the fact that "[b]ecause of the threat of prosecution under the Texas Abortion
Laws and the consequent reprimands, etc., from various medical associations, many doctors who would
otherwise be willing to perform therapeutic abortions upon the members of the class represented by
Plaintiff Roe, have been deterred from doing so." Plaintiffs' Brief at 2, Roe 314 F. Supp. 1217 (No. CA3-3690-B).
Although McCorvey's interest may have met Article III's case and controversy requirements, it is not
clear that her individual claim as a seven month pregnant woman when she filed her complaint met the
"prudential principles by which the judiciary seeks to avoid deciding questions of broad social import
where no individual rights would be vindicated and to limit access to the federal courts to those litigants
best suited to assert a particular claim." Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100
(1979). See generally CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 13 (4th ed. 1983); Mark V.
Tushnet, The Unities of the Constitution, 21 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 285, 300 n.40 (1986).
67. The Supreme Court found that the intervenor, Dr. Hallford, lacked standing because he could raise
all of his constitutional claims as defenses to the criminal actions against him. Roe, 410 U.S. at 125-27.
The trial court had found that Dr. Hallford, who was then being prosecuted in a separate criminal
proceeding for performing abortions in violation of the Texas statute, had standing to intervene in the
action to represent his own as well as his patients' interests. Roe, 314 F. Supp. at 1219-20. It is not clear
whether Hallford's cause of action was an implied cause of action for deprivation of his right not to be
criminally prosecuted under a statute so vague that it deprived him of due process of law guaranteed
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Roe v. Wade, persons who could not have been prosecuted under the
challenged statutes were allowed to proceed as parties to the litigation,
while persons who could have been prosecuted were not permitted to
participate and to represent their own interests.68

In subsequent cases, like Casey, the Supreme Court has enabled
physicians and clinics which perform abortions and provide counseling
services to challenge state statutes restricting abortion by allowing them
to assert their standing to represent the interests of their patients.6,9

Interestingly, individual women and classes of women sometimes have not
been parties to such litigation, presumably because of the difficulty of
finding a plaintiff like Norma McCorvey, who was pregnant, wanted an
abortion, and was willing to remain pregnant, to assert her standing to

sue. 0 Yet, physicians and clinics, as clients, cannot effectively direct

their lawyers to represent the interests of even abstracted women.
Physicians and clinics have interests of their own at stake; moreover, they
cannot know the interests of women who do not seek their services.

Although individual women should have had standing to intervene in
Casey as individuals or as representatives of a class of women, none
seems to have sought permission to do so under the rules governing

voluntary intervention.
Finally, the interests of married couples in using abortion to avoid
parenthood were not represented in Roe because the trial court found that
they too lacked standing. 7' Though the availability of abortion

technology implicates different interests and relationships of married, as
opposed to single, women and their spouses, the trial court found the

by the Fourteenth Amendment or whether he was asserting the constitutional right of his women patients
to decide whether to have children, or both. Roe, 410 U.S. at 121.
68. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the primogenitor of privacy rights in the area
of reproductive decision making, the Supreme Court held that a doctor could raise the claim of his
patients to use contraceptives in the privacy of their own homes.
69. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (joint opinion).
70. See, e.g., Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (joint opinion); Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991); City
of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft,
462 U.S. 476 (1983); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756 (D. Minn. 1986), cert. denied,479 U.S.
1102 (1987).
71. Roe, 314 F. Supp. at 1220. In a separately filed action, John and Mary Doe alleged that they were
residents of Texas; that they were married and had no children; that Mary was presently suffering from
a neural-chemical disorder and had been advised by her doctor to avoid pregnancy, although it presented
no serious risk to her life; that Mary was not pregnant; that on medical advice, Mary had discontinued
use of the most effective means of contraception; that they were conscientiously practicing an alternative
less effective means of contraception; that for highly personal reasons plaintiffs did not wish to become
parents at any time in the near future; and that plaintiffs could not obtain a legal abortion in Texas and
could not afford to travel to other jurisdictions to obtain a legal abortion. Plaintiffs' Original Complaint
at 1-2, Roe, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (No. CA-3-3691-C).
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interests of John and Mary Doe too speculative to present a justiciable
controversy.72 As a matter of fact, the Does had conceived a child prior
to the suit and obtained an abortion.73 How different, then, was their
situation from that of Norma McCorvey at the time of the district court
hearing, after she had given birth, when the court found that her claim
was not moot because she might become pregnant again and wish an
abortion? 74 Did the fact that the Does had been able to obtain an abortion
by traveling out of the country, while McCorvey could not afford to do so,
deprive them of standing they would otherwise have had, even as members
of the class represented by Roe? We are not informed by the trial court's
cursory treatment of standing issues.
4. Class Participation: Abstracting the Interests
Having thus selected the legally cognizable interests to be heard, the
trial court permitted those interests to be generalized. The trial court
permitted McCorvey to represent a class of "similarly situated" women
described in the complaint as "adult, single, pregnant women." 75
Although the class in Roe was never certified, in its written opinion, the
lower court in Roe did not confine the class temporally to women who
were pregnant in 1972, nor socially to women who were adult and single,
nor economically to poor women or women unable to travel to states
where abortion was legal. Instead, the court construed the plaintiff class
as broadly as possible and ultimately eliminated even its social limitations
by holding that the Texas statute deprived "single women and married
persons" of the opportunity to choose whether to have children.76
Despite the size of the class and the importance of the issue to its
members, the trial court record contains no indication that the class was

72. Roe, 314 F. Supp. at 1225.
73. FAux, supra note 55, at 41.
74. See discussion infra note 84 and accompanying text.
75. Class actions are permitted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to promote the efficient
administration of justice where persons interested in the litigation share common questions of law and
fact, are too numerous to permit joinder, and can be adequately represented by representative parties.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure codifies an equitable device for
permitting the adjudication of those interested in the litigation when there were too many to permit

joinder. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808 (1985).
76. Roe, 314 F. Supp. at 1225. The court dismissed the complaint of a childless couple who did not
want to bear children and who claimed a right to terminate any future pregnancy through abortion. Id.
Had the court recognized their standing, perhaps married men might claim a constitutionally protected

privacy right to decide whether or not to terminate a pregnancy they conceived. As it is, the court's
statement with regard to married persons cannot be strictly regarded as a holding.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 68:269

ever certified by the court or that notice was ever provided to members
of the class (through individual mailings or through the public media) that
their interests were being represented before the federal judiciary by
McCorvey and her lawyers, Weddington and Coffee. In the Supreme
Court, the class was treated as though it were all women." Yet, surely
all women, even all pregnant women, or even all pregnant, single women,
do not have the same interests in the question of abortion. Poor women
may have an interest in obtaining free abortion counseling that wealthier
women can afford to purchase; single pregnant women may have an
interest in asserting claims against potential fathers for the cost of
abortions or, as an alternative to abortion, in securing the payment of
prenatal care, medical expenses, and child support that married women
may take for granted; poor pregnant women may have an interest in
securing a legal right to publicly funded abortion or child birth benefits
that nonpregnant women may not. How could Weddington and Coffee8
7
effectively represent all of these diverse interests in their class action?
How should the notice and opt-out provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 79 be applied in cases like Roe v. Wade? The
difficulty of requiring actual representation of a class of people as
enormous and diverse as "all women" or even "all pregnant, single
women" lays bare the fictional nature of this kind of class litigation. By
neglecting or loosely applying the requirements of Rule 23 and by not
recognizing the difficulties of representing subclasses of plaintiffs, the
trial court in Roe easily fashioned the kind of broad-gauged, public
interest litigation sought by Weddington and Coffee. But it also made the
interests of the plaintiff class deceptively monolithic.
Similarly, the state's interest in prohibiting abortions could have been
presented as more complex and diffuse than it was characterized by the
courts in Roe. As Justice Blackmun's historical survey makes clear,
abortion laws have been motivated by many factors, including:
intraprofessional disputes among doctors, concerns for women's health,
moral compunctions about terminating potential human life, efforts to
punish extramarital sexual relations, religious concerns for the dispatching
of souls, efforts to protect the interests of men in their offspring, interests
in maintaining traditional mothering roles for women, and economic

77. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
78. For an excellent discussion of the difficulties involved in representing "an aggregation of litigants
with unstable, inchoate, or conflicting preferences" in law reform class action litigation, see Deborah
L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1183 (1982).
79. See infra note 211 (discussing the requirements and application of Rule 23).
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domination of women.8 ' Nevertheless, the courts adjudicating the
interests of the class represented by McCorvey perceived the state's only
interests as protecting the health of pregnant women and protecting
potential human life. The Dallas district attorney, technically the only
defendant in the case, filed only a two-and-a-half page, double-spaced

brief in the trial court, stating: "Medical science now knows that life
occurs in the human embryo far sooner than the twentieth week of

pregnancy," and therefore "the preservation of the life of the unborn
'human organism' is a matter of compelling interest sufficient to give the
'
State of Texas constitutional authority to enact laws for that purpose. "81

Since plaintiff class members presumably also had an interest in the
protection of their own health, the state's interest in fetal life stands out
as the interest in conflict with their claims to a right to privacy.

5. Mootness
It was important for the plaintiff in Roe to proceed as a class. As an

individual, McCorvey would have been asserting only the right to an
abortion of a single Texas woman who was seven months pregnant when
she filed her complaint and too poor to travel to a state where abortions
were legal.8 2 Yet, Justice Blackmun's decision did not find
unconstitutional the criminalization of abortions in the last three months
of pregnancy. 3 Even if McCorvey's complaint were construed to assert
her right to an abortion when she first sought to exercise it, her complaint

would have required the Court to adjudicate the rights only of women who

80. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 130-52.
81. Defendant's Brief at 2-3, Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (Nos. CA-3-3690-B
& CA-3-3691-C), ajffd in part and rev'd in part,410 U.S. 113 (1973).
82. The trial court based its finding that McCorvey had standing to bring the action on the fact that
she "filed her portion of the suit as a pregnant woman wishing to exercise the asserted constitutional
right to choose whether to bear the child she was carrying." Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1220
(N.D.Tex. 1970), afd in part and rev'd in part, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In her affidavit appended to
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, "Jane Roe" stated: "At the time I filed the lawsuit [March
3, 1970] I wanted to terminate my pregnancy by means of an abortion performed by a competent,
licensed, physician under safe, clinical conditions." Affidavit of Jane Roe in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment at 2, Roe, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (Nos. CA-3-3690-B & CA-3-3691-C). If the court's
finding was necessary to her having standing, then her claim at the time the complaint was filed was
the issue presented for adjudication. Yet her wish at the time she "filed her portion of the suit" was the
wish of a woman six to seven months pregnant to exercise an asserted right to choose whether to bear
a child. Roe, 314 F. Supp. at 1220.
83. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64. Justice Rehnquist in his dissent noted that nothing in the majority's
opinion indicated that a state might not constitutionally proscribe abortions at that stage of pregnancy.
Id. at 171 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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sought abortions in the first trimester of their pregnancies, not their rights
throughout their pregnancies as the Supreme Court ultimately adjudicated
them. The class helped to obscure the mootness issue raised by the fact
that McCorvey had given birth before the trial court held its hearing. 4
In addition to finding that class interests remained at stake, the Court
applied an exception to the mootness doctrine to permit the matter to
proceed on the merits. 5 The Court reasoned that because McCorvey was
likely to become pregnant again and to want an abortion, given the delays
of litigation, the Texas statute would never be subject to review unless the
Court exercised jurisdiction even when the existing facts presented no
controversy.86 But many women are likely to become pregnant and to
want abortions, including McCorvey's own lawyers, and presumably they
would not have standing to proceed as plaintiffs in their own names. Why,
then, was McCorvey's claim any less moot? The point is not that the
Court should have refused to permit the class action or dismissed the
complaint as moot, but that by permitting the class action to represent the
interests of all women who might become pregnant, the Court abstracted
the represented interest beyond any recognizable reality.
6. Third Party Participation
At the same time that it applied standing requirements to limit the
participation of persons with significant interests in the utilization of
abortion procedures, the trial court in Roe further narrowed the range of
interests that would be permitted to participate in the litigation by not
seeking the inclusion of other parties." The trial court did, however,
permit the Dallas Legal Services Project to file a brief as amicus curiae
in support of the plaintiff. The brief set forth the importance of access to
legal abortions for poor pregnant women.88 However, while the court had
the power to do so on its own motion, it neither sought the participation
of doctors and hospitals wishing to offer abortion counseling and
treatment nor appointed a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of

84. Cases in which courts have permitted the class representative to continue to litigate on behalf of
the class despite mootness of their individual claims include Inmates of San Diego Jail in Cell Block
3B v. Duffy, 528 F.2d 954, 956-57 (9th Cir. 1975); Conover v. Montemuro, 477 F.2d 1073, 1081-82
(3d Cir. 1972); Gatling v. Butler, 52 F.R.D. 389, 393-95 (D. Conn. 1971).
85. Roe, 410 U.S. at 125.
86. See id.

87. See Roe, 314 F. Supp. at 1217.
88. Request For Leave To File Amicus Curiae Brief by Dallas Legal Services, Roe, 314 F. Supp.
1217 (Nos. CA-3-3690-B & CA-3-3691-C).
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the fetus, even though fetuses had been recognized for certain purposes
at common law. 9 Nor did the trial court invite participation, as
intervenors or as friends of the court, by other affected persons or
organizations, such as the putative fathers of the fetuses at issue, 90
parents, 9' siblings, other children, welfare agencies, social service
providers, health care workers, 92 religious leaders,93 indigent groups,

allied health professionals, and so on. Only the representatives of certain
interests-all

present

and

future

pregnant

women

and

the

state-participated in the litigation.
Having thus narrowed the number of different interests participating in

the litigation and having generalized the participating interests far beyond
the particular situation actually presented by McCorvey, the litigation
process then polarized the interests. Intervenors such as Dr. Hallford, who
was permitted to participate in the lower court, did not litigate their
claims as third parties with separate status-they were required to

intervene as either plaintiffs or defendants. Even the amici curiae who
participated at the trial and appellate levels could do so only in support
of either the appellants or appellees, not as separate parties with interests
of their own.94 Thus, through the discretionary application of rules of
civil procedure, the trial court set up the substantive issues as a zero-sum
game in which none of the parties could win except at the expense of the
others. So established, the polarized issue then became both the focus of

89. See discussion infira note 140.
90. Since Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), had not been decided yet, the trial
court might have looked to precedent to the effect that a putative father of a child born out-of-wedlock
is entitled under the due process clause to reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard before his
parental rights can be terminated for adoption purposes.
91. Parental interests in the abortion decisions of at least their minor daughters have been recognized
by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (upholding
parental consent requirement with a judicial by-pass); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (holding
that state may require parental notice, when possible, of minor daughter's abortion decision); Bellotti
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (holding that state may constitutionally require parental consent if minor
is allowed to establish instead her maturity or best interest in obtaining an abortion); cf Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756 (D. Minn. 1986), cert.denied,479 U.S. 1102 (1987) (holding that parental
consent requirement absent judicial by-pass was unconstitutional).
92. Doctors have asserted an independent interest in providing good and ethical medical advice to
patients that is uninhibited by criminal abortion statutes. Cf.United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971)
(holding that District of Columbia abortion statute was not unconstitutionally vague where physician
challenged constitutionality of abortion statute).
93. Religious groups have participated extensively as amici curiae in all of the major abortion cases
decided by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the Holy Orthodox Church, Webster
v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605).

94. See Sup. Cr. R. 37.
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the court's discussion of relevant legal principles and the focus of the
nation's debate for the next twenty years about the question of abortion.

II. CHOOSING BETWEEN THE CONFLICTING VALUES
The Court's power lies . .. in its legitimacy, a product of substance
and perception that shows itself in the people's acceptance of the
Judiciary 'as fit to determine what the Nation's law means and to
declare what it demands.
95
-Planned Parenthoodv. Casey
The Judicial Branch derives its legitimacy, not from following public
opinion, but from deciding by its best lights whether legislative
enactments of the popular branches of Government comport with the
Constitution.
-Planned Parenthoodv. Casey9 6

A. A Concept of Legitimacy
In Planned Parenthoodv. Casey, recofisideration of the abortion issue
as it was posed in Roe required the Justices to address the legitimacy of
their decision. Having defined the substantive issue as a choice between
a woman's right to privacy pitted against the state's asserted interest in
a fetus's right to life, the Supreme Court in Roe had to decide the case by
favoring one or the other. In revisiting that choice in Casey, the Court
was obliged to explain the basis upon which such choices are to be made
and why we should respect the Supreme Court's choice as a statement of
law.
In Roe, Justice Blackmun might have believed that the exercise of
judicial review rests upon the same legitimacy that supports common
judging. It does not. His search for such controlling values was the same
task to which Louis Brandeis addressed himself in the Harvard Law
Review article in which he conceived of a common law right to
privacy. 97 Like Brandeis, Blackmun searched for values regarding

95. 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2814 (1992) (joint opinion).
96. Id. at 2865 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).

97. Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy,4 HARv. L. REV. 193, 197 (1890).
Warren and Brandeis stated, "It is our purpose to consider whether the existing law affords a principle
which can properly be invoked to protect the privacy of the individual; and, if it does, what the nature
and extent of such protection is." Id. at 197.
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privacy in the doctrine of caselaw. Both strove to distill essential
values 9 -Brandeis
beginning with the common law decisions and
Blackmun exploring constitutional precedents. Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter also seem to suggest in Casey that the legitimacy of
the Court's choice between the maternal and state interests conflicting in
Roe and Casey rests on the same foundations that support common law

judging-that when adjudicating due process claims, the Court is called
upon to exercise "that same capacity which by tradition courts always
have exercised: reasoned judgment." 99 Chief Justice Rehnquist, on the
other hand, espouses a more positivistic concept of legitimacy. Using his
approach, the Court's legitimacy rests not on popular acceptance in any
form, but on the Court's institutional authority to exercise judicial review,

which was established in Marbury v. Madison." Although the Court in
Roe seems to proceed as a common law court, from examinations of
precedent to statements of doctrine to their application in the dispute
before it, the Court in fact performs a very different function in
interpreting the Constitution to protect fundamental rights.'" This
Article suggests that neither the factors supporting the legitimacy of the

common law nor the acceptance of the constitutionality of judicial review
itself legitimate what the Court did in Roe and Casey.
In this Article, the term "legitimacy" is used to mean generally agreed
upon reasons for accepting declarations by authoritative bodies as
law.' 2 Legal positivists maintain that law is the declaration (through
enactment or enunciation) of rules by those with the political authority to

98. To the effect that non-interpretive theorists like Tribe and Blackmun are paradoxical in that they
justify judicial review as an exercise in traditionalism while exalting its modernistic promise of open
choices, see Tushnet, supra note 66, at 285-94.
99. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2806 (joint opinion).
100. Id. at 2865. Indeed, Professor Alexander Bickel notes that the principle difficulty with regard
to the Supreme Court's function of judicial review of legislation under the Constitution is that it is
"counter-majoritarian." ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITCS 16-23 (2d ed. 1986).

101. Although the term "doctrine" is defined by BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 481 (6th ed. 1990) to
mean "[a] rule, principle, theory or tenet of the law," it is used in this Article to mean a principle rather
than a rule, as those terms are explained by Professor George P. Fletcher in his article Two Modes of
Legal Thought. George P. Fletcher, Two Modes ofLegal Thought, 90 YALE L.J. 970, 978-79 (1981).

Professor Fletcher defines a principle as a judicial assertion that a particular proposition should have
weight in the circumstances of the case, while a rule compels an answer in a case that we must either
accept or ignore as a categorical, that is either valid or invalid, and that either binds us or does not. Id.
at 978.
102. This view of legitimacy differs from one that finds legitimacy in the general acceptance of the
substantive values of authoritative declarations, either because they are "rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition," Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977), or because they will gain
acceptance in the "immediate future." BICKEL, supra note 100, at 239.

z94
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make them-constitutional conventions, courts, legislatures, agencies, and
so on. °3 Others maintain that a rule need not be considered law if it
does not embody, as a substantive matter, certain unwritten moral
principles. In this sense, judicial holdings are not declarations of law, but
assertions about conformance of their rules with a body of moral law or
principles that transcend enacted rules.0 4 To be legitimate, as the term
is used here, declarations must be more than simply positive law. Such
authoritative enunciations or positive laws must also comport with some
transcendent principles or values that underlie our willingness to accept
such declarations as law." 5
Yet, while "legitimate" is used in this Article to mean lawful in the
transcendent sense, such use does not mean that the legitimacy of the Roe
or Casey decisions turns on the conformance of their substance with
transcendent principles. The joint opinion in Casey seems to use the term
much as it is defined here, to mean "the people's acceptance of the
Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation's law means and to declare
what it means."'' 0 6 However, the three Justices who authored the joint
opinion find such acceptance grounded in the conformance of the
substance of the Court's decision with constitutional text and "legal
principle[s].' ' 7 In contrast, this Article suggests that those judicial rules
formulated and declared in compliance with normative procedural
principles of adjudicatory fairness (namely representation and participation
of affected interests) and regarded as fundamental principles underlying
our Constitution and political heritage, but transcending formal criteria for

103. Thus when a court makes a ruling that an agreement is a contract, it not only makes a statement,
it also performs an act which entitles the promisee to certain legal remedies. See Fletcher, supra note
101, at 974; Arthur J. Jacobson, The Idea of a Legal Unconscious, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 1473, 1475-77
(1992). See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw (1961). The question of what law is can be
answered by the positivist as a determinate matter. The law consists of rules that meet a finite set of
formal criteria that identify the manner in which authoritative institutions can declare such rules or other
standards. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 17 (1977). Positivists, then, must recognize
as law rules that they believe to be immoral and unjust, but they can urge that the law be reformed to
embody moral principles outside of the law. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 HARv. L. REV. 593, 601 (1958); Fletcher, supra note 101, at 976.
104. See, e.g., DwORKIN, supra note 103, at 22-31; Fletcher, supra note 101, at 977-79. These
theorists, then, do not urge law reform, but seek rules that conform to natural law or principles of
substantive due process.
105. For example, as discussed below, originalists offer the constitutional text and perceived intention

of the founders as a basis for legitimacy. Fundamental rights theorists offer our national traditions,
rational concepts of well-ordered liberty, and natural law. See generallyLAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 774-80 (2d ed. 1988).
106. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2814 (1992) (joint opinion).

107. Id.
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authoritative rulemaking in the positivistic sense, are legitimate. 08
Reasons for crediting judicial declarations of law with legitimacy in this
process sense are not always clear and may be different when courts act
as common law and constitutional adjudicators.0 9 While courts engaged
in common law adjudication and in judicial review can both be considered
to be making law, decisions like Roe and Casey cannot be regarded as
legitimate for the same reasons that common law decisions can be so
regarded.
B. Paradigmsof Common Law and
ConstitutionalDecision Making
The decisions of common law judges can claim legitimacy on the basis
of factors that do not pertain to the decisions of judges engaged in the
review of legislation under the Constitution. First of all, the common law
tradition as it developed in America prior to World War I claimed
legitimacy as a body of principles that could be discovered through
rational analysis and inductive logic applied to caselaw." ° With its
origins in the English law, common law doctrine was developed over
several centuries through the resolution of thousands of particular disputes
by hundreds of common law judges.' Upon analysis, the resolution of
these disputes were thought to yield general principles, or doctrine, to be
applied in the future, permitting people to order their affairs
accordingly." 2 Particularly during its formative period before the Civil
War, when application of a doctrine to a specific dispute seemed to a
judge to produce unreasonable results, the doctrine was modified to
accommodate changed conditions and judicial common sense." 3 Thus
judicial law making in the common law tradition can be perceived as an

108. See discussion infra part l.B.
109. See discussion infra part II.B.
110. See LAWRENCE M. FREIDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 21-23 (2d ed. 1985); Grant
Gilmore, The Age ofFaith, in THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw 41-67 (1977) (noting that the common law
was accepted as an internally consistent and externally stable set of discoverable principles); see, e.g.,
CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, CONTRACTS, Preface (1971) (viewing contract law as a science to be
studied inductively using cases as primary sources of data).
I 11. See generallyKARL LLEwELLYN, THE COMMON LAw TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 36 (1960).
112. See BENAmIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 22-23 (1921) ("The
common law does not work from pre-established truths of universal and inflexible validity to
conclusions derived from them deductively. Its method is inductive, and it draws its generalizations from
particulars."). For an example of the analysis of common law cases to derive new doctrinal principles,
see Brandeis & Warren, supra note 97, at 193.
113. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 19-39 (1977).
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ongoing, organic process in which legal doctrine is discovered inductively
from past decisions, tested in the empirical crucible of a specific dispute,

and very gradually shaped by its ability to resolve controversies in a
manner comporting with the reasonable expectations of the parties and the
values of judges. Its legitimacy, then, stemmed from the perception of
judges as experts at logically discovering and applying law to facts and
the notion that the law which judges applied consisted of an internally
consistent body of legal principles that transcend the rules that govern
particular cases." 4
Constitutional interpretation by the Supreme Court, on the other hand,

is not ordinarily conceived as this same kind of dynamic process, but one
in which a single unchanging source of law is applied to each case." 5
When the Constitution is ambiguous, the Court must necessarily look to
its own precedents for general principles, but these principles must be
derived in some way from the document and not simply from historical
judicial experience with the application of mutable legal doctrine." 6
Although legal scholars argue over the flexibility of general provisions in

the Constitution to accommodate changing social and economic conditions,
the inquiry must still begin with the text and the scheme of the
document." 7 Thus, although Justice Blackmun in Roe looked to prior

114. Id. at 3, 46-68.
115. This view was expressed by the Court in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) ("The
Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional
law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution.").
116. See BICKEL, supra note 100, at 55; ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 1-11 (1990); JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUsT 1-9, 43, 71-75 (1980).
But see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTTTIONAL CHOICES 3-8 (1985). In Roe, Justice Blackmun seems
to hold such a view and yet gives considerable weight to the historical context of the issues presented
and the Court's own precedents over time. Noting that the Constitution does not explicitly mention any
right of privacy, Justice Blackmun first looked to the recognition of the privacy and fetal interests in
the medical-legal history of our own nation and that of other countries, in an effort to resolve their
conflict "free of emotion and predilection." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130-47 (1973). Invoking Justice
Holmes's admonition in his dissent in Lochner v. New York, Justice Blackmun cautions us that the
constitutionality of state legislation does not depend on its compliance with opinions that seem natural
and familiar to us now. "[The Constitution] is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and
the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not
to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the
Constitution of the United States." Id. at 117 (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)) (alteration in original). The conclusion that one draws from the exercise is that
attitudes about abortion are culturally and temporally contingent, serving a number of religious,
professional, and social purposes, and that, even though nineteenth century laws making abortion
criminal may seem unnatural and anachronistic to us now, they are not unconstitutional for that reason.
Yet, Blackmun goes on to preference a current judicially defined position on abortion over a legislative
position taken in the past, though he has just demonstrated that both must necessarily be culturally and
temporally contingent.
117. See, e.g., Harry Wellington, Common Law Rules and ConstitutionalDouble Standards: Some
Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 266-67 (1973).
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Supreme Court decisions for recognition of a right to privacy, he
ultimately needed to root the principle in the language and design of the
constitutional document itself-a difficult task.'
Second, even viewed as a value-laden, nonlogical exercise of judicial
authority, law made by common law courts reflects the values of many

judges over a period spanning our whole national history and its English
antecedents. Since the realist movement debunked the notion that judges

mechanically apply eternal legal principles previously discovered and
applied by judges, judge-made law may be held in less esteem than it was
in Langdellian days." 9 Nevertheless, at some level, decisions by courts
The Court is more powerful than a common law court when it acts as a constitutional
tribunal. The restraints, however, also are greater, for the power ofjudicial review can be
exercised only when the principle the Court employs is related to constitutional text.
Common law courts are not so restricted.
Id. at 267; see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
overruledby Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
118. On a superficial level, both the three-judge district court and the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade
characterized the plaintiff's assertion of a right to "choose whether to have children," Roe v. Wade, 314
F. Supp. 1217, 1219 (N.D. Tex. 1970), a.f'd in partand rev'd in part,410 U.S. 113 (1973), or "whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy," Roe, 410 U.S. at 153, as a claim to a right to "privacy." Yet, in the
district court, the Texas statute was struck down as vague and overinclusive in violation of the Due
Process Clause and the Ninth Amendment. For a discussion of the Ninth Amendment as a source of'
constitutional rights, see Thomas B. McAffee, The OriginalMeaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90
COLuM. L. REv. 1215 (1990).
In Roe v. Wade, the privacy argument was not presented in the text of the brief written by
Weddington and Coffee, but was included in an appendix consisting of a photo-copy of an unidentified
plaintiffs' brief in an unnamed case in the Southern District of New York, with no attribution to the
attorneys who wrote it. Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Roe, 410 U.S.
113 (No. 70-18). Both the district court and the Supreme Court looked to legal precedents in which a
right to privacy had been found protected by the Constitution as a fundamental right, and drew out of
those cases a principle requiring the protection of a broad right to be free of state interference in matters
of family and procreation. The principle held that the protected right to privacy was "broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. The
Court then proceeded to weigh that right against the state's interest in the fetus to determine whether
the state interest was sufficiently compelling to justify infringement of the right to privacy. Id. at 154.
The district court found that even if the state had a compelling interest in protecting the health of the
pregnant woman and in protecting quickened fetuses, the Texas statute was overbroad in criminalizing
all abortions except those necessary to save the life of the mother. In addition, the district court found
the statute to be unconstitutionally vague. Professor Burt speculates that if the Supreme Court had
affirmed the latter holding, it might have prompted a more satisfactory legislative solution to the
abortion problem than the Court was able to fashion through its substantive due process approach.
ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION INCoNFucr 358-62 (1992).
119. Christopher C. Langdell was Dean of the Harvard Law School in the late nineteenth century and
did much to engender the view that law, like science, was a body of discoverable rules or principles.
See generally LANGDELL, supra note 110. Justice Holmes held a different view:
The language ofjudicial decision is mainly the language of logic. And the logical method
and form flatter that longing for certainty and for repose which is in every human mind.
But certainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man. Behind the
logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of competing
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in the areas of contract, tort, and property law can claim legitimacy on the
basis of their reflection of the beliefs held by a whole professional class
of people-judges and lawyers-brought to bear on changing social

problems over a long period of time.

20

In exercising judicial review, on

the other hand, as in Roe and Casey, the Supreme Court purports to apply
not the judicial wisdom of the ages reflected in doctrine and precedent,
but the directives of a two-hundred-year-old text that seldom addresses
issues directly and is sporadically given authoritative meaning by a single
nine-member court. 2' Thus, Casey does not assert that historical
recognition of rights by federal and state court judges or state legislatures
is sufficient for their constitutional protection. 22 Rather, the opinion

grounds its decision in the Court's own precedents and stare decisis."'
Third, law made by common law judges could claim legitimacy based
on popular assent. The contract doctrine that was hammered out in

legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the
very root and nerve of the whole proceeding.
Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 465-66 (1897).
120. As Justice Holmes observed, "The [common] law embodies the story of a nation's development
through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries
of a book of mathematics." OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (1881).
121. The joint opinion notes that the language of the document (the Bill of Rights) and the practices
of the states at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment are not the only sources of rights
which the Constitution may protect. Further, the opinion relies heavily on the policies supporting stare
decisis as the rationale for affirming Roe v. Wade. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992)
(joint opinion).
122. Justice Scalia reasons conversely in Casey that because a woman's right to abortion has not been
uniformly recognized by state law, it is not a constitutionally protected right. He finds that both the
document and the legal history of asserted rights determine whether they are constitutionally protected.
Justice Scalia finds that the power of a woman to abort her unborn child is not a protected liberty
because "(1) the Constitution says absolutely nothing about it, and (2) the longstanding traditions of
American society have permitted it to be legally proscribed." Id. at 2874 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part). But see Brief of 281 American Historians as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellees, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605)
(arguing that abortion was not illegal for much of our history and that the legislative rationale for
regulating abortion did not focus on interests in the fetus until recently).
In Scalia's view, the fact that the Constitution says nothing about abortion may be a necessary
condition to its nonprotection, but it is not alone sufficient to preclude its recognition as a protected
liberty (or there would be no reason to state the second condition). He leaves open the question whether
the asserted liberty is one which American society has not permitted to be proscribed. That fact would
support a finding that the right is constitutionally protected. Other statements of Justice Scalia's
jurisprudence suggest a negative answer. See discussion infra note 164.
123. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2808-16 (joint opinion). The opinion concludes:
The underlying substance of [the Court's] legitimacy is of course the warrant for the
Court's decisions in the Constitution and the lesser sources of legal principle on which
the Court draws. That substance is expressed in the Court's opinions, and our
contemporary understanding is such that a decision without principled justification would
be no judicial act at all.
Id. at 2814.
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innumerable judicial decisions, for example, can be regarded as ratified
by the silence of popular legislatures with the power to reverse them.'24
In contrast, the Supreme Court speaks with authority that can only be
popularly trumped through the extraordinary process of constitutional
amendment. Thus Justice Blackmun, in support of his finding in Roe of
a fundamental right-one which he grounds in the Due Process Clause-to
make an abortion decision, cites a number of Supreme Court precedents
protecting privacy interests in "varying contexts." According to Blackmun,
these decisions make it clear that only personal rights that can be
deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"
are included in this guarantee of personal privacy. They also make it
clear that the right has some extension to activities relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships and child
rearing and education. This right of privacy ... is broad enough to

encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy.'25

Justice Blackmun does not claim that these Supreme Court decisions were
made in accordance with contemporary popular will because they could
have been modified only through the cumbersome process of constitutional
amendment. Indeed, their particular virtue is that they act as a check2 6on
the temporal will of the people expressed through their legislatures.
Thus, in keeping with the concept of legitimacy as a generally agreedupon reason for accepting the declarations of judges as law, common law
decisions are legitimate because they are thought to conform to
transcendent principles inductively discovered and deductively applied by
many judges over time with the acquiescence of the people. Although the
three Justices writing the joint opinion in Casey invoke seemingly similar
"legal principles" as a basis for legitimacy,"' interpretation of vague
and general language in the Constitution, such as liberty and due process,
can claim no such legitimacy.

124. Although much contract law that was judicially created has since been codified in the Uniform
Commercial Code and other specialized state statutes, these codifications were not a popular rejection
of judicially crafted common law but a way of making it more uniform among the states, and their
generality was an invitation to further judicial declarations of law. GILMORE, supra note 113, at 25-27;
see also John P. Dawson, UnconscionableCoercion: The German Version, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1041,

1042-44 (1976).
125. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53 (citations omitted).
126. See the opinion of Justice Rehnquist in Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2862 (dissenting opinion) (arguing
that the judicial branch derives its legitimacy not from following public opinion, but from deciding by
its best lights whether enactments of the popular branches of government comport with the
Constitution); see BICKEL, supra note 100, at 16-23.
127. See the opinions in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter,
Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2803 (joint opinion); Justice Blacknun, id. at 2843 (concurring opinion); Justice
Rehnquist, id. at 2855 (dissenting opinion), and Justice Scalia, id. at 2873 (dissenting opinion).
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C. Evolution of the Privacy Doctrine
This conclusion is demonstrated by the history of the right to privacy
itself and the evolution of the right of privacy from a proposed common
law doctrine conceived by Justice Brandeis to a constitutional doctrine
recognized by a majority of Justices in Roe as broad enough to require
striking down the criminal abortion statutes of all fifty states.
Interestingly, the right to personal privacy, or the "guarantee of certain
areas or zones of privacy," that Justice Blackmun found "does exist under
the Constitution"'' 28 had its origins in the common law, though Justice
Blackmun did not acknowledge it. 29 As is often recounted, Justice
Brandeis, while still a Boston practitioner in 1890, co-authored an article
entitled The Right to Privacy in which he called for an expansion of the
common law protection for the emotional and intellectual aspects of life
against intrusions made possible by then-recent inventions, such as the
camera, and by newspaper journalism. 3 ' In the article, Brandeis's
concept of privacy was an atomistic, libertarian concept which recognized
certain areas of private activity and personage that would be legally
protected against exploitation by other private interests-not the state. In
short, the privacy Brandeis sought to protect was a right to secrecy or

128. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (Blackmun, J.).

129. There were several other doctrinal bases upon which to find such an expression: the rationale
in Griswold, that privacy principles can be found in the shadows of specific constitutional guarantees;
the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people; and the concept of substantive due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Other doctrinal bases, including the Thirteenth Amendment's
prohibition of involuntary servitude, the First Amendment's prohibition against the establishment of
religion, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, have also been offered as a
constitutional basis for the upholding of women's right to terminate their pregnancies.
130. Brandeis & Warren, supra note 97. Brandeis examined the holdings in cases protecting personal
interests in etchings, photographs, and letters through copyright, contract, trust, and property doctrine
to find a common concern running through all-the concern for the protection of individual privacy
from the prying interest of others. Thus, for example, Brandeis concluded that "the protection afforded
to thoughts, sentiments, and emotions, expressed through the medium of writing or of the arts, so far
as it consists in preventing publication, is merely an instance of the enforcement of the more general
right of the individual to be let alone." Id. at 205. He stated:
The intense intellectual and emotional life, and the heightening of sensations which
came with the advance of civilization, made it clear to men that only a part of the pain,
pleasure, and profit of life lay in physical things. Thoughts, emotions, and sensations
demanded legal recognition, and the beautiful capacity for growth which characterizes the
common law enabled the judges to afford the requisite protection, without the imposition
of the legislature.
Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step which must be
taken for the protection of the person, and for securing to the individual what Judge
Cooley calls the right "to be left alone."
Id. at 195.
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solitude, and he sought to legitimate
it through the authority of precedent
31
and growth of the common law.'
The legitimacy of a right to privacy as a constitutional entitlement does
not fare as well. After Brandeis was appointed to the Supreme Court, he
had occasion in Olmstead v. United States to consider the meaning of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendment guarantees of personal liberty.' 32 Justice
Brandeis believed that, like the common law, the constitutional guarantees
against "specific abuses of power, must have a similar capacity of
adaptation to a changing world."'133 Thus he argued that the protection
of the amendments was much broader than the majority had found it. In
order to support that contention, Justice Brandeis ascribed to the framers
of the Constitution the motives and concerns credited to common law
judges in his article. 134 Under this approach, the concept of a right of
privacy as solitude became not just a private, civil cause of action, but a
constitutional right enforceable against the government. However,
Brandeis's shift in the attribution of privacy concerns from judges to
framers is not supported by citation to historical evidence or account.
Such support would seem to be necessary in order to ground the
preference for privacy in the task of constitutional interpretation in which
the Court was engaged.
The right to privacy, thus elevated to a constitutional right,
metamorphosed into another incarnation when Justice Brennan based his
decision in Eisenstadt v. Baird'35 on Justice Brandeis's dissent in
Olmstead, and held that the right to privacy protected individual autonomy

131. Id. at 193. "Political, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the
common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society." Id.
132. In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1927), the question was whether, in a criminal
prosecution by the United States, the use of evidence of private telephone conversations between the
defendants and others, intercepted by means of wire tapping, amounted to a violation of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments. While a majority of the Court held that the government's wire tapping did not
violate the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, Justice Brandeis dissented.
133. Id. at 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
134. Paraphrasing his Harvard Law Review article, Brandeis & Warren, supra note 97, Justice
Brandeis stated:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit
of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings
and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of
life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs,
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the
Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men.
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478. Compare with quoted text supra note 130.
135. 405 U.S. 438 (1971).
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in decision making, not solitude. 36 Most recently, the constitutional
right to privacy (at least according to some Justices) has come full circle
from a right to be left alone to a right to intimate association, based on
the belief that true liberty must include the right to define oneself through
intimate sexual relationships of one's choice. 13 ' No matter how
compelling that conclusion may be, it is not arrived at through the same
inductive process used by common law judges, and it loses its historical
justifications as it takes on a life of its own in constitutional
jurisprudence. Even if one grants validity to Brandeis's premise that the
framers intended to enshrine a right to privacy in the Constitution, it was
privacy as solitude, not privacy with regard to certain relationships
expressed as principles of autonomous family decision making or intimate
association. These principles stem not from the Constitution even as it
was perceived by Brandeis with its common law roots, but from a vision
of privacy as it has developed since, no more or less legitimate than the
vision of privacy offered by the joint opinion in Casey.

136. In Eisenstadtv. Baird,the Court was asked to decide whether a Massachusetts statute prohibiting
the sale or gift of contraceptives, except by a physician or pharmacist to a married person, violated the
fundamental rights of single people protected in Griswold v. Connecticut. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438.
Justice Brennan, in an opinion in which five members of the Court concurred, wrote that while in
Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital relationship, that relationship is, after
all, the association of two separate minds and hearts. Thus he found that "[i]fthe right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free of unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child." Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
In the footnote to that statement, Justice Brennan quoted Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557'(1969),
and the passage from Justice Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead quoted above. Yet, Justice Brennan's
concept of privacy is not Brandeis's concept of privacy as solitude. For Brennan, it is not so important
that single people be protected against unwarranted intrusions into their homes and personal activities
(as in Griswold) as it is that their authority to make certain decisions be unimpaired by the state. Thus
the constitutionally protected right to privacy as solitude put forward by Justice Brandeis in Olmstead
became the right to privacy as autonomy in Eisenstadt and later in Roe.
137. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 208 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In his dissent in
Bowers v. Hardwick, Justice Blackmun, who was joined by three other Justices, looks for "the reason
why" certain rights associated with the family have been accorded shelter under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 204-06. He finds the principle, not inductively from the articulated rationale of
Supreme Court precedents, but in his belief that "the 'ability independently to define one's identity that
is central to any concept of liberty' cannot truly be exercised in a vacuum; we all depend on the
Iemotional enrichment from close ties with others."' Id. at 205 (quoting Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984)). Justice Blackmun goes on to note:
The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant way through their intimate
sexual relationships with others suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours, that there may
be many "right" ways of conducting those relationships, and that much of the richness
of a relationship will come from the freedom an individual has to choose the form and
nature of these intensely personal bonds.
Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
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D. The Non-Evolution of a Doctrine of Fetal Interests
One might ask whether a similar analysis of common law doctrine
pertaining to fetal interests is relevant to the adjudication of the issues
raised by abortion. The principles, purposes, and social policies
underlying laws pertaining to the property, tort, and criminal interests of
fetuses are relevant under several theories of constitutional interpretation.
For the originalist, they are significant if they can be regarded as part of
the framers' understanding of the existing law at the time that the
Constitution was ratified. For the non-interpretative, fundamental rights
theorist or natural law theorist, they are pertinent if they can be regarded
as expressions of conventional morality, traditions deeply rooted in our
nation's history, or part of a concept of ordered liberty. Yet Justice
Blackmun undertakes only a cursory survey of the common law regarding
have never been recognized
fetal interests and concludes that "the unborn
1 38
in the law as persons in the whole sense."
A common law court would have done better. Persons "in the whole
sense" is an interesting though unexplained concept, but not one relevant
to the analysis that is necessary to the task at hand. The search is not for
conformance of common-law doctrine with an ideal or fully developed
principle of "whole person," but for the essential interests, values,
concerns, and principles underlying the legal recognition that courts have
39
admittedly afforded the unborn to serve the purposes of tort,

138. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973). Justice Blacknun states that "in areas other than
criminal abortion, the law has been reluctant to... accord legal rights to the unborn except in narrowly
defined situations and except when the rights are contingent upon live birth." Id. at 161. Although he
concedes that parents may maintain an action for wrongful death of a stillborn child for prenatal injuries,
that unborn children have been recognized as acquiring rights or interests by way of inheritance, and
that fetuses have long been represented in legal proceedings by guardians ad litem, Justice Blackmun
deduces that the common law did not accord fetuses all of the rights of "whole persons." Id.; see Ronald
Dworkin, The Future ofAbortion, N.Y. REV. BooKs, Sept. 8, 1989, at 47.
139. What should we make of the fact that the trend in tort law is away from the traditional rule that

denied recovery for prenatal injuries, even of a child born alive, toward doctrine that first permitted
recovery for prenatal injuries occurring after viability and later for prenatal injuries occurring before
viability both to parents of stillbom fetuses and to fetuses born alive? Are these courts trying to
compensate families for emotional distress and medical expenses, deter wrongful conduct in the fiture,
or recognize the loss of human life? See, e.g., Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (Il1.1988);
1900), overruled by Amenn v. Faidy, 114 N.E.2d
Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 56 N.E. 638, 640 (Ill.
412 (II. 1953); Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884) (applying traditional rule denying
recovery for prenatal injury), overruled by Torrigein v. Watertown News Co., 225 N.E.2d 926 (Mass.
1967). Butsee Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946) (finding post viability injury actionable
on behalf of a fetus later born alive); Torrigein, 225 N.E.2d 926 (allowing non-viable fetus recovery);
Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (permitting child born alive to sue mother
for negligent injury in utero); Amadio v. Levin, 501 A.2d 1085 (Pa. 1985) ("Today we join... twenty-
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property, t 4 contract, and criminal law.14 1 The point is not that these
common law cases suggest that unborns should be recognized as persons
by the Constitution, either because they were so regarded at the time of
its ratification or because conventional morality as expressed in these
decisions hold them so. Rather, the interest protected and the policies
furthered in those cases might inform our understanding of the interest of
the state in protecting fetal life and the nature of the fetal interest which
the Constitution might protect directly.
Instead of such an analysis, Justice Blackmun looked to the express
terms of the text of the Constitution and found that the Constitution does
not include protection for the unborn, maintaining that if they were so
protected, their right to life would be specifically guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 142 This absolutist vision of the Amendment's
guarantees is not warranted, however, for life itself is not guaranteed by
the Amendment, as the death penalty cases would indicate, but only due
process.141

nine other jurisdictions that hold that actions lie by the estate of stillborn children for wrongful death
incurred while they were en ventre sa mere."); Sinkler v. Kneale, 164 A.2d 93 (Pa. 1960) (permitting
a child born alive to recover for pre-viability injuries in utero). See generallyW. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 367-70 (5th ed. 1984); William Maledom, Note, The Law
and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46 NOTRE DAME LAw. 349 (1971).
140. What is served by common law cases that have long held that for purposes of inheritance, a
hearing which determined the rights of decedent's children was not conclusive on the rights of a child
who was not yet born at the time of the hearing? I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 130; Deal
v. Sexton, 56 S.E. 691 (N.C. 1907); see Dawn E. Johnson, Note, The Creationof FetalRights: Conflicts
with Women's ConstitutionalRights to Liberty, Privacy andEqualProtection,95 YALE L.J. 599 (1986).
141. What are we to make of the appointment of guardians ad litem to represent the interests of the
unborn in medical treatment cases, and cases involving abuses during pregnancy? See generally In re
Klein, 538 N.Y.S.2d 274 (App. Div. 1989) (holding that strangers were not appropriate guardians of
fetus where mother's husband and father of fetus was competent to serve); Susan Goldberg, Of Gametes
and Guardians:The Impropriety ofAppointing GuardiansAd Litemfor Fetusesand Embryos, 66 WASH.
L. REV. 503 (1991). For a discussion of maternal duties toward fetuses, see Robertson, supra note 6
(arguing in favor of limitations on abortion rights to protect mature fetuses that women have chosen not
to abort); Patricia King, The Juridical Status of the Fetus: A Proposalfor Legal Protection of the
Unborn, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1647 (1979) (arguing that fetal viability is the logical and ethical point for
the attachment of legal significance); Note, MaternalRights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the
Criminalizationof "FetalAbuse," 101 HARv. L. REv. 994 (1988).
142. Blackmun notes that citizens are defined as "persons born or naturalized in the United States,"
Roe, 410 U.S. at 157, and concludes that this and other references to persons have only postnatal
applications. Semantically, however, if "person" must be modified by "born" as it is in the Fourteenth
Amendment, then the noun "person" alone cannot mean a being that is born. Blackmun also raises
various problems that he sees would exist if fetuses were regarded as persons for Fourteenth Amendment
purposes, but several of these concerns are predicated on the notion that they must be treated the same
as other persons for all purposes. The Fourteenth Amendment, however, does not guarantee life but only
that life will not be deprived without due process.
143. See, e.g., Pully v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983); Barclay
v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983).
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Perhaps a partial explanation for the underdevelopment of a doctrine of
fetal interests lies again in the procedures used to present substantive
issues to the Court. The kind of analysis of common law cases initially
undertaken by practitioner Brandeis with regard to privacy interests might
have been undertaken in Roe, but what party in the Roe litigation had an
interest in undertaking it? In Roe, the state was the only party opposing
the plaintiff's claim to an overriding right to privacy, yet the state's
theoretical interest recognized by the Supreme Court was in "potential

human life"-that is, life after birth, not pre-natal life.'44 The Dallas
district attorney's slim brief in the trial court simply asserted, without
explanation, that the state's interest in "the preservation of the life of the
unborn 'human organism' is sufficiently compelling to give the State of
Texas constitutional authority to enact laws for that purpose."' ' Perhaps
if a guardian ad litem had been appointed to represent the interests of the
fetus as a fetus, rather than the state's interest in a potential, born person,
a Brandeisian analysis of the historical and current legal status of fetuses
might have been presented to the court for its consideration. Instead, the

controversy was presented in its most uncomplicated form, as sterile
abstractions of women against the unborn.

Thus, having created its own task-that of refereeing and deciding the
zero-sum game-the Supreme Court made the choice by holding that a
fetus is not a person for purposes of our Constitution. The Court found
that one set of values or world view, that of pro-choice advocates, is

recognized by our Constitution, while the other world view, that of prolife advocates, is not. Dean Guido Calabresi concluded that by making

144. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
145. Defendants' Trial Brief, Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (No. 70-18), afd
in part and rev'd in part,410 U.S. 113 (1973). The State of Texas also submitted a brief and made oral
arguments in the trial court, although it was neither a party-defendant nor an intervenor in the suit. In
its brief, the state did not argue that it had a compelling state interest in protecting fetal life either in
utero or as potential human life after birth. Instead it argued that the plaintiffs had no fundamental
privacy right and suggested that the state had many interests in regulating abortion apart from the
protection of fetal or potential life, including the prevention of promiscuity, incest, pandering, and
delinquency. Defendants' Memorandum of Authorities in Support of its Motion to Dismiss at 9-10, Roe,
314 F. Supp. 1217 (No. 70-18). It is not clear how the state, which was neither a defendant nor an
intervenor, had standing to file a motion to dismiss. The state's brief noted that a decision finding a
fundamental privacy right to choose whether to bear children "could result in undesirable circumstances.
To prohibit the state from exercising reasonable control over the marriage relationship, family and sex
could result in promiscuity, infanticide, incest, pandering, indecency, delinquency, etc." Id.
When asked during oral argument in the trial court whether, if the court granted an injunction against
the statute's enforcement by the defendant Dallas district attorney, other Texas district attorneys would
be free to enforce the statute, Weddington replied, "We goofed." Transcript of oral argument at 42, Roe,
314 F. Supp. 1217 (No. CA-3-3690-B).
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that decision the basis of its opinion in Roe v. Wade, the Court not only
failed to ameliorate the conflict of deeply held values but probably
exacerbated the conflict "wildly,"' 4 6 further polarizing the national
debate, not just on the substantive issue of abortion, but on the
fundamental issue later raised in Casey--how law is to be made and why
it should be respected.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND LEGITIMACY IN
PROCESS WRIT LARGE

A. Judicial Review in Roe v. Wade
The inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due process
claims may call upon the Court in interpreting the Constitution to
exercise that same capacity which by tradition courts always have
exercised: reasoned judgment.

-Planned Parenthoodv. Casey'47

[T]he best the Court can do to explain how it is that the word "liberty"
must be thought to include the right to destroy human fetuses is to
rattle off a collection of adjectives that simply decorate a value

judgment and conceal a political choice.
The Imperial Judiciary Lives.

48
-Planned Parenthood v. Casey

As this Part sets out briefly, the problem of legitimacy that preoccupies
the Court in Casey is not solved by the major foundational theories of
judicial review. The legitimacy of judicial review has been a concern of
legal scholars almost since it was first exercised in Marbury v.
Madison149 in 1803. Its exercise in Roe v. Wade illustrates its profound

146. CALABRESI, supra note 22, at 92. Dean Calabresi finds such a basis for the decision
unnecessarily divisive, inspiring the losers to expose as a sham the Court's finding that the fetus is not
a person, by legislatively requiring women seeking abortion to view colored pictures of fetal
development. Id. at 92-93. Calabresi would have framed the issue as a choice between women's right
to equal participation in sex, and life values associated with the fetus. Id. at 99-100.
147. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2806 (1992) (joint opinion).
148. Id. at 2875, 2882 (emphasis in original) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
149. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803); see, e.g., Paul Brest, The FundamentalRights Controversy: The
EssentialContradictionsofNormative ConstitutionalScholarship,90 YALE LJ.1063 (1981); Thomas
C. Grey, Origins ofthe Unwritten Constitution:FundamentalLaw in American Revolutionary Thought,

1993]

SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS

effect on our governance. Historically, the resolution of questions of a
fundamentally moral nature has been considered a state prerogative. Thus
the states have traditionally outlawed immoral conduct such as murder,
theft, assault, and fraud. Justice Blackmun's substantive due process
approach to the resolution of the conflict presented by Roe preempted
state moral authority over abortion and elevated its regulation to the

federal level. Moreover, by recognizing the constitutional primacy of the
right to privacy over the states' interests in fetal life, at least during the
first two trimesters, Roe also took the moral issue of abortion away from

legislatures and deregulated it, leaving the question to individual decision
makers-pregnant women-to resolve in accordance with their own moral
precepts. 5 Thus, not only did Roe preempt state moral prerogatives and
federalize the abortion issue, it also favored individual, decentralized

decision making and moral relativism over.centralized, legislative decision
making and moral absolutism. 5 ' This diminution of state and legislative

authority by judicial pronouncement provoked heated debate about the
foundations of judicial review in constitutional interpretation.
Because it is not addressed in the text of the Constitution, the abortion
issue tended to divide the discourse into two camps, those who would

limit judicial review to the express language of the Constitution or
original intent of the framers and those who would permit more
contemporary understandings and events to inform constitutional
interpretation.

These divisions are reflected in the approaches

to

legitimacy taken by the joint opinion in Casey and those taken by Justices
Rehnquist and Scalia, discussed above.

30 STAN. L. REv. 843 (1978). For an insightful reexamination of the dilemma of judicial review, see
BURT, supranote 118, in which Professor Burt argues that the egalitarian democratic ideal requires that
the Court act as a catalyst for legislative action that accommodates minority interests, not as the final
arbiter that awards victory to one side or the other. To the extent that Professor Burt envisages the Court
mediating the interests of majorities and minorities in exercising judicial review, his analysis is
consistent with the views stated in this Article.
Some commentators have given up the search for a foundational theory ofjudicial review altogether,
finding that the efforts to find one are as dangerous as they are unconvincing. See, e.g., LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, CONSTITrrTIONAL CHOICES (1985). Professor Tribe observes:
Those who struggle to ground anything as complex as judicial review in any such more deeply
secure foundation seem to me destined to leave us, and themselves, unsatisfied-caught in an
infinite regress in which each reply.., begets but deeper questions about why the reply should
count as an answer at all ....
Id. at 4.
150. There is little question that federal anti-abortion legislation would have met the same
constitutional fate as the Texas statute in Roe v. Wade through application of the due process
requirements in the Fifth Amendment.
151. Theodore Lowi, Liberal and Conservative Theories ofRegulation, in THE CONSTITUTION AND
THE REGULATION OF SociET' 7-38 (Gary C. Bryner & Dennis L. Thompson eds., 1988).
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Although this Article cannot undertake an evaluation of the resulting
literature on the legitimacy of judicial review,'52 part of the debate turns
on the capacity of the Court to perform its unique functions, which is the
concern of this Article. Professor Bickel has stated that "[t]he search must
be for a function, which differs from the legislative and executive
functions; which is peculiarly suited to the capabilities of the courts;
which will not likely be performed elsewhere if courts do not assume it
.... ,,153 He finds the Court's performance of judicial review to be such
a function and a primary mechanism for protecting enduring values which
government was meant to serve. 5 4 Some scholars, such as Dean
Wellington at Yale Law School, after comparing the powers, functions,
strengths, and weaknesses of common law courts and the Supreme Court
engaged in judicial review, have agreed that constitutional judicial review
is legitimated by the Court's peculiar institutional competence to
contribute to an organic constitution. Dean Wellington finds that "because
it is insulated and because constitutional law as well as common law can
serve to filter out the passion and bias of the moment, the Supreme Court
is an institution well-positioned to translate conventional morality into
legal principle."' 55 But Wellington seems not to appreciate that the
legitimating force of the common law lies not in the filtering and
restraining effect of its doctrine, but in the empirically logical, historically
based, and popularly embraced nature of its process. Other scholars, like
Justice Scalia, argue that when engaged in judicial review, the Supreme
Court's only function, to which it is well suited, is to apply the language
of the document to the case before it, not to divine conventional morality
and embody it in a living charter.'56 But this originalist position does
not explain how we are to discern the meaning of the textual terms or
apply them to contemporary problems. Essentially, then, the adjudicatory

152. Professor Tribe has noted:
Saying anything at all about how constitutional choices in general might be validated as
"legitimate" even if controversial seems nearly pointless these days .... When it comes
to legitimacy, all has been said already, and what has been said is all so deeply riddled
with problems that it seems hardly worth restating, much less refuting or refining.
TRIBE, supra note 149, at 3.
153. BICKEL, supra note 100, at 24.
154. Id.
155. DWORKIN, supra note 103, at 149; Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding,60 B.U. L. REv. 204 (1980) (arguing that judicial review should enforce fundamental
values in our society to be discovered through an understanding of the framers' original intent, custom,
social practices, conventional morality, and precedent); Grey, supra note 149; Wellington, supra note
117, at 221, 266-67.
156. Antonin Scalia, Oiginalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
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civil procedures applied in Roe, or as Professor Ely has called it, "process
writ small,"' 7 set up a substantive polarity to be resolved by the courts.
This polarity sets in opposition not only those discussing abortion policy
but also those discussing foundational theories about governance, oX
"process writ large,"'5 8 and raises elemental questions about the
relationships between the federal government and the states, between the
judiciary and the legislature, and between law and morality, all of which
the Justices struggled with in Casey.
Recently, several prominent academic legal theorists have produced
popular books presenting and justifying to the public their "foundational
theories" about the Constitution, that is, their theories about fundamental
institutions of governance in our representative democracy, including
constitutional judicial review. 5 9 Each has discussed the implications of
his theories for the abortion debate. While the straightforward, coherent
style of these books and their relevance to pressing moral and political
issues of the day is welcome,' 60 none succeed in defusing or resolving
the conflict over abortion by explaining how the needs of those affected
by unwanted pregnancies can be addressed through the application of
neutral, objective legal principles. Because each is confounded by or
accepts the paradigm of the conflicting absolute moral interests at stake
in abortion, none can escape the necessity for a judicial resolution
ultimately based on the substantive moral assessments of the judiciary
itself.
In his book, The Tempting of America: The PoliticalSeduction of the
Law, Judge Bork condemns the decision in Roe v. Wade because he finds
it simply an expression of the Court's own subjective views about the
morality of abortion.' 6' He finds that the Constitution does not address
the question of abortion and that, "[t]here being nothing to work with, the

157. See notes 181-82 infra and accompanying text.
158. See notes 181-82 infra and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW (1990); JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); TRIBE, supra note 11; see also
CHARLES FRIED, ORDER & LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION-A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT
(1991); KENNETH KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA (1991); HARRY WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE
CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION (1990).
160. It is interesting to speculate whether these efforts to popularize constitutional jurisprudence stem
from a perception that the law is indeed politicized and ultimately responds to popular political
perceptions of it, see, e.g., BORK, supra note 159, at 12, or whether they are a response to the
entrepreneurial spirit of the 1980s. Whatever the explanation, they raise interesting questions about the
ability and responsibility of legal scholars when writing for a lay audience to illuminate the complexities
of their subject and to disclose the primary assumptions upon which their views are based.
161. Id. at 114, 220.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 68:269

judge should refrain from working."' 62 Since judges have no
contribution to make, the controversy must be shouted in the media,
63
thrashed out in the streets, and heatedly debated in the legislatures.
However, Judge Bork's originalist approach fails to legitimate judicial
disposition of the abortion issue because his position on the question-that

judges should decide not to decide-is dependent upon the perception that
the substantive issues to be decided are those posed by Roe. While they
deny the existence of a right to abortion as a part of a protected liberty
interest because it is not found in the text of the Constitution, originalists
validate the right by accepting it as the subject of their textual search. If
the judicial process were to distill and refine from the disorderly evidence
about abortion a different lexicon of issues, the search would take us in
64
different directions.
At the other end of the spectrum, Professor Laurence Tribe, as an
exponent of the interpretive approach to judicial review, demonstrates that
approach's inability to provide a legitimate resolution to the problem of

abortion. 65 In his popular book, Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes,
Professor Tribe accurately perceives the abortion problem as one posed in
terms of mutually exclusive polarities and claims an intention to find ways

to move beyond the conflict to shared values upon which accommodations
that respect conflicting world visions can be founded.

66

His thesis is

162. Id. at 166.
163. Id. at 166-67.
164. Furthermore, as Professor Mark Tushnet points out, the question of whether the Constitution
speaks to an issue is one which cannot be answered by judges without reference to their own subjective
value preferences which dictate their selection of evidence to be taken into account in the effort to find
the meaning of Constitutional provisions. Mark V. Tushnet, Followingthe Rules Laid Down: A Critique
of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983). Among other critiques of
interpretivism, Tushnet observes that to gain understanding of past meanings, one must imagine a former
world view and transport it into one's own-an exercise in hermeneutis-and seek to see the world
as those who understood the meanings of words and constitutional provisions would have seen it. Yet
these imaginative reconstructions of the past are shaped at least in part by our own subjective interests,
concerns, and values and thus by definition cannot claim to be objectively correct. Id. at 793-804.
Consequently, originalists cannot legitimate their judicial self-restraint and deference to legislative action
on the ground that neutral and objective principles of judicial review require it.
165. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 777 (2d ed. 1988); TRIBE,
supra note 149, at 9-20. This approach claims fidelity to an organic Constitution formed by judicial
application of principles derived from our national traditions, the basic values implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), conventional morality, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986),
or natural rights, Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798); Edward S. Corwin, "The HigherLaw"
Background ofAmerican ConstitutionalLaw, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149 (1928); Grey, supra note 149, at
843.
166. Nevertheless, Tribe proceeds to play the advocate, not the academic, when he presents a biased
exposition of the absolutist positions he characterizes.
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that neither the pro-life nor the pro-choice position is, in fact, absolute,
and that each permits qualifications and conditions that reflect common
values and admit the possibility of compromise.' 67 Yet, Tribe betrays his
own project by adhering to a fundamental rights approach (or some would
say substantive due process approach) to judicial review. 16 If the
Justices interpret constitutional provisions in keeping with external
sources of substantive values such as our deeply rooted national
traditions 69 and values fundamental to the "Anglo-American regime of
ordered liberty,"' 70 and not in accordance with their own subjective
predilections, why should we care, as Tribe professes to care, about
informing the current popular debate about abortion? Why write a book
to explain the abortion issue to the American public when the Supreme
Court is charged with the responsibility for resolving it, not according to
that public's preferences or contemporary morality or to the preferences
of its elected officials, but in accordance with the "teachings of
history"?
More fundamentally, Tribe's project is doomed because he is trapped by
the dichotomies he seeks to dispel. He cannot find common ground
because he, too, conceives of the abortion issue as the clash of absolutes
he decries."' Despite his initial recognition of the "realness" of the
problems involving abortion and the temporal and cultural contingency of
positions regarding it, 2 Tribe does not situate abortion rights in the

167. TRIBE, supra note 11, at 8-9, 229-38.
168. Id. at 83-84, 90-95, 99, 111.
169. The right to privacy, Tribe maintains, springs from "now quite ancient roots," which had their
beginnings in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925). TRIBE, supra note 11, at 92-93.
170. TRIBE, supra note 11, at 91-92 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968)
(White, J.) and citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (Cardozo, J.)); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968) (White, J.); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494
(1977); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 419 U.S. 110 (1989) (Scalia, J.)). Nevertheless, Professor Tribe
denounced recent Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas's apparent adherence to natural law
principles as "the loadstar of constitutional interpretation" because it endangers self-government in the
United States. Laurence H. Tribe, "NaturalLaw" and the Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1991, at A15.
171. TRIBE, supra note 11, at 6-7, 96-97. Tribe's concluding effort to transcend the absolutes is
provided by a hypothetical future technology that would permit the development of a fetus without the
mother undergoing a pregnancy after conception. In that future world, liberty of the woman to require
the death of her conception would have to yield to the claim of life for all and current claims of a right
to fetal life would be unmasked as an effort to impose upon women traditional sex roles and harsh
sexual morality. Id. at 225-30. What Tribe accomplishes by this flight of fancy is the conclusion that
the claim to liberty in the atomistic sense is a true absolute while the claim to life is contingent and
repressive. This is not the revelation that he promised.
172. TRIBE, supra note 11, at 27. About one-fifth of Tribe's book deals with the history of abortion
in America and around the world. Id. at 27-77. Tribe entreats:

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 68:269

many communities that make up our national heritage, nor does he discuss
or explain our conflicting rights analysis in temporal and cultural
terms. 7 3 Rather, he speaks as though it is the time and culture that
make up our history that validate abortion rights as the abstraction and
absolute that he has set out to defuse.' 74 What is important is not
whether he is right in his reading of our national traditions (if one can be
"right" about such things), but that he contends that time and culture
count and make determinate the rights that he has demonstrated to be
indeterminate. Again, his effort to heal the national wound inflicted by the
the social
clash of absolutes is defeated because he cannot escape
7
contingency of his own perception of them as absolutes. 1
As noted by several reviewers, in the end, instead of discovering
of the 6pposed
common ground, Tribe distorts and exaggerates stereotypes
76
positions on abortion and thus exacerbates the conflict.
Professor John Ely's process approach to judicial review, set forth in his
77
can be regarded as a middle ground on
book Democracy and Distrust,1
the continuum of approaches to constitutional interpretation. Ely's theory

We must see the reality that "Roe" and "Wade" stand for if we are to move beyond
the clash of absolutes. Giving voice to the human reality on each side of the "versus"
keeping both the woman and the fetus in focus at the same time, may be the only way
to avoid the no-win battle that mercilessly pits women against their unborn children ....
Id. at 6.
173. Tribe accepts the right to abortion as an abstraction of individual autonomy without appreciation
of the fact that the availability of abortion technology raises questions about the moral responsibility of
women for others, such as existing children, parents, spouses, and fathers, or their responsibility to their
future children to provide them a minimally adequate home, family, and education. See GILLIGAN, supra
note 37, at 111-120; KRISTIN LuKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 180 (1984).
174. TRIBE, supra note 11, at 111, 128-29, 138. Reviewers have almost uniformly criticized Tribe
for his failure to present the unbiased, dispassionate investigation of the pro-life and pro-choice positions
that he proposes. See, e.g., Jean Baucher, Tribal Conflict Over Abortion, 25 GA. L. REv. 595, 603-05
(1991); David M. Smolin, Why Abortion Rights Are Not JustifiedBy Reference to Gender Equality: A
Response to Professor Tribe, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 621, 659-60 (1990).
175. Thus, Tribe reaffirms the absolutes when he dismisses conditional legislative compromises--such
as consent requirements, notification provisions, waiting periods, and restricted funding-as not
compromises at all because "they promise abortion rights in principle but deny them in practice ....
[S]olutions that split the difference-denying some fetuses life and some women liberty-hardly offer
a solution." TRIBE supra note 11, at 209-10; see also Maximilian B. Torres, Book Note, 28 HARe.J.
ON LEG. 282, 284 (1991) (reviewing TRIBE, supra note 11). But see RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY,
IRONY AND SOLIDARITY (1989) (arguing against the notion that there are noncontingent, discoverable
foundational truths, such as absolute rights).
176..See, e.g., Baucher, supra note 174; Smolin, supra note 174, at 659-60; see also Stephen L.
Carter, Abortion, Absolutism, and Compromise, 100 YALE L.J.2747 (1991); Celeste M. Condit, Within
the Confines of the Law: Abortion and a Substantive Rhetoric of Liberty, 38 BuFF. L. REV. 903 (1990);
Michael W. McConnell, How Not To Promote Serious DeliberationAbout Abortion, 58 U. CHI. L. REV.
1181 (1991).
177. ELY, supra note 159.
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of judicial review relies on interpretation of the constitutional text, but it
is not the "clause bound" interpretivism of originalists like Judge
Bork.' 78 Instead, Ely reads the Constitution to be a document
establishing a system of government based on two principles:
representation and participation-the archetypal democratic values. 7 9
His process approach promises a theory of constitutional interpretation
mainly free of subjective judicial value judgments and subject only to
judicial implementation of these process values.8 0 A participationoriented and representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review is both
supportive of our representative democracy and involves tasks that courts
are institutionally well-equipped to perform.' His thesis is summarized
as follows:
[C]ontrary to the standard characterization of the Constitution as "an
enduring but evolving statement of general values," . . the selection
and accommodation of substantive values is left almost entirely to the
political process and instead the document is overwhelmingly
concerned, on the one hand, with procedural fairness in the resolution
of individual disputes (process writ small), and on the other, with what
might capaciously be designated process writ large-with ensuring
broad participation
in the processes and distributions of
82
government. 1

178. Daniel R. Ortiz, Pursuinga Perfect Politics: The Allure andFailureofProcess Theory, 77 VA.
L. REv. 721, 722 (1991); see also ELY, supra note 159, at 88 n.*.
179. Ely states:
[Tlhe "values" the Court should pursue are "participational values" of the sort I have
mentioned, since those are the "values" (1) with which our Constitution has preeminently
and most successfully concerned itself, (2) whose "imposition" is not incompatible with,
but on the contrary supports, the American system of representative democracy, and (3)
that courts set apart from the political process are uniquely situated to "impose."
ELY, supra note 159, at 75 n.*.
180. This understanding of the document eschews a role for the Supreme Court in choosing between
substantive values in conflict, unless the Constitution clearly prefers one value over the other. Otherwise,
the Court must intervene only when persons with interests in one value or the other have been excluded
from participation in representative government (and thus a legislative resolution of the issue) or such
persons have been unduly prevented from participating in the costs and benefits legislated. ELY, supra
note 159, at 77; John H. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wo6 A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920, 933-36 (1973).
181. Ely observes:
[A] representation-reinforcing approach assigns judges a role they are conspicuously well
situated to fill. My reference here is not principally to expertise. Lawyers are experts on
process writ small, the processes by which facts are found and contending parties are
allowed to present their claims. And to a degree they are experts on process writ larger,
the processes by which issues of public policy are fairly determined: lawyers do seem
genuinely to have a feel, indeed it is hard to see what other special value they have, for
ways of insuring that everyone gets his or her fair say.
ELY, supra note 159, at 102 (emphasis in original).
182. Id. at 87.
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Since there is no express treatment of abortion in the text of the
Constitution, and no issue of participation or representation posed by
abortion, under Ely's theory of judicial review there are no constitutional
principles to apply and the conflict must be resolved by the
legislature.' 8 3 Finding that "the moral dilemma abortion poses is so
difficult as to be heartbreaking," Ely nevertheless finds Roe's resolution
of it "frightening" because the woman's "super-protected right is not
inferable from the language of the Constitution, the framers' thinking
respecting the specific problem in issue, any general value derivable from
the provisions they included, or the nation's governmental structure. ' 84
However, even this seemingly neutral, principled process approach fails
to provide an adequate explanation of the proper role of the Court in
resolving questions like abortion. Thus Ely's process approach has been
criticized, first, because, as Judge Posner has pointed out, the argument
proves too much, for one can find participation and representation issues
in almost any constitutional challenge;' 8 5 and second, because, as
Professor Ortiz argues, no process theory, Ely's included, can escape the
subjective judgments courts must make when interpreting the
Constitution. 6 Judges are able to find imperfections in participation
and process only by applying their own value judgments about what
groups are being improperly excluded from the process.' 87
Professor Ely's process approach fails for our purposes, not so much
because it must necessarily involve some judicial choice among
substantive values (since on some level all judgments do), but because,
like originalism, it accepts the wrong choice. This Article defines the
problem to be the formulation and conception of the complex issue of

183. Ely, supra note 180, at 927-28, 933-37.
184. Id. at 933, 935-36.
185. Richard A. Posner, Democracy and DistrustRevisited, 77 VA. L. REv. 641,649 (1991). Because
Ely cannot produce social science data to support his conclusions about the representational issues at
stake in, for instance, affirmative action suits, Posner believes any constitutional controversy can be
conceived as implicating participational and representational questions for the Court's resolution. Thus,
Ely's theory leaves judges free to do anything: "abolish capital punishment, force the states to allow
homosexual marriage, force them to extend the franchise to nonresidents and maybe even to aliens-all
in the name of the Constitution's participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing theme," id. at 649,
much like fundamental rights theorists. Ely, of course, would disagree. Earlier, he argued clearly that
the abortion issue does not present a representational issue, for he finds that although few women sit
in the legislatures that restrict their right to abort, no fetuses sit in legislatures. ELY, supra note 180, at
933-36.
186. Ortiz, supra note 178, at 722.
187. Id. at 741. Therefore, in Ortiz's view, Ely fails to provide an alternative to a fundamental rights
approach or a resolution to the irreconcilable conflict embedded in our political tradition between
majoritarianism (based on an aggregation of individual value preferences) and judicial review (based
on communitarian assumptions about social values). Id. at 744-45.
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abortion as a conflict between two simple, abstract absolutes. Ely's theory
does not speak to that problem or examine the constitutionality of the
formulation of the issue through what he terms "process writ small."
Therefore he seeks to answer the wrong questions-those posed by a
flawed adjudicatory process. The question to be answered is whether the
judicial process that formulates the substantive issue comports with the
constitutional principles of procedural fairness informed by the
participational and representational principles he finds underlying process
writ large. Do those principles also provide a standard for evaluating the
legitimacy of adjudicatory process? If judges are to make law, as surely
they do in cases like Roe, does not the constitutional blueprint partially
revealed by Ely require that their law making be based on a process as
participatory and representative as possible?'
The Justices in Casey do not do much better than these academics in
articulating for popular understanding coherent theories legitimating
judicial review, and their positions suffer from the same weaknesses. The
authors of the joint opinion seem to understand that many question why
the nation should accept Supreme Court interpretations of the Constitution
as the law of the land. The authors took a nonpositivistic approach to
answering these concerns by not regarding the Court's formal authority
under the Constitution and Marbury v. Madison as dispositive. The joint
opinion would seem to hold that the legitimacy of its judgments is to be
found in the public's belief that the Court's substantive judgments are
derived from "legal principles."' 8 9 But there the string runs out. It is not
clear where the Justices find such principles if they are not articulated in
the Constitution. Precedent plays a role, as the joint opinion's discussion
of stare decisis indicates, but not a determinative one, as the Justices'
willingness to narrow and modify previous abortion decisions
demonstrates. Again, from history, precedent, perceptions of popular
reliance, acceptance of its prior decisions, and its own sensibilities, the
Court seems to distill an approach, if not a principle, to govern this and
future cases. But the approach is still a balancing one, though different
from that struck in Roe, and one that weighs the same abstract interests
set in conflict there. Instead of dividing gestation into three zones in
which the two interests weigh differently, the Casey plurality would weigh
the two interests throughout gestation and permit regulation except where
the state imposes an undue burden on a woman's choice.

188. See John Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure,63 TEXAs L. Rn'. 579 (1984) (urging that
constitutional requirements be more clearly established to govern civil procedure in state and federal
courts).
189. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2814 (1992) (joint opinion).
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In applying the undue burden standard in Casey, the Court seems to be
trying to find the middle ground between radical advocates on both sides
of the controversy that it polarized in Roe and to find legitimacy in the
perceived consensus of the American public favoring women's choice, but
with limitations. While seeking common ground and trying to avoid the
aggravating effects of Roe are laudable efforts, the Court is still trapped
in the dichotomy. Its perception of the issue as a choice between two
conflicting interests is again conveyed to the nation and validates the
demonstrations by both sides, who blame the Court for withholding total
victory in the zero-sum game. Furthermore, although the authors of the
joint opinion seem willing to give more weight to information about the
social, economic, and political meaning of abortion, findings of "undue
burden" will ultimately rest on the Court's substantive judgment about
how much is too much. The Court will be subject to the same accusations
that it simply imposes its own political judgment, favoring one interest or
the other, in place of that of the legislature. As we have seen, that is
where the debate over judicial review began. Thus, while the joint opinion
acknowledges the importance of the question, it does little to advance its
resolution.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, on the other hand, part
company with the authors of the joint opinion at the statement of the
issue. They do not see legitimacy to be a question of public acceptance of
the Court's role as lawgiver, but a question of the Court's institutional
authority under the Constitution to apply its language t6 the case at hand.
Thus, they adhere to a more mechanistic, positivistic, and institutional
concept of legitimacy. Like Professors Bork and Ely, these Justices base
the legitimacy of judicial review on the application of the document's
text. Any textual ambiguities are to be resolved in light of historical
practices at the time of its framing.' 90 However, this formulation
suggests that if, historically, abortion had been liberally permitted in this
country, as indeed it was prior to the twentieth century, then the
ambiguity in the term "liberty" might be resolved the other way, a result
Justice Scalia would surely condemn. Further, this originalist approach is
subject to the criticisms discussed above. Justice Scalia does not tell us,
for instance, how we are to know the meanings of the text or historical
practices he finds relevant, or how judges are to avoid their own selective
use of historical information.
The purpose of this Article is not to evaluate and advocate one
foundational theory of judicial review over another, but to demonstrate

190. Id. at 2883-85 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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how confounded these theories are by the task they seek to
perform-justifying judicial choices between antithetical values set in
opposition by adversary procedures-when the express language of the
Constitution does not dictate one. Rather than continuing to try to resolve
this conundrum, courts should view the task as an effort to create
procedures that will frame the issues in such a way that stark choices
between antithetical interests will not be presented for judicial review. If
trial court procedures precipitated more focused, better understood, fully
discussed, multifaceted (or polycentric) issues for decision, perhaps the
discourse about legitimacy would change, and we might come closer to
establishing some basic agreement about the legitimacy of the Court's role
in judicial review.
B. The Problem of Institutional Competence
The District Court heard the testimony of numerous witnesses and
made detailed findings of fact regarding the effect of this statute....
These findings are supported by studies ....
91
-Planned Parenthoodv. Casey'
[I]f a court can find [a constitutional violation] simply by selectively
string-citing the right social science articles, I do not see the point of
emphasizing or requiring "detailed factual findings" in the [trial] court.
-Planned Parenthoodv. Casey'92
In the exercise of judicial review in suits like Roe, the courts are called
upon to perform at least two functions: first, to divine the constitutional
boundaries of permissible legislative action; and second, to grant relief
affecting large numbers of people and bureaucracies. The latter
necessarily requires courts to make judgments with regard to the
desirability, feasibility, and reasonableness of various social policies. Yet,
courts have difficulty carrying out this function because the procedures
upon which to formulate
used are not suited to establishing a factual9basis
3
prospective rules of general applicability.

191. Id. at 2826-27 (joint opinion).
192. Id. at 2880 n.6 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
193. Common law jurisprudence based on concepts of universal legal principles relied little on
empiricism to settle disputes between individual litigants. Roscoe Pound, MechanicalJurisprudence,8
COLUM. L. REv. 605 (1908). Public interest litigation, though, required courts to perform new functions.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 68:269

In both Roe and Casey, the Supreme Court felt a responsibility to
establish guidelines for future bureaucratic or legislative action, rather
than leave legislatures to a trial-and-error method.'9 4 The relative
novelty of this judicial task strains traditional procedures available to
carry it out. Modern courts, asked in effect to adjudicate the future
interests of many people, are placed in the position of a legislature or
administrative agency engaged in prospective rulemaking, not in their
traditional role of creating law incrementally through retrospective, caseby-case determinations involving individual litigants. Yet courts lack the
representative quality of legislatures, as well as their authority to hold
investigatory hearings, exercise continuing oversight over administrative
programs, and create new approaches to the remediation of social
problems. They also lack the substantive expertise, the accountability to
the executive branch, and the continuity of jurisdiction that characterize
administrative agencies. Thus, the resolution of the clash of absolutes
raises serious questions about the institutional ability of cour.ts to carry
out the tasks required by judicial review, regardless of the jurisprudential
basis for that review.
First, how well can a court gather information necessary to wisely and
fairly settle public policy disputes? The exchange between the authors of
the joint opinion and Justice Scalia lays bare the uncertainty and
disagreement on the Court about how it should obtain factual information
necessary for constitutional adjudication. The Supreme Court has long
recognized the importance of social policy-oriented information to its
constitutional decision-making process. 9 As early as 1908, Justice
Brandeis, then an attorney practicing before the high Court, submitted his
innovative brief in Muller v. Oregon 96 setting out facts about the
effects of long working hours on women, as opposed to facts particular to

Class action lawsuits challenging state action, for example, often require courts to settle issues of social
policy and secure prospective relief, sometimes enjoining action or inaction by whole government
bureaucracies with regard to large numbers of people for the indefinite future. See generally Chayes,
supra note 8; cf THE ROLE OF COURTS INAMERICAN SOCIETY: FINAL REPORT OF THE COUNSEL ON
THE ROLE OF COURTS 102-114 (John Lieberman ed., 1984) [hereinafter THE ROLF OF COURTS]
(examining the role of courts and the courts' suitability for those roles).
194. "State and federal courts as well as legislatures throughout the Union must have guidance as
they seek to address this subject in conformance With the Constitution." Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804 (joint
opinion); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973)..
195. Jeffrey M. Shaman, Constitutional Fact: The Perception of Reality by the Supreme Court, 35
U. FLA. L. REv. 236 (1983) (citing the need for a legitimate methodology to prevent the manipulation
of legislative facts).
196. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
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the situations of the parties to the suit. 97 Professor Kenneth Culp Davis
later characterized these as "legislative facts."' 9 8
In the exercise of judicial review, courts are necessarily required to
examine the factual predicate of legislation to determine whether the
challenged statutes are rationally related to valid legislative goals or
whether the legislation is tailored to serve a compelling state interest.' 99
Judicial scrutiny of legislative facts which are asserted to support

challenged statutes has become accepted as a task the judiciary must
necessarily perform." 0 Yet traditional procedures used by federal courts
to carry out that task were developed for a different purpose-finding
facts about a particular situation, determining the relevance and veracity
of testimony from litigants and witnesses, assuring that the dispute is
limited to justiciable issues, and permitting the parties to present reasoned

argument.20 '
The traditional civil procedures provide only limited opportunities to
include legislative facts in the adjudication. In Roe v. Wade, the trial court
had only the state and two private parties before it, and the Supreme
Court had only one private party (after affirming the dismissal of the Does

and finding that Dr. Hallford lacked standing to sue). Neither court, then,
was enlightened by the contributions that other interested parties might
have made at the trial level about their own situations and that of others
like them.2 °2

197. Id.; see also John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining,Evaluating,and
EstablishingSocial Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 477 (1986) (arguing that social science research
used to create a legal rule should be treated as social authority and given precedential effect).
198. 2 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 12.3 (1979); Kenneth C. Davis, An
Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REv. 364, 402-03
(1942); see also Kenneth C. Davis, Factsin Lawmaking, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1980) (arguing that
Supreme Court law making should not be based on legislative facts that parties have not had an
opportunity to challenge).
199. Even when fundamental rights are not at stake, the Court requires that challenged legislation be
at least rationally related to a valid legislative end. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S.
432 (1985) (holding that zoning ordinance requiring special use permit for mentally retarded persons'
group home was not rationally related to legitimate governmental purpose); cf.Allied Stores v. Bowers,
358 U.S. 522 (1959) (holding that state law exempting from taxation merchandise belonging to
nonresidents was rationally related to a legitimate state policy). For a comprehensive discussion of
legislative facts in constitutional litigation, see Rachael N. Pine, Speculation and Reality: The Role of
Facts in JudicialProtection of FundamentalRights, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 655 (1988).
200. PAUL BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 894-95
(1975); Dean Alfange Jr., The Relevance ofLegislativeFactsin ConstitutionalLaw,114 U. PA. L. REV.
1539 (1987); Kenneth L. Karst, Legislative Facts in ConstitutionalLitigation, 160 Sup. CT. REv. 75,
76-77 (1960); Shaman, supra note 195, at 242-45.
201. Fuller, supra note 63, at 364-371; THE ROLE OF COURTS, supra note 193, at 114.
202. Only one party, the Dallas Legal Services Project, participated as amicus curiae at the district
court level in Roe v. Wade. See Request for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief by Dallas Legal
Services, Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, (N.D. Tex. 1970) (No. CA-3-3690-B), aff'd in part and
rev'd inpart,410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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It is true that on appeal scores of organizations representing a wide
variety of interests in the question of abortion filed briefs as amici curiae
in the Supreme Court, offering the Court legal argument and factual
information of which it might take judicial notice." 3 Nevertheless,
Supreme Court rules require these amici filings to support the position of
either the plaintiff or the defendant, not their own mediate positions. °4
Often the briefs amount to nothing more than "me too" briefs in which
amici essentially vote their support for one side or the other. Yet this kind
of voting is a far cry from even a Gallup poll as a means of determining
popular views on questions the Court has framed. Amicus briefs may,
however, be valuable as avenues of pluralist representation before the
Court.205
Many of these briefs have provided the Court with relevant information,
such as descriptions of medical technology, epidemiological data, religious
views on abortion, historical accounts of abortion practices, and
sociological analyses of the phenomenon of abortion." 6 However, this
information is usually provided at the last stage of legal proceedings,
permitting the parties little or no opportunity to rebut it. Thus, the
veracity of the information provided by amici is not tested in the crucible
of evidentiary rules and cross-examination in the trial court. The
methodology of studies cited goes unexamined. Requiring amici to take
adversarial positions might be justified if the effect of doing so were to
test the veracity of their information through the adversarial process. This
benefit is lost, however, when amici do not file until the last stage of
appellate review.
Finally, the submissions are not a response to the Court's need for
information but the amici's perception of what the Court needs to know.
Yet the Court is ill-equipped to generate needed information for itself.

203. For a partial list of amici filings in abortion litigation, see Pine, supranote 199, at 693-94 n.163.
See also Symposium, The Webster Amicus CuriaeBriefs: Perspectives on the Abortion Controversy and
the Role of the Supreme Court, 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 153 (1989). Seventy-eight amicus briefs were filed
in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989). Susan Behuniak-Long, FriendlyFire:
Amici Curiae and Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 74 JUDICATURE 261 (1991).
204. Sup. CT. R. 37. See generally,ROBERT L. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES,
335-43 (1981). For a history of Supreme Court amicus practice, see Karen O'Connor & Lee Epstein,
Amicus CuriaeParticipationin U.S. Supreme CourtLitigation:An AppraisalofHaknan's "Folklore,"
16 LAW & Soc'y REv. 311 (1981-82); Karen O'Connor & Lee Epstein, Court Rules and Workload:
A Case Study of Rules Governing Amicus CuriaeParticipation,8 JUST. SYS. J. 35 (1983) [hereinafter
O'Conner & Epstein, Court Rules].
205. See O'Connor & Epstein, Court Rules, supra note 204, at 36; Kathryn Kolbert, Did the Amici
Effort Make a Difference? 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 153 (1990).
206. Kolbert, supra note 205, at 156-57.
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Folklore has it that Justice Blackmun spent the summer before writing the

Roe decision in the library of the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota,
researching the medical issues he thought important to his decision. 7
Similarly, while Justice Blackmun recited a good deal of the history of
abortion practices and the attitudes toward fetal interests, he was assisted

in doing so only by his law clerks and by partisan amici briefs, not by
legal or social historians the Court might have chosen to rely upon. While
the Court's passive posture with regard to the generation of information

is a basic characteristic of the Anglo-American adversary process, it may
not be conducive to effective law making.
The primitive state of legislative fact-finding in Roe v. Wade became
more sophisticated in later abortion litigation. For example, in Hodgson

v. Minnesota the plaintiff doctors and clinics presenting an "as applied"
challenge to Minnesota abortion regulations amassed an impressive array
of expert witnesses and statistical information about the actual effects of
the law.208 In Planned Parenthoodv. Casey, plaintiffs provided the same
kind of information about the probable effects of the law in presenting a
"facial" challenge to Pennsylvania's abortion regulations. 20 9 The

plaintiffs in Hodgson and Casey supplied the trial courts with much of the
information the Texas court lacked in Roe, some of it presented as

stipulated facts agreed to by all parties. This practice of making a joint
presentation of undisputed facts and expert testimony with regard to
disputed legislative facts is to be applauded. However, only some of the
interested parties affected by the litigation were parties to the suit, and the
trial court did not have the benefit of the legislative facts as others, such

207. BOB WOODWARD & ScowT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 229 (1979).
208. 648 F. Supp. 756 (D. Minn. 1986), rev'd, 853 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 497 U.S. 417
(1990). In Hodgson, the Minnesota statute requiring notification of both parents with a judicial bypass
provision had been in effect for five years and advocates were able to dramatically demonstrate its actual
effects in a hearing that lasted for five weeks. Id.
209. 744 F. Supp. 1323 (E.D. Pa. 1990), ajfd in partand rev d inpart,947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991)
(affirming district court's holding that statutory spousal notice provision constituted an undue burden
and reversing the holding that other provisions constituted an undue burden), affd in part and rev'd in
part,112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (holding that all of the challenged provisions of the statute except spousal
notification were constitutional). Plaintiffs in Casey challenged the constitutionality of Pennsylvania
abortion regulations, which required, among other things, spousal notification, before they were
enforced. Id. Therefore, plaintiffs were required to show that the spousal notification provision could
not be constitutionally applied to the one percent of the women who obtain abortions, whose behavior
it was thought to affect. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2829 (1992) (joint opinion). In
order to do so, plaintiffs presented extensive expert testimony about the likely effects of the provisions
on such women and about the obstacles those effects would cause for such women. In the context of
a facial challenge, these legislative facts were accepted for their predictive ability, not as proof of the
statute's actual effect as in Hodgson. Justice Rehnquist dissented, finding that plaintiffs had failed to
establish that no set of circumstances existed under which the provision would be valid. Id. at 2870.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 68:269

as poor women, minors, and men, might have perceived and presented
them.
Second, how well can courts take into account the many varied and
important interests at stake in law-making litigation? Standing
requirements serve the worthy goals of conserving judicial resources and
permitting only those with an interest, and hence an incentive to litigate
effectively, to participate in suits like Roe. Nevertheless, standing
requirements hobble the courts as well as the parties, making it difficult
for them to understand the issues confronting them and to assess the
consequences of proposed judgments. In addition, conventional procedures
do not permit the fair resolution of disputes because they do not provide
notice and an opportunity to be heard to many persons whose interests
will be dramatically and directly affected by the suit. Husbands, potential
fathers, grandfathers, grandmothers, unborns, doctors, poor women or

unhealthy women who want abortions only if they cannot obtain needed
health care, women carrying deformed fetuses, and childless persons
seeking to adopt children were not represented in Roe, yet their
relationships with each other were profoundly affected by it. Thus in Roe
the Court observed: "Neither in this opinion nor in Doe v. Bolton ... do
we discuss the father's rights, if any exist in the constitutional context, in
the abortion decision. No paternal right has been asserted in either of the
cases ... .*121o Furthermore, the class of women who were plaintiffs in

Roe was so broadly defined that no meaningful representation of their
actual interests could have been provided by two lawyers, even if some
kind of notice had been given to the class members, which it was not.2 '

210. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 n.67. (1973) (citations omitted). Other courts have held that
fathers acting in their own behalf or on behalf of fetuses they produced lack standing to seek to enjoin
the abortions of the fetuses. See, e.g., Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 958 (1974); Coleman v. Coleman, 471 A.2d 1115 (Md. 1984).
211. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishes four requirements: that the number
of people in the class be too numerous to permit ordinary joinder, that members of the class share
common questions of law or fact; that the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of
the claims or defenses of the class; and that the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Parties may maintain suits under subsections b(l) and
(2) where separate actions might result in judgments subjecting the party opposing the class to
inconsistent standards of conduct, resulting either from conflicting injunctions or from an inability to
satisfy all claimants when money damages.are at issue. However, subsection b(3) encompasses group
litigation where it would be both convenient and desirable to seek primarily money damages and where
questions common to the class predominate over the questions affecting individual members. Persons
included in b(3) class certifications are entitled to notice of the action and may be excluded by the court
if they so request; any judgment will be binding against all members who do not request exclusion, and
any member who does not request exclusion may enter an appearance through counsel. FED. R. Civ.
P. 23(b).
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Without notice of the action or the position of the named plaintiffs on the
issues to be litigated, all women, as the class was ultimately considered,
can hardly be said to have been represented.
Third, conventional procedures used in Roe involved no effort to explore
areas of agreement that might have permitted the parties to arrive at a
partial settlement of their differences. For example, the State of Texas
was never permitted or encouraged to offer Norma McCorvey subsistence
benefits or medical care, to help her secure child support payments or
adoption or child care assistance under existing programs, nor to offer to
construe any ambiguities or vagueness in the statute generously in the
future.2" 2 Had the suit been settled on such bases, it might have
provided precedent for others to obtain relief. Women similarly situated
who did not want such relief would have been free to litigate their own
interests. As it was, the lower court's judgment in Roe was not based on
any common values held by the parties and expressed in settlement
negotiations. The court's own value choices were reflected in its finding
that the asserted liberty interests were protected by the Ninth Amendment.
To the extent that courts can ascribe value judgments to the parties
participating in voluntary settlements, they avoid accusations that they
have imposed their own predilections on the parties in the name of
constitutional interpretation.
What is needed is a judicial process that permits the substantive issues
presented to the court for judicial review to reflect the multifaceted nature
of the substantive policy issues to be affected by new medical
technologies, not the all-or-nothing dichotomy of the adversarial process.
Unless we are willing to pay the price in inefficiency and delay that caseby-case adjudication of constitutional challenges brought by individual
litigants will exact, but to which traditional procedures are well-suited, we
must refine those procedures to perform new functions. In cases in which
large groups of people request prospective, systemic relief against
government action pursuant to generally worded constitutional provisions,
the purpose of civil procedure should be to enable the court to order an
informed resolution of the complex social policy controversy necessarily
resulting from its interpretation of the document. Thus the task is to create
or implement procedures that will permit judicial resolution of this type
of dispute and that are fair, informed, efficient, institutionally appropriate,
and legitimate.

212. Justice Blackmun agreed with the district court that the Texas statute should be struck down as

void for vagueness. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164. The district court wondered, among other things, whether the
statute's exception for abortions necessary to save the life of the mother would apply to a woman who
threatened suicide. Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1223 (N.D. Tex. 1970), aft'd, 410 U.S. 113.
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IV. PARTICIPATION AND LEGITIMACY
IN PROCESS WRIT SMALL
[T]he law, equity and justice must not themselves quail and be helpless
in the face of modern technological marvels presenting questions
hitherto unthought of. Where [a patient], or a parent, or a doctor, or a
hospital, or a State seeks the process and response of a court, it must
answer with its most informed conception of justice in the previously
unexplored circumstances presented to it. That is its obligation ...

for

the actors and those having an interest in the matter should not go
without remedy.
213
-In re Quinlan
If we take seriously the untidy evidence about abortion as a utilization
of medical technology that takes on meaning only through its implication
of various relationships in their historical, social, and political contexts,
what can we do with it? If traditional adversarial procedures are
inappropriate for the resolution of the social policy issues the evidence
presents, what are the alternatives? It is unlikely that the Supreme Court
will abdicate its long-standing practice of reviewing the constitutionality
of state legislation, even when challenges are based on ambiguous,
indeterminate provisions of the text. Federal courts will continue to
receive constitutional challenges to abortion legislation under the Supreme
Court's new undue burden test announced in Casey. Even if all
constitutional questions involving abortion were rendered moot by federal
legislation, the Supreme Court would be called upon to adjudicate other
constitutional claims regarding the utilization of medical technology.
There are two courses. We could decide to accept the polarization of
issues in such cases, as in the past, but utilize procedures that would
confine the litigation to the specific complaints of the parties, restrict the
certification of class action suits, and provide only retrospective relief
where possible, thus developing policy through case-by-case adjudications.
Under such procedures, the claim of Norma McCorvey would have been
adjudicated as the claim of a seven-month pregnant, poor, single, Texas
resident. The relief granted her would have been precedential only in
cases subsequently determined to be similar by other judges. Proceeding
tlius, courts engaged in constitutional judicial review would imitate the
common law tradition of judicial regulation, permitting social policy
formation to evolve like common law doctrine on an incremental basis.

213. 355 A.2d 647, 655-56 (N.J. 1976) (Chief Justice Hughes).
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Such a process for the formulation of social policy is inefficient, however,
in its excessive utilization of judicial resources to try a large number of
similar cases. It is time consuming and expensive for the litigants, and it
results in a lack of uniformity and an uncertainty about the applicability
of doctrine to unlitigated situations.
A. The ParticipatoryRulemaking Model
Alternatively, courts might emulate a rulemaking model for policy
formulation. Since the problems of institutional competence arise from the
law-making functions of the court engaged in judicial review, it is
instructive to look at the procedural mechanisms that better equip other
rulemaking and law-making institutions to make social policy
determinations. In an effort to point out its illegitimacy, critics of Roe
liken Justice Blackmun's creation of trime ster limitations on state abortion
legislation to a regulatory code. 214 But, if broad-gauged judicial
regulation is an inevitable part of judicial review, and if that regulation
must necessarily be based on a judicial selection of values (as discussed
in Part III, either directly in the case of fundamental rights approaches or
indirectly in the case of originalism and representational process
approaches), then why should the courts not draw on the experience of
administrative agencies engaged in rulemaking to devise suitable policy
formulation procedures for themselves? In addition, as developed below,
a new process which renders courts more institutionally competent to
perform their judicial law-making functions may provide their judgments
with a clearer claim to legitimacy as well.
A court engaged in judicial review of open-ended constitutional
provisions, such as liberty and due process, is not unlike an administrative
agency given a broad mandate from Congress to make law under a general
policy directive, such as the mandates found in the Sherman Act 21 5 and
the Civil Rights Act. 21 6 In both cases, the court/agency has only the
vaguest instructions from its empowering source indicating the goals its
law making is to achieve. 217 And, in both cases, the attenuated nature
of the relationship between the court/agency and its authorizing and

214. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2848 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part

and dissenting in part).
215. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1990).
216. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1990).
217. One rationale for such broad legislative directives is the inability or unwillingness of the
legislature to come to grips with difficult policy choices and the desire to pass politically charged issues
to administrative bodies only indirectly accountable to the electorate.
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legitimating source (the Constitution and the Congress, respectively) gives

rise to questions about the body's law-making authority."' The courts
might do well to consider adopting the rulemaking principles developed

for administrative law making, particularly recent models of negotiated
rulemaking that seek to avoid polarization in the administrative process.
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires that certain kinds of

rules be promulgated after notice and an opportunity for comment has
been given to interested parties. 2 9 This kind of rulemaking is called

"informal rulemaking." Administrators and legal scholars have long been
interested in improving informal rulemaking by making it less an
adversarial and more a collaborative process, through what has become
known as "negotiated rulemaking.1 220 Recent legislation establishes a
framework for the conduct of negotiated rulemaking by those federal
agencies that voluntarily decide to use the procedure.22' In the

negotiated rulemaking process, parties affected by an agency rule help

218. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican AdministrativeLaw, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1669 (1975).
219. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1989). Administrative agencies make law through both adjudication and
rulemaking. While neither the Constitution nor most statutory delegations of rulemaking authority
require agencies to promulgate rules in a particular way, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) does
contain such requirements. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 4.8,4.10 (2d ed. 1984). The
APA establishes minimal procedures, including public notice in the Federal Register and an opportunity
for public comment, when an agency formulates a rule or statement of future effect that is not required
by statute to be based on a formal, on-the-record hearing. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 556-557 (1989). Sections
556 and 557 establish trial-like procedural requirements for rulemaking required by Congress to be made
through on-the-record hearings. These include requirements that the rule adopted be supported by
substantial evidence, that the hearing be conducted by an administrative law judge or agency member,
and that the parties be allowed to present oral and written testimony, cross-examine witnesses, and
present proposed determinations of fact and law and exceptions to the recommended determinations of
the tentative agency decisions. The trial-like procedures required for formal rulemaking are not
commonly required because they are considered cumbersome and undesirable for many administrative
law purposes.
220. See generally Chisman Hanes, Citizen Participation and Its Impact Upon Prompt and
Responsible Administrative Action, 24 Sw. L.J. 731 (1970).
221. Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 581-590 (Supp. 1992) (originally named
Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990); see also NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING ACT OF 1990, REPORT OF
THE COMMrrTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 101-461, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6697. Negotiated rulemaking has been used to promulgate rules pertaining to
vehicle emissions, 40 C.F.R. § 66 (1991), and pesticide exemptions, 40 C.F.R. § 166 (1992); to develop
flight and duty time regulations for airline flight crews, 14 C.F.R. §§ 121, 135 (1992); and to develop
a proposed standard for occupational exposure to benzene. The benzene negotiations did not produce
a consensus and were abandoned. See United Steelworkers of America v. Rubber Mfrs. Ass'n., 783 F.2d
1117 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Negotiated rulemaking was also used to develop a standard to protect firm
workers, but similarly failed to produce a consensus rule. Henry H. Perritt, Administrative Alternative
Dispute Resolution: The Development of NegotiatedRulemaking and OtherProcesses, 14 PEPP. L. REV.
863, 896 (1987); see Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, The Theory and Practiceof Negotiated
Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133 (1985).
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formulate the rule before it is published as a "proposed rule" in the
Federal Register. Negotiated rulemaking grew out of experience with
labor negotiations and the settlement of litigation challenging agency
rules. 2" Often, when an agency has adopted a rule using informal notice
and comment rulemaking procedures, the rule will be challenged and
subjected to judicial review. Once a complaint has been filed, the
plaintiffs bargain with the agency for a new rule, agreeing to dismiss the
suit if the agency adopts a course of action which all parties find
agreeable.223 Thus, several prominent commentators believe that

informal notice and comment rulemaking under the APA polarizes issues
that must be finally settled in costly litigation. To eliminate this
inefficient conflict and delay, Professor Philip Harter and others propose
that persons affected by the rule, who might otherwise take their
objections to court, participate with the agency in shaping policy and
writing detailed rules.224 Negotiated rulemaking is based on the premise
that the participation of interested parties in the formation of policy leads
to accommodation rather than the bifurcation of positions, and not only
produces more acceptable rules, but produces them more quickly and at
less cost.
Under procedures recommended by the Administrative Conference of the
United States (ACUS) 225 and essentially enacted by Congress, an agency
considering negotiated rulemaking with regard to a set of issues must first
assess the feasibility of negotiating a rule.22 6 Usually, the agency

chooses a "convener" to identify affected parties and interests 227 and

222. See Philip J. Harter, NegotiatingRegulations:A Curefor Malaise,71 GEo. L.J. 1, 8-18 (1982).
223. Jeffrey M. Gaba, Informal Rulemaking by Settlement Agreement, 73 GEo. L.J. 1241, 1243-48
(1985).
224. See generally Harter, supra note 222; Susskind & McMahon, supra note 221; Michael J.
Zimmer & Charles A. Sullivan, ConsentDecreeSettlements by AdministrativeAgencies in Antitrust and
Employment Discrimination:Optimizing Public and PrivateInterests, 1976 DUKE L.J. 163 (1976).
225. Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States, I C.F.R. § 305.824
(1992) [hereinafter ACUS Recommendations].
226. See Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, 5 U.S.C. § 583 (Supp. 1992). Under § 583, the
agency is to consider the need for a rule, whether there are a limited number of identifiable interests that
will be significantly affected by the rule, and the reasonable likelihood that a committee can be
convened with a balanced representation of persons who can adequately represent the identified interests
and who are willing to negotiate in good faith to reach a consensus.
227. ADMiNISTRATIvE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING
SOURCEBOOK, 97 (1990) [hereinafter ACUS]; 5 U.S.C. § 583(b). Sometimes such a convener has been
a disinterested person within the agency, and sometimes it has been a private organization with whom
the agency contracts. ACUS, supra,at 98. The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, which establishes
a framework for voluntary negotiated rulemaking by agencies, provides that the agency should consider
the convener's report and publish notice in the FederalRegister announcing the intention to establish
a rulemaking committee, the subject of the rule to be developed, a list of the interests affected, a list
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publishes a notice in the Federal Register indicating the agency's
intention to engage in negotiated rulemaking, seeking comments on the
proposal, and inviting applications for additions to the proposed
rulemaking committee.2 8 Some commentators have argued that agencies
should provide funds to finance factual research and hire staff to support
the parties in their negotiations, so that all affected interest groups,
including those with few financial resources, can participate. 9 Often
the agency agrees to publish the negotiated consensus rule in the Federal
Register as a proposed rule. 230 In addition to identifying affected
interests, the convener may conduct pre-negotiation training and
orientation sessions for participants and usually supervises fact-finding
activities and the acquisition of technical advice.23 ' The rulemaking
committee's objective is to bargain out a consensus rule that the agency
and all participants2" will agree is better than the rule they might get

of persons to represent those interests, a proposed agenda, a target date for publication of a proposed
rule, and a description of the administrative support to be made available. See 5 U.S.C. § 583.
228. 5 U.S.C. § 584.
229. See Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual
Framework, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1256, 1347 (1981); H.R. REE. No. 101-461, supra note 221 (noting that
groups of social security beneficiaries may need special resources to engage in negotiated rulemaking).
But see Pacific Legal Foundation v. Goyan, 664 F.2d 1221, 1227 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that agency
may not fund public participation in a proceeding without express congressional authorization).
230. ACUS Recommendations, supra note 225, 1 13; ACUS, supranote 227, at 97-105. Subsections
583(a)(6) and (7) of the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act provide that the agency shall consider
whether "the agency has adequate resources and is willing to commit such resources, including technical
assistance, to the committee," and whether "the agency ...will use the consensus of the committee with
respect to the proposed rule as the basis for the rule proposed by the agency for notice and comment."
5 U.S.C. § 583(a)(6), (7).
231. See, e.g., Environmental Protection Agency Notice of Open Meetings of the Negotiated
Rulemaking Advisory Committee on New Source Performance Standards for Residential Wood
Combustion Units, 51 Fed. Reg. 18,661 (1986), 51 Fed. Reg. 23,468 (1986); ACUS, supra note 227,
at 187-96 (proposing a "resource pool" to fund research and the participation of parties otherwise unable
to participate).
232. The agency may participate in the negotiations as a kind of disinterested referee protecting the
public interest in negotiations between affected private interests, as it has in some environmental
rulemaking proceedings. Alternatively, an agency may actively participate as an interested party to
ensure that the proposed rule is consistent with statutory requirements and is administratively feasible.
The agency reserves a veto power over any consensus rule, a power inherent in its legislative authority
to promulgate the final rule. See Susskind & McMahon, supra note 221, at 158. The Administrative
Dispute Resolution Act makes such participation necessary to its model and provides so in § 586(b):
The person or persons representing the agency on a negotiated rulemaking committee shall
participate in the deliberations and activities of the committee with the same rights and
responsibilities as other members of the committee, and shall be authorized to fully represent
the agency in the discussions and negotiations of the committee.
5 U.S.C. § 586(b).
It is important that the agency assure that it can effectively administer the rules it proposes. For a
discussion of several recent examples of the Social Security Administration's failure to do so, see
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through litigation.233 Typically, the proposed rule will be published by
the agency for comment, and because most of the interested parties were
involved in the drafting, the final rule will usually be very similar to the
one proposed by the committee, unless the agency receives unanticipated
responses during the period for public comment.234 Courts would do well
to consider adopting similar principles and procedures in order to resolve
complex policy disputes affecting large numbers of people in a more
deliberate, consensual, and informed way.
Certain essential conditions must be present if negotiated rulemaking is
to be successful. The ACUS recommends that the rulemaking committee
consist of a limited number of interested parties who believe that they
may have more to gain from negotiating a consensus rule than pursing
litigation, and who have a number of specific interests that can be traded
off in the negotiations.2 35 In addition, parties must share fundamental
values at some level or they will not be successful in finding a common
basis for their agreement.236 This precondition to successful negotiation
among interested parties may be especially problematic in the abortion
context.2 37
Advocates of negotiated rulemaking maintain that the overall costs of
negotiated rulemaking are lower than the costs of conventional rulemaking
because interested parties can often avoid duplicative research by
cooperatively developing information needed to settle the policy at
issue; 238 there are fewer incentives for parties to posture and to engage
in fact-finding in order to position themselves for future court challenges;
policy positions do not become radical and polarized; consensus rules are
developed faster under agency-imposed deadlines; and parties agreeing to
consensus rules are less likely to challenge them, thus reducing the
likelihood of expensive, protracted litigation.239
Negotiated rules are regarded by proponents as more accurate because
they take into account information provided through a cooperative process

MARTHA DERTHICK, AGENCY UNDER STREss 3-7, 22-48 (1990).

233. Section 582(2) of the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act defines consensus as "unanimous
concurrence among the interests represented on a negotiated rulemaking committee ... unless such
committee (A) agrees to define such term to mean a general but not unanimous concurrence; or (B)
agrees upon another specified definition." 5 U.S.C. § 582(2).
234. 5 U.S.C. § 553. In several instances, negotiated rulemaking has failed to produce a consensus,
and agencies have proceeded with informal rulemaking. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v.
Rubber Mfrs. Ass'n., 783 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
235. ACUS Recommendations, supra note 225, 4; see Harter, supra note 222, at 50.
236. Harter, supra note 222; Susskind & MeMahon, supra note 221, at 139.
237. See discussion infra at notes 301-03 and accompanying text.
238. See Harter, supra note 222, at 55-56.
239. See generally id. at 28-3 1.
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consented to by all parties and supervised by the convener. More
importantly, the negotiation process also takes into account the policy
positions of affected people, which has not been the case in agencydominated notice and comment rulemaking and litigation. This quality of
negotiated rulemaking adds legitimacy to the resulting rule, based on
notions of notice, pluralism, participatory government, respect for affected
interests, and agency expertise. With regard to reforms in the
administrative process, Professor Stewart noted that:
So long as controversies remained bipolar in form and
character-citizen versus the government-it remained possible to
conceive of administrative law as a means of resolving conflicting
claims of governmental power and private autonomy. However, the
expansion of the traditional model to include a broader universe of
relevant affected interests has transformed the structure of
administrative litigation and deprived the simple notion of restraining
government power of much of its utility. In multipolar controversies,
demarcation of distinct spheres of governmental and private
competency may no longer be feasible, and the non-assertion of
government
240 authority may be itself a decision among competing
interests.
Similar observations could be made about judicial resolution of
constitutional challenges to abortion regulation.
While courts are not administrative agencies and should not try to be,
some of the conditions that make negotiated rulemaking an appealing
device for the promulgation of rules of general applicability pertain to
judicial adjudication as well. As noted earlier, judges must address the
need to depolarize issues, to avoid subsequent litigation, to obtain
information, and to take account of the values of affected interests when
they engage in law making as part of judicial review.
B. The ParticipatoryAdjudication Model
What would it be like if courts adopted principles of administrative
rulemaking-notice to affected persons, representation of their interests,
participation in policy formulation, and consensus or authoritative

240. Stewart, supra note 218, at 1756 (exploring the extent to which expanded notions of standing

have developed in administrative adjudication to permit broad participation in policy making). See
generally Ernest Gellhom, PublicParticipationin AdministrativeProceedings,81 YALE L.J. 359 (1972);
Hanes, supranote 220 (recognizing the tension between enhanced public participation and prompt public
action); Richard B. Stewart &Cass R. Sunstein, PublicProgramsand PrivateRights, 95 HARV. L. REv.
1193 (1982).
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arbitration? Suppose, just suppose, that the trial court in Roe v. Wade had
foreseen the full consequences of the case that began with Norma
McCorvey and ended with attempts to amend the Constitution and the
bombing of abortion clinics. Suppose the trial court had adopted
procedures that permitted or even encouraged representatives of women
with different interests in terminating their pregnancies to intervene in the
litigation. Suppose the'court had ordered the broad class of all single and
married pregnant women to be divided into subclasses and their members
notified of their representation in the litigation at least by publication.
Suppose, in addition, the court had appointed and required the joint
funding of a special master to establish joint fact-finding procedures and
had invited knowledgeable amici curiae to participate. And suppose the
court had appointed a special master or magistrate to act as a facilitator
or mediator to encourage those who would be affected by the court's
disposition of the issues to find areas of agreement and to settle at least
some of their differences, such as discussing ways to develop certain
kinds of assistance that would make abortion less a necessity and more an
alternative for many women.241
Such procedures would have had several objectives: first, to broaden
participation in the litigation by recognizing more parties, including public
entities, in the interest of fairness; second, to obtain reliable and relevant
information about the subject of litigation, in the interest of
reasonableness; third, to provide a means of settling related policy issues
in a single proceeding, in the interest of efficiency; and fourth, to
encourage the parties to engage in good faith efforts to settle their
differences on the basis of shared values so that, to the greatest extent
possible, the values embodied in a consent decree or the court's judgment
are those of the parties and not the judge, in the interest of legitimacy. To
a court engaged in interpreting general constitutional provisions, these
procedures would have several advantages over the conventional adversary
process.

1. Broadening Participation in the Interest of Fairness
Given the reality that judicial review will continue to be an important
function of the Court and that it necessarily entails basic policy
determinations, the Court would be wise to emulate a deliberative, law-

.241. Courts can also resolve disputes by facilitating settlements, designating other decision makers,
and by designing the process rules for other, nonjudicial agencies. See generally THE ROLE OF CouTs,
supra note 193.
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making model for performing that function. In some respects, the
procedures recommended here can be seen as an effort to create a minilegislature within a court, a representational process for putting social
policy into law. Insofar as the proposed reforms would facilitate the
reflection in policy formulation of a variety of interests that exist in the
larger political body, they are such an effort. The process recommended
here would require courts to take affected interests into account by
including them in deliberations and listening to their positions before
formulating policy prescriptions. The approximation would be imperfect,
however, since practical limitations would restrict the number of interests
to be represented. In addition, unlike legislation, the social policy
embodied in a judicial decision need not accommodate all interests
represented, though courts should encourage the parties to do so by
agreement.
The procedural rules regarding standing, mootness, and intervention
have traditionally been used to define legally cognizable interests
narrowly and to exclude from participation many parties with actual, and
sometimes substantial, interests in the resolution of the conflict.242
These rules help to assure that courts will not render advisory opinions,
that courts will exercise their powers only to settle real cases and
controversies, and that parties before the courts will have an interest in
vigorously litigating their claims. However, a less restrictive application
of those rules would reflect the fact that questions involving the
application of new medical technology (such as abortion, genetic
screening, organ transplantation, new reproductive techniques, or life
sustaining treatments) are not bifurcated, but are complex situations
affecting a variety of relationships not easily reformulated by judicial
decisions. They may well reflect what Professor Lon Fuller has called the
"polycentric" nature of the disputes, such as those submitted for judicial
resolution in modern public law litigation.2 43 As Professor Eisenberg
observed, "many legal problems seem nonpolycentric only because the

242. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (finding that interests of
private plaintiff challenging affirmative action plan did not represent the views of all individuals affected
by the court's judgment). For a discussion of similar observations with regard to litigation brought under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see Maimon Schwarzschild, PublicLaw By PrivateBargain:
Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness of Negotiated InstitutionalReform, 1984 DuKE L.J. 887,
889 (1984).
243. According to Fuller, polycentric disputes involve problems presenting a number of related issues
("interacting points of influence"), the resolution of any one of which depends on a resolution of the
others (requiring spontaneous and informal collaboration, shifting its forms with the task at hand). Fuller,
supra note 63, at 395. That quality was shared by many of the institutional reform problems presented
to courts in the 1970s and 1980s. See supra note 8.
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common law solves them by treating as 'irrelevant' a number of
circumstances and ramifications that might be considered perfectly
relevant at other times or places."24' 4
Representation of persons with many different interests in the litigation
not only informs the court of their experience and perspectives but
increases perceptions of the fairness of the proceeding and its result.245
Individuals excluded from such suits will not be directly bound by the
court's decree under the doctrine of res judicata, 2" but the stare decisis
effect of the judgment may have the same practical effect. Thus, providing
them with an opportunity to make some input into the disposition of their
interests comports with our notions of fair adjudication. The significant
effect of broad prospective judgments of courts exercising judicial review
on interests now excluded from participation would seem to justify, indeed
require, the loosening of procedural restrictions on participation in such
suits.

24 7

In addition to participation, the negotiated rulemaking model of public
law adjudication will most often require that persons with affected
interests participate through representatives. Representation of the
interests of unorganized individuals in litigation is most often
accomplished through class actions, and courts have considerable
experience policing representation through the class action device. If
interested individuals are members of a class in a class action lawsuit,
they are subject to the final adjudication of their interests in judgments
that will be applied as res judicata in subsequent litigation of those same
interests. 4 8 Very often, individual class members are not members of

244. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Participation,Responsiveness, and the ConsultativeProcess: An Essay
for Lon Fuller,92 HARV. L. REV. 410, 424 (1978).
245. See infra notes 262-67 and accompanying text.
246. Where there has been a consent decree, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not preclude
subsequent suits by persons not parties to the decree from challenging the decree entered into by the
defendant in a prior action and involving the subject matter of the subsequent suit. Martin v. Wilks, 490
U.S. 755 (1989). This decision is contrary to prior rulings by some federal appellate courts that
nonaggrieved employees in employment discrimination disputes who failed to intervene, or who were
denied intervention, could not subsequently attack the decree in a separate action. See, e.g., Thaggard
v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 900 (1983); Dianna Rohleder
Mans, CivilProcedure:Consent Decreesand the Doctrineof "ImpermissibleCollateralAttack" [Martin
v. Wilkes, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989)], 29 WASHBURN LJ. 475, 476-77 (1990).
247. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit the voluntary intervention of persons to be affected
by the remedy in a suit brought by others. FED. R. Civ. P. 24; Berkman v. City of New York, 705 F.2d
584,588 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,484 U.S. 848 (1987). The involuntaryjoinder of parties considered
necessary to the provision of complete relief to existing parties is also permitted. FED. R. CIv. P. 19(a);
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 400 (1982). Also, the court can invite interested persons
and groups to participate as amici curiae. FED. R. App. P. 29.
248. See, e.g., Dosier v. Miami Valley Broadcasting Corp., 656 F.2d 1295, 1299 (9th Cir. 1981)
(binding members of the class provided they were adequately represented); Fowler v. Birmingham News
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an organized association or corporation, but are identifiable only by the
similarity of their relationship with the defendant 49 and the similarity
of their interests with those of the named plaintiff. Usually these interests
are not sufficiently great to justify the expenses of litigation as an
individual. 2 0 Because the individual named plaintiff and his or her
attorneys are distinct from those on whose behalf the action is brought,
there is the danger that class members will not be adequately
represented.2 5' Ideologically motivated attorneys, many of whom work
with organizations with predetermined litigation programs, may
consciously or unconsciously subordinate the interests of class members
or subgroups of class members to their political agendas. 5 2 In addition,
classes as defined by the named plaintiff may be underinclusive in failing
to take into account all those who share common interests in the subject
of the suit, or overinclusive in purporting to represent divergent interests
or those who differ with the named plaintiffs and lead attorneys on the
merits of the controversy, those who wish to assert different claims
against the defendant, or those who seek different relief from that sought
by the named plaintiff and others in the class.
Representation of class members' interests should be sought through
publication of notice to the class-an element of Rule 23 that is not
always considered.25 3 If the idea of publishing notices in newspapers to
inform women that their rights are being finally adjudicated in a class
action lawsuit such as Roe seems inappropriate, it may be because we
actually regard the class action as a fiction, merely a procedural device
for obtaining a broad pronouncement of judicially formulated social
Co., 608 F.2d 1055, 1058 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that a judgment in class action extinguished all
claims which were or might have been made on behalf of class members). See generally 7A CHARLES
A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1789 (1972) (discussing

effect of actions under Rule 23).
249. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2); PROPOSED RULES OF CiviL PROCEDURE, 39 F.RtD. 69, 102 (1966)
(advisory committee's notes to Proposed Rule 23). Thus, class plaintiffs in suits challenging
governmental action are defined inpart by the jurisdictional authority of the defendant. According to
this reasoning, since Roe sued only Wade, the Dallas District Attorney, and not the Texas State
Attorney, the plaintiff class ought to have been limited to Dallas residents.
250. See Note, Developments in the Lan-ClassActions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1324-25 (1976);
Special Project: The RemedialProcess in InstitutionalReform Litigation, 78 COL. L. REv. 784, 873-75
(1978) [hereinafter Special Project).
251. See generally Note, supra note 250, at 1416-38.
252. Special Project,supra note 250, at 883-87; Stewart, supra note 218, at 1765-66.
253. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(3) requires notice to the class members in certain kinds of class actions,
for example, those certified under subsection (b)(3). See discussion supranote 211. As noted above, no
certification motion was submitted in Roe and .no notice was given to the class. Nevertheless, the
litigation was characterized as a class action by both the trial court and the Supreme Court. Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 122 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1223 (1970).
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policy. Commentators have recommended that, in class action lawsuits,
courts should conduct an investigation early in the litigation to determine
divergent interests within the asserted class, and where conflicts within
the class seem likely, that members should be notified, not simply of the
pendency of the suit, but of class preferences, and that seriously
conflicted subclasses should be represented by separate attorneys.254 The
court's authority to certify classes provides it with a mechanism for
conditioning certification on modifications of the class definition, the
creation of subclasses, and subsequent periodic notice on the progress of
litigation to the class. In addition, the court may permit intervention as of
right to disaffected class members. 2"
Finally, the interests of subclasses most often conflict at the remedial
stages of litigation.256 Where the injunctive relief sought is of a complex
nature, as it proved to be under Justice Blackmun's trimester system,
represented subgroups of the class should be given opportunities to
articulate and assert their particular objectives and to negotiate their
individualized interests in order to build a satisfactory overall settlement.
Although the ability of the court to predict the interests of subgroups
becomes more difficult as the remedy sought becomes more complex (and
hence the court is less able to predict the need for subclass
representation),257 the members of the class can exercise their Rule
23(c) right to exclude themselves from the judgment or seek other
counsel. They may effectively do so, however, only if they are informed
of how their interests are perceived and asserted by the named plaintiffs
at the remedial stage.25 8 Without such notice, the silent consent of
members to representation can hardly be said to be informed. Especially
where class representatives propose consent decrees, class members and
others who will be affected by the decree should be notified and invited
259
to comment upon it.

254. Rhode, supra note 78, at 1197-99.

255. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a); see, e.g., Trbovich v. UMW, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972); Nuesse v.
Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1967). But see, e.g., Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531
(1971) (holding that taxpayer's interest in case not sufficient to permit intervention); Jefferson County
Say. Bank v. Caparra Gardens Highland Dev. Corp., 53 F.R.D. 178 (D.P.R. 1971) (denying applicant's

motion for leave to intervene because applicant's claim raised new issue).
256. See, e.g., cases cited in Rhode, supra note 78, at 1187-89 nn.14-22; Special Project,supra note
250, at 889.
257. See, eg., cases cited in Rhode, supra note 78, at 1187-89 nn.14-22.
258. For a discussion of a district court judge's creativity in providing notice to a proposed class of
tens of thousands of potential plaintiffs in mass tort litigation, see Ellen Tannenbaum, Note, The PrattWeinstein Approach to Mass Tort Litigation,52 BROoKLYN L. REv. 455, 466-67 (1986).
259. Schwarzschild, supra note 242, at 929-34.
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The use of such extended participation has been employed in some
institutional reform litigation, sometimes called "public law litigation," in
which class action suits are brought against large public or private
institutions, such as hospitals, to obtain systemic reforms. ° In several
such suits, trial courts have actively sought the participation of
professional, patient, and family groups, at least at the remedial stage of
litigation. 26' Amici curiae and expert witnesses have presented testimony
in court or have participated with the parties in formulating remedial
decrees. These participants not only have informed the court of
professional standards and concerns; they also have presented the views
of a wide variety of other affected groups, such as service providers,
relatives, and patient subgroups, before the court issued a judgment and
order which directly affected them.2 62 Notions of fairness based on

260. Chayes, supra note 8, at 1284; Rudenstine, supra note 8; see, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S.
678 (1978) (creating a detailed remedial order directed at state prison system); Welsch v. Likins, 550
F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977) (requiring minimum constitutional standards for in-state facility for mentally
retarded if the state chose to operate one); Milliken v. Bradley, 402 F. Supp. 1096 (6th Cir. 1975)
(designing decree to implement desegregation in education); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1974) (holding that civilly committed mental patients have a constitutional right to treatment, to be
implemented by courts). With regard to remedial devices for affecting reform, see generally Special
Project, supra note 250; Fiss, supra note 8; Sttsan P: Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law
Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355 (1991) (arguing in favor of the legitimacy of a deliberative model of
remedial decision making).
261. Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp., 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. I
(1981); Wyatt, 503 F.2d 1305; Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975).
262. For example, Dixon, 405 F. Supp. 974, was a suit in the District of Columbia brought as a class
action by patients at St. Elizabeth's Hospital to enforce a statutory right to treatment and compel the
creation of community mental health treatment for persons who would otherwise require institutional
care. After finding the federal and District of Columbia defendants obligated to create such treatment
opportunities for the class, the district court required the government defendants to cooperate with the
plaintiff class in proposing a remedial decree for the provision of needed community mental health
services. Although the court did not appoint a special master or other representative of the court to
mediate or coordinate such joint efforts, the attorney for the federal government fulfilled that function,
and after two years of negotiations between public and private community providers, including but not
limited to the parties, a several hundred page document was produced that required procedures for
assessing patients, finding and developing needed community services for them, requiring individualized
treatment plans and case management services, specifying the devotion of certain public funds to finance
the provision of services, and requiring periodic reporting to the court on implementation of the decree.
Parties to the suit and the community groups who participated in the remedial process became better
acquainted with the difficulty others had experienced in giving them what they wanted; they exchanged
information which none had had access to before the proceeding; and eventually they became invested
in their work product and sought its successful implementation. All felt more fairly treated for having
had the opportunity to participate in the development of a comprehensive court order that virtually
determined the viability of their efforts to provide housing, jobs, services, and treatment to mentally ill
patients.
For materials describing the remedial stage of the Dixon suit, see records of the Dixon Monitoring
Committee, on file at the Mental Health Law Project, 1101 15th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005.
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notice and an opportunity to be heard-that is, to participate-underlie our
most fundamental concepts of due process. Although the process used to
develop remedial decrees in institutional reform suits is complicated and
time consuming, the process permits the resolution of literally hundreds
of issues subsidiary to the initial liability determination in a 263
single
proceeding, thus reducing litigation and fact-finding costs for all.
Moreover, broadened participation serves other fundamental values
embodied in our notions of fairness. 264 Permitting those with affected
interests to articulate their concerns before a neutral decision maker
demonstrates respect for their worth as individuals and concern for their
situations. 26' Furthermore, in the process of identifying those with
affected interests, participatory procedures help allocate responsibility for
the social problems before the court and require those included to take
responsibility for their solution as well. 26 6 Finally, the involvement of
affected parties promotes their acceptance of the outcome and makes more
likely their support of and commitment to the remedy ultimately
ordered.267
My thesis is that this kind of participatory, deliberative process can be
implemented at the liability stage as well as at the remedial stage of
litigation. Such a participatory process was effectively used in the Karen
Quinlan case in which the father of a twenty-two-year-old comatose
woman petitioned the court to be app6inted her guardian, with express
power to terminate all extraordinary medical measures keeping her
alive. 268 Joined in the proceeding were a court-appointed guardian ad
litem, the hospital in which Ms. Quinlan was a patient, her attending

263. See, e.g., Halderman,612 F.2d 84; Wyatt, 503 F.2d 1305; New York State Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (approving consent judgment fulfilling inmates'

constitutional right to protection from harm and to a minimum quality of care); New York State Ass'n
for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (holding that plaintiff class of
mentally retarded residents had an Eighth Amendment right to protection from harm which had been
systematically violated).

264. Professor Summers argues that a process can be evaluated in accordance with its ability to obtain
"good results" and its ability to further "process values" such as participation, rationality, and
humaneness. Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes-A Pleafor "Process
Values," 60 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1974).
265. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); JERRY L. MAsHAw, DuE PROCESS IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 158-80 (1985).
266. See LAWRENCE SuSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE: CONSENSUAL
APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES 27 (1987).

267. See the discussion of the remedial process ordered in Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974
(D.D.C. 1975); Sturm, supra note 260, at 1373-76.
268. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (NJ. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
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physicians, the county prosecutor, and the New Jersey attorney
general. 26 9 The court consulted expert medical witnesses and invited
religious authorities to comment on the petitioner's character and to
inform the court of the religious doctrine underlying the petitioner's
motivations. The New Jersey Supreme Court correctly understood that:
The litigation has to do, in final analysis, with [Karen's] life,-its
continuance or cessation,-and the responsibilities, rights, and duties,
with regard to any fateful decision concerning it, of her family, her
guardian, her doctors, the hospital, the State, through its law
enforcement authorities, and finally the courts of justice.27
All were represented. The court held that Ms. Quinlan had a right of
privacy protected by the New Jersey and United States Constitutions to
refuse medical treatment; treatment that held little or no promise for her
improvement or recovery from her terminal condition. It also held that her
right could be exercised by her guardian during her incompetence if
certain procedures were followed. The New Jersey Supreme Court held
that if after future medical examinations Ms. Quinlan's guardian, family,
and physicians concluded that there was no reasonable possibility of her
return to a cognitive and sapient state, they must consult with the
hospital's ethics committee or some similiar body. If that consultative
body agreed with the prognosis, in accordance with medical practice and
prevailing standards, life support systems could be withdrawn without any
civil or criminal liability on the part of any participant. 27'
The collective determination required by the court before Karen's
guardian could terminate her life support can be considered the exercise
of a constitutionally protected privacy right. While the court did not ask
the parties to agree on a constitutional standard establishing the nature of
that right, their participation in the determination of the merits of the
controversy permitted the parties to inform and influence the
constitutional parameters established by the court. The court in Quinlan
may have sensed that there was a lack of community consensus on the
underlying substantive principles for determining whether a life is worth

269. The physicians, hospital, and county prosecutor were joined as parties so as to restrain them
from interfering with the powers of the guardian to authorize discontinuance of all extraordinary medical
procedures for his comatose daughter. These parties then requested declaratory judgments regarding their
responsibilities. The state attorney general intervened as a matter of right. The New Jersey Catholic
Conference was admitted as amicus curiae and evidence of religious dogma permitting the withdrawal
of extraordinary medical treatment from terminally ill patients was admitted as relevant to Mr. Quinlan's
character and qualifications to be appointed guardian. Id. at 651-53.
270. Id. at 651.
271. Id. at 671-72.
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continuing and the likely success of treatment. The court may have thus

concluded that a choice of controlling principles and procedures should
reflect the preferences of those affected-the hospital, treating health care
professionals, and the family-as well as the court's. Further, the court
created a permanent collective decision-making body to carry out the

remedial aspects of its judgment and to continue the deliberative process.
Thus the court fashioned an institutional mechanism, modeled on hospital

ethics committees, which could include health care professionals, social
workers, theologians, and attorneys, 72 to consult with family members

and to implement its judgment that Karen's guardian could, with legal
impunity,

terminate

life-sustaining

treatment

under

certain

circumstances. 3
Similarly creative procedures might well be added to the repertoire of
courts entertaining constitutional challenges based upon the privacy
doctrine to state control over the utilization of other medical technology,

including abortion, so that liability determinations as well as remedial
efforts will be more informed, respectful, and accepted. If rights are
linked definitionally and logically to remedies,

74

then the broad, social

policy-filled law making engaged in by the Supreme Court in cases like
Roe and Casey should flow, not from liability determinations set up by
polarized adversaries, but from a broad representation of the social
realities upon which sound policy must be based.

272. Quoting a law journal article written by a medical doctor, the court described a need for a
"forum for more input and dialogue in individual situations [as a way] to allow the responsibility of
these judgments to be shared. Many hospitals have established an Ethics Committee composed of
physicians, social workers, attorneys, and theologians." Id. at 668 (quoting Dr. Karen Teel, The
Physician'sDilemma: A Doctor's View: What the Law Should Be, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 6, 8-9 (1975)).
For a discussion of the development of interdisciplinary, hospital ethics committees to educate and
advise physicians and families on difficult treatment decisions, see RONALD E. CRANFORD & A.
EDWARD DOUDERA, INsTITUTIONAL ETHics COMMITrEE AND HEALTH CARE DECISIONMAKrNa (1984);
Joan Gibson & Thomasine Kushner, Will the "Conscience ofan Institution" Become Society's Servant?
HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1986, at 9; Mark Siegler, Ethics Committees: Decisions by Bureaucracy,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1986, at 22; Robert M. Veatch, HospitalEthics Committees: Is There A
Role?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1977, at 22. Ethics committees have been characterized as
facilitators of consensus decisions, focusing on the process of decision making.
273. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 671.
274. See, e.g., L.L. Fuller & William Perdue Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46
YALE LJ. 52 (1937) (stating that courts identify competing interests and apply normative principles to
define rights and protect them with appropriate remedies); Holmes, supra note 119, at 462 ("The duty
to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep
it-and nothing else.").
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2. Increasing Access to Information in the
Interest of Reasonableness
Apart from recognition of participation rights for reasons of fairness,
broadening participation would permit more parties with an interest in the
problem at issue to contribute social policy information to the court and
to relate their experiences to the court without having to mold them into
abstract legal principles embodied in the plaintiffs or defendant's
litigation position.27 Broadened participation would encourage all of the
parties and the court to see the subject of the action from many
perspectives, rather than remaining fixed only upon their own interests.
Moreover, the constitutional violations at issue in Roe and similar suits
do not suggest a single resolution. Broadened participation would allow
courts to be better informed about what remedies may be appropriate and
the cooperation of persons with such interests is often necessary if
remedies ordered by the courts are to be effective. 76
It has been argued that because potential intervenors cannot accurately
perceive their interest in a particular case until remedies are proposed,
courts should hold hearings and permit comment on consent orders
77
(though perhaps not intervention) at the remedial stage of litigation.
Many might participate as amici curiae, asked by the court to supply only
specified information. 78 Others might be identified during litigation, be
provided notice of a proposed decree, and be given an opportunity to
comment upon it.2 7 9 In that way, groups with different perspectives

could supply information on the same subject.
Obtaining such participation at the trial level has much advantage over
the present practice of waiting until the case is before a court of appeals
or the Supreme Court. Although one organization did request permission
to make a submission to the trial court in Roe prior to a determination of
liability, in all probability the opportunity to do so was not widely known
among potentially interested groups. Particularly in a suit like Roe,
regarded from its inception as a test case, courts should use their

275. For a discussion of efforts to reduce the courts' misunderstanding of relevant considerations
through disclosure of the full range of class concerns, see Summers, supra note 264, at 21-25.
276. See, e.g., Special Project, supra note 250.
277. For a discussion of the desirability of intervention and collateral attack in the case of Title VII
consent decrees under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see Schwarzschild, supra note 242, at 919-29. See
also discussion supra notes 266-69 and accompanying text.
278. See LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW

196-99 (1987) (discussing the federal government's use of amicus curiae status to "raise general
questions the parties do not always reckon with" and to "spur social change").
279. See supra note 269.
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prerogatives to seek amici submissions to obtain information that they
deem important to their decisions rather than passively await the
submissions various organizations decide to provide. Furthermore, amici
ought not to have to support any particular party to the case but should be
able to submit their views as their own. Had the trial court in Roe done
so, it might have had a rich factual record before it about the need for and
consequences of prohibiting abortions in Texas, much like the records
developed in later abortion litigation."' 0 As it was, the court was largely
ignorant of the number of women in Texas of child-bearing age, the
number of pregnancies terminated legally and illegally in the state, the
health reasons for which abortions are sought, the health consequences of
illegal abortions, the safety of legal abortions, the economic circumstances
of the women seeking abortions, the ages and educational levels of the
women seeking abortions, the availability of medical and child care
assistance to pregnant women, the psychological consequences of having
or not having an abortion in various circumstances, and so on. All of this
information would have been relevant to a legislative judgment regarding
the desirability of permitting or prohibiting abortions in various
circumstances. If, in their exercise of judicial review, courts inevitably
make judgments that reflect their assessment of that desirability, at least
it should be an informed assessment.28 '
In certain instances, courts have gone further than merely soliciting
amici briefs in their pursuit of relevant and necessary information and
have appointed special masters to assist litigants in developing the factual
282
predicate for the case and to explore the possibilities for settlement.

280. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text; see also FED. R. EVID. 706 (authorizing federal
courts to appoint expert witnesses).
281. See Hutchinson, supra note 16, at 555 ("[I]nstead of chastising courts for their imperial

presumption, commentators celebrate them as the preferred forum for democratic deliberation.") (citing
Ronald Dworkin and Laurence H. Tribe).
282. See generally WAYNE D. BRAZIL ET AL., MANAGING COMPLEX LITIGATION: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO THE USE OF SPECIAL MASTERS (1983); Vincent Nathan, The Use of Masters in Institutional

Reform Litigation, 10 U. TOL. L. REV. 419 (1979). Delegation of fact finding functions to special
masters (and other parajudicials, including administrative agencies) has not been viewed as violative of
the due process right of litigants to have their cases and controversies determined by Article III judges,
or otherwise prohibited by Article III, so long as the judge retains and exercises authority to deal with
matters of law and the issue of whether the findings of the master are supported by the evidence.
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, as applied in La Buy v. Howes Leather
Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957), precludes reference of a whole case to a master, such as the antitrust cases
involved there, if such reference amounts to "little less than an abdication of the judicial function
depriving the parties of a trial before the court on the basic issues involved in the litigation." Id. at 256.
Out of concern for maintaining respect for judgments and confidence in the outcome of litigation, the
La Buy Court held that calendar congestion, complexity of issues, and an anticipated lengthy trial do
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Special masters appointed to assist in the discovery stage of complex
litigation involving a variety of commercial matters have been asked to
participate in document searches, to be present at depositions, to review
allegedly privileged documents, and to coordinate stipulations of facts and
position papers.283 Other special masters have been authorized to
supervise the whole discovery process, assist the court in fact finding
during the trial
stage,284 and assist parties in settlement
negotiations."' Special masters can break down formal barriers of
communication, can spend more time learning about the case, are free of
the institutional restraints on judges, and can establish informal
procedures, all of which discourage adversarial posturing by attorneys and
parties and facilitate candor and cooperation, which are necessary for
settlement.286

For example, in a case involving the petition of Indian tribes for
allocation of fishing rights in treaty waters, the district court permitted

groups representing some commercial and recreational fishermen to

'
participate as "litigating amici."287
These amici were permitted to
participate in discovery and at trial but were not allowed to veto any
settlement. Further, the court appointed a special master selected jointly
by the parties and the court to prepare the case for trial and to mediate
efforts by the parties to develop their own allocation plan through
bargaining.28 The master facilitated cooperative methods for gathering

not constitute "an exceptional condition" as required by Rule 53. Thus, the appointment of masters has
been confined to cases in which they are appointed to assist judges in specific judicial duties, including
ones in which specialized expertise is required by the technical nature of the issues or where supervision
of relief already determined by a court is required. Comment, Masters and Magistratesin the Federal
Courts, 88 HARv. L. REV. 779, 795-96 (1975); see also Linda Silberman, JudicialAdjuncts Revisited:
The Proliferation ofAd Hoc Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2131 (1989).
283. BRAZIL ET AL., supra note 282, at 5-12.
284. Harold Kaufman, Masters in the FederalCourts:Rule 53,58 COLuM. L. REV. 452,463 (1958).
See generally Jack B. Weinstein, Standing Masters to Supervise Discovery in the Southern Districtof
New York, 23 F.R.D. 36 (1958).
285. Ronald E. McKinstry, Use ofSpecialMasters in Major Complex Cases,in FEDERAL DISCOVERY
IN COMPLEX CIVIL CASES: ANTI-TRUST, SECURITIES AND ENERGY, 211, 225 (1980).
286. BRAZIL ET AL., supra note 282, at 12-25. However, special masters participating in the trial
stages of litigation must comply with notions of fundamental due process and the Code of Judicial
Conduct of the United States Judges, which explicitly states that most of its provisions apply to special
masters and preclude ex parte communication. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Application of the
Code of Judicial Conduct § A.
287. Francis E. McGovern, Toward a FunctionalApproachforManaging Complex Litigation,53 U.
CHI. L. REv. 440, 456-60, 463 (1986) (describing United States v. Michigan, a case for which Professor
McGovern was the special master). For a discussion of the case, see infra note 303.
288. United States v. Michigan, File No. M26-73CA (W.D. Mich. May 7, 1985) (pre-trial order),
discussed in Sturm, supra note 260, at 1374 n.92; see also McGovern, supra note 287, at 465-68.
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and sharing information between the participants and developed a joint
computer analysis that identified solutions satisfying the minimum
interests of all parties." 9 Joint fact-finding efforts, directed by the court
and coordinated by a special master, are not only efficient in avoiding
duplicative efforts and creating incentives for stipulations, 290 but they
also enable the court to obtain information the court deems necessary to
its determination29 and thus promote the "reasoned" part of the
"reasoned decision making" norm that supports judicial resolutions.

3. Encouraged Settlements in the Interest of Legitimacy
Perhaps most important, an expanded, participatory litigation process
would create a forum, like that provided by negotiated rulemaking, in
which represented parties could trade off their interests in different
aspects of the controversy in order to gain concessions from other

participants and to work toward a settlement to be embodied in a consent
decree.292 Issues of participation and settlement need to be kept
separate. Involvement of affected groups in the litigation process can be
expanded in the interests of fairness and increased information sharing
without necessarily permitting affected interests to authoritatively settle
their own differences. As discussed more fully below, much of Professor
Fiss's often cited critique, Against Settlement,293 is leveled at the
difficulties of representation and resource inequality in complex litigation,

289. See Sturm, supra note 260, at 1373-76.
290. BRAZrL Er AL., supra note 282, at 27. Others have argued that the appointment of special
masters at the trial stage of litigation results in unnecessaiy costs, delays, and an abdication of judicial
responsibility. Adventures in Good Eating v. Best Places to Eat, 131 F.2d 809, 815 (7th Cir. 1942);
Charles E. Clark, Difficulties Encounteredin a System ofMasters, 23 F.R.D. 569 (1958).
291. At the remedial stages of institutional reform litigation, some courts have taken an inquisitorial
role akin to the activist role of courts in gathering evidence in the European legal systems. See Sturm,
supra note 260, at 1366; John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure,52 U. Ciii. L.
REv. 823, 826-30 (1985).
292. See, e.g., United States v. ITT Continental Baking, 420 U.S. 223 (1975):
Consent decrees and orders have attributes both of contracts and ofjudicial decrees or, in this
case, administrative orders. While they are arrived at by negotiation between the parties and
often admit no violation of law, they are motivated by threatened or pending litigation and
must be approved by the court or administrative agency. Because of this dual character, consent
decrees are treated as contracts for some purposes but not for others.
Id. at 236-37 n.10 (citations omitted).
Such procedure might even permit serious consideration of the kind of affirmative benefits described
by Professor Mary Ann Glendon in her comparative legal analysis. GLENDON, supra note 27. Her work
suggests that European women are provided better options with respect to contraception, abortion, and
child birth than have been possible in our litigious, adversarial system.
293. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
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rather than the legitimacy of settlement. This Article has already noted the
lack of legitimacy that haunts constitutional decisions based on judicially
selected values, such as decisions made under the Due Process Clause and
characterized as substantive due process. If the Constitution does not
clearly direct us to a choice of values, then we should use constitutionally
derived principles of fairness in process writ small-notice and an
opportunity for persons affected to be heard by a disinterested, responsive,
and reasonable decision maker-to arrive at these values. Courts should
establish procedures first, for the expression of value choices by those
who are to be governed by the legal disposition of their interests, and
second, for the declaration of law in accordance with those choices to the
extent that they can be agreed upon. Such a declaration of law could
provide legitimacy in those situations in which the judge's function is no
longer to apply law to particular facts about individual parties, but to
make law of general applicability on the basis of judgments about social
policy. As discussed above, the consequences of stare decisis, collateral
estoppel, and the precedential value of judgments militate in favor of
predicating settlements on the broad representation of affected interests.
The legitimacy of settlements rests upon contract principles of
individual autonomy, private ordering, bargained-for exchange, and
judicial supervision of contract formation in the interest of fairness. The
judicial role is thus not to supervise the substance of the bargain struck
by the parties in settlement, but to supervise the process of their
bargaining and to dismiss the suit at the parties' behest. However,
exceptions to this model of judicial supervision have been made in certain
kinds of suits. Thus, courts will decide if the substance of a settlement is
fair in cases such as guardians settling suits on behalf of minors, divorce,
class actions, antitrust, criminal, and shareholder derivative suits. In these
situations, courts review the substantive fairness, adequacy, and
reasonableness of the settlement because the situations involve either
parties with unequal bargaining power or issues affecting the public
interest.
Professor Fiss argues that courts should not permit settlements in public
law litigation because the process of contract formation is inherently
unfair.2 94 Thus, Fiss complains that class action suits should not be
settled because parties may not represent the groups they purport to
represent nor have equal resources for gathering information, holding out

294. Id. at 1076-79.
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for better terms, or paying for litigation expenses.295 Yet, these flaws in
representation and inequalities affect litigation performance and judgments
as much, or more, than settlements. Nevertheless, Professor Fiss argues
that courts can play a greater role in equalizing the parties' positions
when they render judgments than they can when presented with a
settlement. 296 That is true only if conventional hands-off procedures are
used by judges during settlement negotiations, not if courts become
involved in supervising the joint fact-finding activities and facilitating the
bargaining process either directly or through the appointment of a special
master, as is advocated here.2 97
The fundamental difference that Professor Fiss finds between judgment
and settlement is the difference between a bargain model and a justice
model-the former takes inequality as an integral and legitimate
component of the dispute settlement process while the latter struggles
against it. The bargain model has as its objective the attainment of private
ends and peace. The justice model has as its objective the attainment of
public values embodied in authoritative texts and concepts of justice. At
the extreme, the difference is a conflict between autonomy reflected in
contract law and private law making and justice reflected in public or
community law making. For Fiss, even though settlement may be freely
consented to by parties who believe the results. benefit them more than
would the outcome of litigation, the settlement may not embody
justice.29 '
This analysis is premised on the notion that we can know "justice" and
can hold settlements up to that standard to determine whether justice is
served. Litigation, however, is initiated by parties to determine what is
just in their particular case. If they agree in their settlement on what is
justice for them, does not the settlement reflecting that agreement
constitute justice for them? It would seem to do so in a positive sense in
that those with authority to arrange their affairs through contract have
determined the rule of law for their own case. But Fiss would seem to
argue that settlement is not law in the transcendent sense-it does not
comport with principles of justice that should be embodied in the law.299
Thus, the parties should be deprived of the legal authority that they would
otherwise have to determine their relationships through judicially

295. Id.
296. Id. at 1077; cf.Judith Resnick, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) (discussing
the evolving nature of the judicial role, from disinterested deliberator to active manager, and its legal

consequences).
297. See infra note 331 and accompanying text.
298. Fiss, supra note 293, at 1085-86.
299. Id. at 1089.
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enforceable contracts. The law-making authority of private parties to
create legally binding obligations through contracts is, of course,
circumscribed by public policy limitations. The question is where those
boundaries should be drawn."' 0 In litigation asserting constitutional
claims, the courts should grant the parties considerable latitude to create
law through settlement while still retaining judicial authority to set
outside constitutional boundaries.
4. The Possibility of Compromise
More fundamentally, commentators such as Judge Harry Edwards would
argue that abortion is an issue that implicates such fundamentally different
values that people cannot negotiate with regard to them. Thus, the hope
of legitimacy through compromise and settlement is illusory. Judge
Edwards observes:
It is a fact of political life that many disputes reflect sharply
contrasting views about fundamental public values that can never be
eliminated by techniques that encourage disputants to "understand"
each other .... One essential function of law is to reflect the public
resolution of such irreconcilable differences; lawmakers are forced to
choose among these differing visions of the public good. A potential
danger of ADR [alternative dispute resolution] is that disputants who
seek only understanding and reconciliation may treat as irrelevant the
choices made by our lawmakers and may as a result ignore public
values reflected in rules of law.3 °'
The problem posed by judicial review, however, is that the court must
assess the choice of fundamental public values made by lawmakers. My
proposal is that the court's evaluation should reflect the values of the
litigants to the extent that there is agreement among them. Consent
decrees approved by the court in such cases would bind only the parties
and would provide a nonbinding precedent that might be followed by
others.
However, Judge Edwards's point has force. People may be in favor of
or be against legal abortion under certain circumstances for various
reasons. Some people oppose abortion because of a religious view that the
fetus has a soul created by God, and that only God is entitled to control

300. See Marc Galanter, The Day After The Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REv. 3, 32-37 (1986).
301. Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panaceaor Anathema, 99 HARV. L. REV.
668, 669-79 (1986).
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its fate.2 Other people recognize a fetus not as an entity having a soul,
but as a human being, or as an entity with the potential to become a
human being. To the extent that arguments in favor or against abortion are
grounded in the existing or potential humanity of the fetus, they are not
relevant to the fundamental values of people who regard the fetus as an
element of divinity-a soul. For these religious people, the discussion is
about apples and oranges, and there is no common ground for
compromise. However, for the rest, and probably the majority of us, there
is a shared value-maximizing the element of humanity. We share a
common goal of making the lives of people-men, women, and
children-as meaningful and moral as possible. We are talking only of
apples and how best to maximize them-qualitatively and quantitatively.
Even so, if litigation challenging the constitutionality of state abortion
legislation were to be enlarged to permit the representation of persons
other than women seeking abortions and the state, is it realistic to expect
that any kind of compromise could be struck with regard to their
positions? It is realistic if we conceive of their interests as multiple and
particular. For example, suppose Norma McCorvey's interest was seen not
simply as an interest in obtaining a legal abortion, but as a variety of
interests: an interest in obtaining information about abortion, including
information about the feasibility of travel to procure an abortion where it
was legal; an interest in the means to purchase a psychiatric examination
to determine whether her distress at being pregnant rendered her suicidal
so that she came within the exception of the Texas statute for abortions
to preserve the life of the mother; an interest in obtaining medical benefits
for prenatal care or child birth if she chose to go to term; an interest in
adoption alternatives; an interest in child care if she chose to keep the
baby; an interest in child support, job training, welfare payments; and so
on. Her request for relief might have reflected these interests, and she
might have sought not simply an injunction against enforcement of the
anti-abortion statute, but a mandatory injunction requiring the state to
perform any statutory duties it might have had to further these other
aspects of her interest. Suppose the state were represented, not just by its

302. For diverse religious views on abortion, see Text of Vatican's Doctrinal Statement on Human
Reproduction, N.Y. TIMES, March 11, 1987, at A16; J. DAviD BLEICH, Abortion in HalakhicLiterature,
in CONTEMPORARY HALAKHIC PROBLEMS 325 (1977); JOHN A. HARDON, THE CATHOLIC CATECHISM
106 (1975); SUSAN T. NICHOLSON, ABORTION AND THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH 19-39 (1978); PAUL
D. SIMMONS, PERSONHOOD, THE BIBLE AND THE ABORTION DEBATE (1989); RABBI RAYMOND A.
ZWERIN & RABBI RICHARD J. SHAPIRA, JUDAISM AND ABORTION (Religious Coalition for Abortion
Rights Education Fund 1989); Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology and Abortion: Toward Love,
Compromise, and Wfisdom, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1011 (1989).
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attorney general, but by the director of its human services department.
Suppose the state's interests were viewed as broader than its interest in
strict enforcement of the Texas statute against physicians and others who
procure abortions, to include its interest in providing needed job training,
medical and subsistence assistance, counseling, contraceptives, and child
care benefits to women like Norma McCorvey. Suppose the following
groups were also represented: private and public prenatal clinics, the
Medical Society, the local hospital association, private adoption agencies,
child welfare agencies, welfare rights organizations, and organizations of
fathers asserting an interest in providing for and raising their children.
Suppose these interests were broadly viewed to include not just an interest
in supporting or opposing the abstract right to abort, but interests in
providing services and benefits to mothers and children who want and
need them.
These parties might have sat down together and admitted that the
situation was a mess-a status quo that none of them had an interest in
preserving. And they might have argued over the facts they thought
important-how many women were in Ms. McCorvey's situation, what
alternatives were available to improve it, and so forth-and agreed to
secure those facts together. Someone might have made a list of existing
programs and a list of programs that all parties would agree should exist,
such as educational, contraception, and counseling programs. They might
have agreed to the principle that decisions to continue pregnancies should
be informed; that women seeking legal abortions should have access to
psychiatric examinations; that regulations further defining the exception
in the Texas statute should be issued; that women determined by their
physicians to be pregnant be given information about prenatal care as well
as abortion, adoption, and foster care alternatives to raising their children;
that contraceptive information, devices, and assistance be made more
readily available, particularly the means to purchase them. Perhaps the
state would have decided it was more expedient to provide better
contraception, counseling, information, maintenance, medical care, and a
liberal construction of the statute's exception, than to risk having its
abortion law struck down in its entirety.
Perhaps the other participating parties might have agreed to provide
certain information and services needed and wanted by the plaintiff and
others similarly situated. If agreement were reached on even some of these
matters, they might have been embodied in an agreement between the
parties and submitted to the court for its approval. The price of the state's
agreement would have been withdrawing the complaint, but Norma
McCorvey might have decided that the benefits obtained from the state
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and the private litigants made it worthwhile to forego a declaration that
she had an abstract right to abortion on demand and the risk of a
determination that she had no such right. Other interested women in
different situations who were not parties to the suit or who were not
represented by a class representative would still have been free to raise
new challenges, present new information, and seek new remedies,

including a judicial determination that the statute as construed and
enforced under the circumstances created by the consent decree was
unconstitutional. Such a scenario is not unimaginable.0 3

303. A similar scenario is imaginable in the Pennsylvania suit, where individuals and organizations
with interests in informed consent and counseling, minors seeking abortions, and notification of
husbands, might have been invited to participate along with the impressive array of expert witnesses
who provided valuable information to the district court. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp.
1323, 1334-68 (E.D. Pa. 1990), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). Instead of only physicians and clinics, private parties
might have included individual minors and associations representing their interests, organizations
providing counseling to battered women, welfare rights organizations, religious groups, allied health
professionals, and others. They might have been able to agree, for example, on when the twenty-fourhour waiting period might be waived or when the information required for informed consent could be
imparted so that the waiting period did not impose a hardship on women who had to travel to abortion
clinics.
Such an effort to depolarize and settle litigation seems to have been successful in United States v.
Michigan, the fishing rights case discussed earlier. See discussion supranotes 287-92 and accompanying
text. For a full discussion of the case, see McGovern, supra note 287, at 456-68. In that case, brought
against the State of Michigan by Indian tribes seeking to enforce a treaty granting them fishing rights
in Lake Michigan, the initial litigation set up a zero-sum game in which the parties were competing for
a limited resource-one party could gain only at the expense of the other parties. The Indians' reduced
catches had resulted in a lower standard of living, anger, and rioting, and they believed fundamental
political as well as economic values were at stake. The treaty provided little guidance on the allocation
issues (prior judicial interpretation had assured the Indians a "reasonable living standard"), and the issue
affected all Michigan citizens because of its impact on commercial fishing, sport fishing, and tourism.
However, rather than being treated as a bifurcated issue, the allocation problem was viewed by the
court as polycentric; that is, the solution to any particular aspect of the problem was seen as dependent
on the solution reached on other aspects. See generally Fuller, supra note 63. The court therefore
encouraged the five parties (three Indian tribes and the United States as plaintiffs and the State of
Michigan as defendant) and "litigating amici" (individually named commercial and sports fishermen and
fishing associations) to engage in "integrative bargaining" over an expanded array of issues about which
the parties had different value preferences. The parties bargained over the determination of such issues
as the kinds and quantity of fish to be taken, the fishing gear to be used, the place and time of catches,
the replenishment of fishing beds, and so on. The court asked the parties to propose management plans
and appointed a special master to facilitate their settlement efforts throughout the joint generation and
sharing of information, the development of computerized decision models, and mediation.
Although one of the three tribes rejected the negotiated settlement, the court ordered the agreement
after a trial on the merits. No party appealed the court's action and no violence occurred. The process
itself was regarded by the parties and the masters as a valuable educational process and a means of
respecting the dignity and autonomy of the participants. McGovern, supra note 287, at 468. While the
utilization of abortion technology does not present a competition for scarce resources, it does present
polycentric problems in which many persons have separate interests reflecting different value preferences
to be traded off in integrated bargaining over a solution that maximizes as many of those interests as
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Yet, even after such agreement, dispute might well remain over whether
the Constitution permits states to prohibit abortion under any
circumstances. There are those who maintain that, at the core, compromise
between pro-life and pro-choice advocates is impossible because pro-life

arguments are fundamentally deontological (an ethic of duty that defines
moral behavior as compliance with intrinsically moral rules that apply

universally without regard to their consequences in any given situation)
while pro-choice arguments are fundamentally teleological (an ethic of
aspiration directed at the attainment of certain goals which recognizes
gradations of right and wrong depending on circumstances)." 4 The

former fosters concepts of moral absolutism while the latter accepts the
concept of moral relativism and situational ethics. Pro-life advocates
assert the rule "thou shalt not kill innocent life" as an intuitively
perceived, absolute, and universal moral rule that prohibits abortion even

where all would agree that other peoples' welfare is enhanced by the
deed.30 5 On the other hand, pro-choice advocates would not admit any
such absolute rules, but rather assert that the rightness or wrongness of
any particular abortion must be judged by its furtherance of other goals,
such as the welfare of existing persons.

While this analysis is helpful to understanding the seemingly intractable
abortion debate, like the abstraction of legal rights in Roe, this antithetical

characterization of the positions of pro-life and pro-choice advocates is
overdrawn. There are few pro-life advocates who do not admit an
exception in the rare but instructive situation in which it is certain that the
mother will die without an abortion. 30 6 And there are few pro-choice
advocates who would not claim that violent rape, for example, is

universally immoral. Neither position, then, is completely unqualified.

possible and respects the integrity of all parties' moral positions.
304. Randall A. Lake, The MetaethicalFrameworkofAnti-Abortion Rhetoric, 11 SIGNS 478,480-81
(1986); see Carter, supra note 176 (concluding that in the absence of political consensus, litigation and
protest are all we can expect in the abortion controversy).
305. Professor Ruth Colker builds on the aspirational nature of theology to suggest that theology in
combination with feminist theory explaining obstacles to the realization of aspirational goals can be used
to interpret the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause in such a way as to permit a
compromise of pro-life and pro-choice positions. Colker, supra note 302, at 1041-74.
306. Even the Catholic Church, which regards the fetus as having a soul, takes the position that in
such situations, although every effort should be made to save the lives of both, the death of the fetus
is not sinful if not intended as the objective of the actions taken. See Pius XII, Allocution to the
Association of Large Families,ACTA ApoSTOLICAE SEDIS 855 (1951) ("Never and in no case has the
Church taught that the life of the child must be preferred to that of the mother ... "); SECOND
VATICAN COUNCIL, PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH INTHE MODERN WORLD 51 (1965); Paul
VI (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith), Declaration on Procured Abortion m, at 12 (Dec. 5,
1964); HARDON, supra note 302, at 334-42.
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More fundamentally, both positions depend for their validity on the
existence of alternatives: alternatives to compelled childbirth and
alternatives to abortion. For the pro-life advocate, the law is an instrument
30 7
of the state, whose purpose it is to promote a good and just society.
Yet, there can be no morality or virtue in a woman adhering to the "thou

shalt not kill" rule if compliance is compelled, for virtue requires freedom
to choose the good and the bad. 30 8 Furthermore, to the extent that the
objective of the pro-life position is not the promotion of virtue, but the
protection of fetuses believed to be persons, the morality of the position
depends on a choice between principles other than "thou shalt not kill,"
as discussed shortly. Thus, justified as a rule to protect human lives, the

pro-life position becomes more like the position of Civil War abolitionists
who condemned the enslavement of human beings they believed to be
persons. But the liberation and protection of slaves did not require the
enslavement of others. In contrast, the absolute prohibition against

abortion would require the sacrifice of another human life when a

307. The premise that the purpose of government is the promotion of a virtuous citizenry, the
fostering of good relations between citizens, or the establishment of justice, is not new. Aristotle, for
instance, found the aim of all legislation to be the training of citizens in "habits of right action."
ARsITOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS Book 10, ch. 9, § 14.2 (Terence Irwin trans., 1985), quoted in I
FREDERICK COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 352 (1946). In fact, it was the prevailing political
premise prior to the seventeenth century. WALTER BERNS, FREEDOM, VIRTUE AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 228-31 (1957). John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, and Jean Jacques Rousseau posited a
different premise, that the purpose ofgovernment was to assure the greatest amount of personal liberty
consistent with peace and order. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 3-10 (J.W.
Gough ed., 1946) (1698); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 2-21 (Michael Oakeshott ed., 1946) (1651);
JEAN J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES, 10, 18 (Everyman's Library ed. 1913).
See generally 5 FREDERICK COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 44-46, 128 (1960); 6 id. at 91.
308. John Milton's Areopagitica is sometimes cited in support of the notion that there can be no
moral virtue without liberty. Thus, Milton is quoted as stating:
As therefore the state of man now is; what wisdome can there be to choose, what
continence to forebear without the knowledge of evil? ..
I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and unbreathed that never
sallies out and sees her adversary ....
JOHN MILTON, Areopagitica,in COMPLETE ENGLISH POEMS 574, 590 (Gordon Campbell ed., 4th ed.,
J.M. Dent & Sons 1990) (1874). However, some scholars argue that Milton never contended that liberty,
though necessary to virtue, was the object of government. Rather, he may have intended liberty only
for people educated, through constraint, to know the good. BERNS, supra note 307, at 237. More
modern, libertarian views conceive of law and the United States Constitution as systems for maintaining
personal liberty, individual rights, and the processes for peaceful change, devoid of substantive moral
principles. See generally ELY, supra note 159. The classical political premise is not without its
spokesmen in modem politics, however. See Justice Official Sees Weakening of Moral Fiber, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 1992, at A20. Attorney General William P. Barr, speaking to the Catholic League for
Religious and Civil Rights argued recently that "The founders believed that popular government and its
laws necessarily rested upon an underlying moral order that was antecedent to both the state and to manmade laws." Id.
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mother's life is endangered by her pregnancy. Yet, neither the
Constitution nor religious authorities prohibit the state from exacting
innocent life itself in order to save or improve other life, as the
constitutionality of military draft laws and the Catholic position on
abortion would indicate.3 0 9 Thus, even as a moral imperative justified
as necessary, not to the virtue of the actor or society, but to the
preservation of other lives as a good in itself, the moral validity of the
"thou shalt not kill" rule depends on the resolution of such a choice in
accordance with some other moral principle. That is, when a zero-sum
game is presented-when there are two lives, neither one of which can
exist if the other exists-the principle "thou shalt not kill" is not decisive,
for one or the other must be killed. The choice between the two provides
the freedom of choice necessary to its morality or the virtuous resolution.
of the question in accordance with a separate, perhaps higher order
principle. 3'0 And thus, alternatives are again essential to the morality of
the resulting decision.
Similarly, for the pro-choice advocate, there can be no exercise of a
right to ,autonomous decision making, whether protected by the
Constitution or not, if no options are present. Just as there can be no
autonomous choice in favor of childbirth when abortion is proscribed,
neither can there be autonomous choice in favor of abortion if there are
no viable alternatives to it, such as subsidized child care or adoption.
Autonomy is the freedom to choose between alternatives. Therefore, in
order for there to be action which is moral or autonomous, there must be
alternatives.
On this basis, pro-life and pro-choice opponents may be able to come
to some accommodations, such as supporting measures that make both
abortion and child birth more a choice and less a necessity, in the name
of maximizing autonomy and virtue. Paradoxically, we may find that true
autonomy is the freedom to make a choice to compromise autonomy in
certain situations in order to further other values. If so, pro-choice
advocates might consent to limiting their future right to choose abortion
in order to further other values, such as preservation of a fetus whose
father is ready, willing, and able to assume full and exclusive

309. See, e.g., United States v. Griglio, 467 F.2d 572 (1st Cir. 1972); United States v. Spencer, 473
F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1973); Smith v. United States, 424 F.2d 267 (9th Cir. 1970).
310. For example, in the classic case where a mother in childbirth will die unless the fetus is
destroyed, the choice between the two lives could be made in accordance with a rule that prefers young
lives over older lives or one which prefers lives in which society has made investments of education
and training over lives in which it has not.
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responsibility for its support and care. And, we may find that true virtue
lies in permitting others to freely choose the good under most
circumstances. If so, pro-life advocates might agree to support legal
abortion in more situations, such as when pregnancies present serious
health problems other than death or will result in serious social problems
that destroy the meaning, if not the existence, of other lives.3 .

C. The ParticipatoryModel and Legitimacy in Process
Writ Small
1. Principles Embodied in the Constitution
One can make the argument that the participatory procedures advanced
here are necessary to provide due process to persons affected by a court's
judgment.' 1 2 That is, the Constitution itself can be read to embody
principles of representation and participation that inform the interpretation
of due process requirements governing process writ small as well as large.
Thus, when interests in life, liberty, and property are adjudicated, the
procedural process which one is due must provide for the representation
and participation of those with affected interests, whether before a civil
court or an administrative agency.313 As discussed above, Professor Ely

311. See, for example, the German and French abortion laws discussed in GLENDON, supra note 12,
at 27.
312. Leubsdorf, supra note 188, at 614-15 (arguing that litigation should be brought to establish
constitutional requirements for civil procedure in state as well as federal courts).
313. These two procedural values, Ely argues, should provide the basis for judicial review of
legislation challenged as unconstitutional. John H. Ely, Another Such Victory: ConstitutionalTheory and
Practicein a World Where CourtsAre No Differentfrom Legislatures, 77 VA. L. R. 833, 834 nA
(1991). Thus, Supreme Court decisions that protect freedom of political advocacy and association under
the First Amendment are based in, and defensible as necessary to promote, democratic participation in
government. Professor Ely also finds participation and representation values in other clauses of the
Constitution, including the dormant power aspect of the Commerce Clause, which protects unrepresented
out-of-state interests, the Bill of Rights' assurance of a forum in which the socially marginal are
represented, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id. Similarly, the doctrine of strict scrutiny
developed under the Equal Protection Clause can be seen as necessary to assure that racial and other
minorities are not unduly burdened by legislatures in which they are not represented. Id. Aside from
certain substantive constraints contained largely in the Bill of Rights, Ely argues that courts are not
given license by the Constitution "to create or 'discover' further rights" not necessary to effectuate
representation and participation in democracy. Id.
The Supreme Court's due process analysis provided in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976),
would seem to confirm that observation as it applies to procedural rights. Under Mathews, the Due
Process Clause does not constitute a statement or prioritization of values other than accuracy; rather it
provides a utilitarian calculus for weighing the costs and benefits of procedures. Jerry L. Mashaw, The
Supreme Court'sDue ProcessCalculusforAdministrative Adjudicationin Mathews v. Eldridge: Three
Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28 (1976). If, as Ely postulates, the

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 68:269

has argued that the text of the Constitution and the framers' intentions as
revealed in the Federalist Papers instruct us that the principles of
representation and participation essential to democratic government must
inform judicial interpretation of the document.314 Ely argues that judicial
review undertaken to enforce these overarching principles of
representation and participation is also defensible in terms of institutional
competence, because courts are better able to police matters of procedure
than matters of substance, such as the discovery of fundamental
rights. 15 Ely's deference to judicial aptitude for process is even more
appropriately invoked when the policing to be done is of the adjudicatory
process rather than the legislative process.
Although Ely and his critics do not develop the idea, perhaps the
principles animating the Constitution's provisions regarding procedural
fairness and the Supreme Court's decisions interpreting them are also
principles of participation and representation. 316 For example, inherent
in the framing of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and, indeed,
deeply ingrained in Anglo-American jurisprudence, is the concept that the
procedures most likely to reduce the risk of adjudicatory error (the.
erroneous application of law to facts) are notice to persons with interests
affected by the proceeding and an opportunity to be heard.31 7 The
threshold issue in due process adjudication is a determination of which
3
interests affected by the proceeding are constitutionally cognizable. ,I

selection of substantive values is to be left to institutional processes established by the Constitution, then
we must look to that Constitution to find process principles that legitimate the substantive value
selections which are inevitably made by courts when they recognize certain adjudicatory procedures as
required by due process.
314. Ely, supra note 313, at 840 n.15.
315. Id. at 834 n.4; ELY, supra note 159, at 102.
316. Cf Leubsdorf, supra note 312, at 597-98.
317. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950). "[D]ue process [requires]
notice [to be] reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the [judicial] action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Id. at 314;
see also Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908). In Mathews, the Court held that when
constitutionally cognizable liberty and property interests are adjudicated, procedures must be provided
whose benefit in reducing the risk of error outweighs their cost to the government. Mathews, 424 U.S.
319, 334-35. See generally Frank I. Michelman, Formjal and Associational Aims in ProceduralDue
Process, in DUE PRocEss: NoMos XVIII 126, 126-28, 154 n.4 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman
eds., 1977); Stephen N. Subrin & A. Richard Dykstra, Notice and the Right to be Heard: The
Significance of Old Friends,9 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 449, 452-73 (1974).
318. The Constitution does not require that due process be provided whenever personal interests are
affected by government action. O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980). Rather,
it requires due process only in cases where certain property or liberty interests found by the Supreme
Court to be constitutionally.protected are involved. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). See
generally William Van Alstyne, Cracks in the "New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the
Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 445 (1977); Peter N. Simon, Liberty and Property in the
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Case law construing the Due Process Clause holds that an interest must
be defined by positive law-state or federal constitutional provisions,
statutes, or common law-in order to be protected by due process."'
Many of the interests at stake in cases like Roe, such as the interests of
spouses, health professionals, parents, and others, may not be so defined.
Broadening the concept of constitutionally cognizable interests to permit
the participation of persons whose interests are affected by the utilization
of the particular medical technology in question would increase the
number and the procedural complexity of such suits, but need not expand
the substantive rights ultimately defined.32 The process to which
interested persons would be entitled is notice and a hearing. Notice
permits the representation of affected interests in the proceeding. 2 ' An
opportunity to be heard also assures at least some participation in the factfinding and deliberative aspects of adjudication.322 To the extent that the
text of the Constitution and the Supreme Court's declarations of its
requirements support a claim that the participatory and deliberative
procedures recommended here are legitimate, that claim is a positive one
grounded in the Court's institutional authority to interpret the
Constitution.
Surely, it cannot be said that the principles of representation and
participation advocated here were respected in Roe, where the substantial
interests of millions of women, millions of their male partners, millions
of relatives, doctors, childless persons, and unborns were adjudicated in

Supreme Court: A Defense ofRoth and Perry, 71 CAL. L. REv. 146 (1983). Interests regarded as "mere
expectations" are not protected and may be affected by state action arbitrarily and without hearing. See,
ag., Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979).
319. E.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980); Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Ro, 408 U.S.
564 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See generally TRIBE, supra note 165, at 667.
320. Cynthia R. Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 189 (1991) (urging

reformation of procedural due process in the government benefits context based on feminist theory in
order to pursue the connection between people and government rather than their separation; seeking to
improve solutions within the context of particularized programs rather than abstractions; creating a
culture of government care rather than government intrusion). With regard to interests constitutionally
protected by due process in such a framework, Professor Farina notes: "Our thinking about what
interests 'trigger' due process would not be caught in the positivist trap, for we would neither fear the
perils nor yearn for the solutions that made the trap so fatally seductive for liberal legalism." Id. at 270.
321. Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982).
322. Considerable litigation has been generated around the question ofwhen such an opportunity to
be heard must be afforded. See, e.g., Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979); Mackey v. Montrym, 443
U.S. 1 (1979); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
There has also been considerable litigation concerning the attributes of such a hearing. Cleveland Bd.
ofEduc. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985). The requirement that the decision be rendered by a neutral
decision maker can be regarded as necessary to the effectuation of the other two values. See Gibson v.
Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
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a Texas courtroom in which only four parties (one of which was
dismissed) and one amicus curiae participated; where no discovery had
taken place except a single deposition of the unnamed plaintiff; where no
witnesses or evidence were presented; 32 3 and where three lawyers spoke
for the multitudes for about thirty minutes each.
2. Claims to Legitimacy
Even if the Constitution does not require broadening representation and
participation in proceedings such as Roe and Casey in the positivistic
sense, process reforms may be necessary to establish the legitimacy of the
resulting judicial action in the transcendent sense.324 One cannot argue
that the trimester regulations announced by Justice Blackmun are
illegitimate in the positivistic sense. The Justices were all duly appointed
and sworn, the case was within the Court's subject matter jurisdiction, and
the Court had personal jurisdiction over the parties. It has been argued,
though, that the Roe decision was illegitimate because it failed to embody
transcendent moral principles as a substantive matter. My critique of Roe,
however, is about the legitimacy of the process by which the Court
fashioned law in the case, rather than the substance of that law. Such a
view of legitimacy avoids the conundrums of foundational theories of
judicial review, for under the process theory posited in this Article, the
legitimacy of judicial declarations of constitutional restraints lies not in
the correctness of the imposition of judicial value judgments in the name
of fundamental rights and substantive due process, but in the Court
ordering a settlement of such disputes in accordance with, or at least with
an understanding of, the values of those whose interests are affected and
who have been represented in and participated in the suit. As explored in
Part III, consensus settlements (negotiated and entered into with court
encouragement and facilitation and with approval by representatives of
affected interests and the state) privilege the substantive values of

323. The-district court record did contain an excerpt from Roscoe Gray's Attorney's Textbook of
Medicine relating to conception and fetal development. Defendant's Brief at 2, Roe v. Wade, 314 F.
Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (Nos. CA-3-3690-B & CA-3-3691-C), afl'd in partand revd in part,410
U.S. 113 (1973). For an updated version of the source excerpted, see RoscoE N. GRAY, ATToRNEY's
TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE
58-10, 58-14, 58-15 (3d ed. 1990). In addition, an affidavit of Dr. Trickett
regarding the need for legal abortions was appended to the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Roe, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (No. CA-3-3690-B).
324. As discussed above, I regard as legitimate those judicial rules formulated and declared in
compliance with normative principles of adjudicatory fairness (namely that the representation and
participation of affected interests are fundamental in our Constitution and political heritage), but which
transcend formal criteria for authoritative rulemaking in the positive sense.
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participants over those of the judicial decision maker. Where settlement
cannot be reached, judicial declarations of law are at least informed by the
values and policy preferences of those who will be affected and of those
who were allowed to participate.
Professor Ely argues that the "broad participation in the process"
required by the Constitution legitimizes legislative value selections at the
general law-making level.325 Ely also suggests that the "decisional
values" the Court should pursue in its own process are "participational"
values because they are values with which the Constitution is largely
concerned, they are consistent with and supportive of democratic
government, and they are values which courts are institutionally well
suited to impose.3 26 This Article has argued that such legitimacy can be
provided by participation in law making on a particular or adjudicatory
level. However, this does not mean that the Constitution necessarily
requires such a participatory process whenever the Court is required to
exercise judicial review over legislation affecting individual interests. It
does mean that the legitimacy which compliance with express
constitutional requirements might otherwise provide may be based on
compliance with constitutionally derived process norms in the course of
adjudication.
Proponents of the traditional adversary model of adjudication, such as
Professor Fuller, have grounded that model's legitimacy in norms of
participation, reasoned judgment, and neutral decison makers; they have
decried departures from the adversarial model as illegitimate.327
However, as the task required of the court in constitutional adjudication
differs from the traditional, private dispute model, so these same norms
require procedures different from those of the adversarial model to
effectuate them. Participation and reasoned judgment are certainly
enhanced by the process advocated here. To the extent that resolution of
litigation is accomplished through settlement, the ideal of a neutral
decision maker is effectuated only as the ideal provides a background
premise for resolution when settlement fails. Professor Fiss recognized the
shift in adjudicatory tasks where courts were asked to give meaning to
constitutional values in remedial litigation and found Fuller's private
dispute model inadequate for the task posed by institutional reform
litigation.328 However, Fiss missed the implications of that shift for the

325. ELY, supra note 159, at 76-77.
326. Id. at 240 n.75.
327. Lon L. Fuller, Collective Bargainingand the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. REv. 3, 41-42.
328. Fiss, supra note 8, at 5.
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liability-determining process. 3 29 I argue that we should acknowledge the
implications of the public law model in constitutional judicial review at
the liability and remedial stages and adopt procedures that permit courts
to perform competently and legitimately at each stage. 3
In addition to implementing legitimating process norms, the
participatory model advocated here casts the court in the role of mediator,
facilitator, and referee of the rules of the game, not in the role of
sovereign awarding victory on the merits to one side or the other. This
supervisory role is one to which the courts are institutionally better suited.
It is true that difficult issues will arise concerning what interests are
affected, who can represent them, what is consensus, and whether
representatives have sufficient resources to participate effectively in the
litigation. However, these are matters that courts have traditionally policed
through class representation procedures, the approval of consent decrees,
and the doctrines of standing, intervention, and mootness 31 Judges
seem to be more capable of determining whether a group claiming to
represent poor, single, pregnant women has such a constituency among its
membership or has other means of knowing and conveying their common
concerns, than determining abstract interests in abortion and weighing
those interests against interests of the state as required by Roe and Casey.
A full exploration of the philosophical basis of a legitimacy claim based
on participation in judicial law making is beyond the bounds of this
Article. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note its affinity to libertarian
political tradition. Traditional libertarian political theory holds that
individuals are the original repositories of natural rights.332 The
contractual, libertarian theory of democratic government holds that
government may legitimately interfere in private lives because abstract,
hypothetical individuals have collectively agreed to such loss of liberty in
exchange for certain benefits.33 It is not clear to many people that our

329. Id. at 12-16; see also Fiss, supra note 293.
330. See supra notes 268-91 and accompanying text.
331. See, e.g., Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1329-30 (5th Cir. 1977). See generally JOHN S.
MURRAY ET AL., PROCESS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 475-540 (1989).

332. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 55 (Richard D. Heffner ed., New
American Library 1956) (1859); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER
OF EMINENT DOMAIN 7-18 (1985); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
1776-1787, at 330 (1969); Waiter Berns, JudicialReview and the Rights and Laws of Nature, 1982 SuP.
CT. REV. 49, 62-63 (1982); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems,
47 IND. L.J. 1, 10 (1971). But see TRIBE, supra note 149, at 5-6.
333. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 109-19 (Herbert W. Schneider ed., Macmillan Publishing 1958)
(1651); see JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 282 (Peter Laslett ed., student ed. 1988)
(3d ed. 1698).
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Constitution, the reflection of such a bargain, provides for interferences
by the Supreme Court-hence the problem of legitimacy debated in Casey.
Yet Supreme Court decisions which intrude upon the lives of women, their
partners, doctors, social service agencies, and others could be seen as
based in consent if those who were affected by such judicial action, or
their representatives, had agreed through a participatory adjudicative
process to the law established in the proceeding. Thus, the participation
and consent by representatives of affected individuals provide a good
second-best basis for the legitimacy which is usually provided by
legislative accountability.
Furthermore, libertarian concepts developed through law and economics
analysis underlie the settlement rationale supporting the process advocated
here.334 Basic to the concept of negotiated rulemaking is the belief that
affected parties bring to the bargaining table positions on several issues
to be resolved. In the negotiating process, parties trade off their lesservalued positions in order to gain ones they value more highly. In
accordance with the microeconomic premise that people will rationally
maximize their own self-interests, parties who are permitted to exchange
their preferences will arrive at a resolution that is optimally efficient-the
result which best accommodates the highest values of those at the
bargaining table. 335 Thus, the bargain model for policy formation, either
through administrative rulemaking or judicial law making, draws heavily
on the normative appeal of the contract analogy and law and economics
analysis.
At the same time, the participatory adjudication model is responsive to
those who criticize the view that law is a rational system. Some legal
scholars regard judicial interpretations of indeterminate text and judicial
choices between contradictory legal doctrines as nonrational
determinations by those with power, reflecting the judge's own value
perspective determined by his or her age, sex, race, time, place, and life
experience. 336 If judicial declarations are power speech, settlements
empower persons other than judges to speak the law-at least the law to

334. But see JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 202-215 (1988) (arguing that
permitting parties to trade offjustice (the hypothetical judgment that a court would render) for efficiency
may not be desirable where settlement affects unrepresented third party interests and fails to produce
legal precedents as public goods).
335. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3-15 (3rd ed. 1986); RcHARD A.
POSNEit, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 60-61 (1983); Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism,Economics and
Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 119-36 (1979).
336. See generally Gerald E. Frog, The Ideology ofBureaucracyin American Law, 97 HARv. L. REV.
1276, 1286-92 (1984); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 HARV.
L. REv. 1685 (1976). Thus, some critical legal studies scholars regard law as simply the rationalization
of a given political culture. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 114 (1987).
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govern their own case in accordance with agreed-upon values that reflect
a more collective perspective.337
The participatory process proposed here accommodates a feminist
concept of law to the extent that it includes a vision of the judicial

process more respectful of individual dignity and relational interests. In
addition, it facilitates participation in policy formation, as well as fact
finding, through deliberation, bargaining, mediation, and conciliation
rather

than

by

prioritizing

a

hierarchy

of

rights

by

judicial

declaration.338 This multi-party, participational, and consensual process
for resolving even constitutional disputes comports with the allegedly

feminist perception of policy dilemmas as an adjustment of relationships
bringing about the realization of shared values and responsibilities. Other
feminists worry that, unprotected by equalizing formal procedures and the
concept of rights, women will be subordinated to men in the participatory
dispute resolution processes recommended here.33 9
CONCLUSION
If abortion raises questions about how relationships between people
should be arranged--about the creation of ourselves in the mirrors
provided by others,3 40 about responsibilities to other people to whom we
are already connected, 34' about the origination of new lives with which
to associate,342 and about the interests of others in those new
lives 343-then the wisdom of many disciplines should be brought to bear
on it: history, philosophy, religion, sociology, psychology, and economics.

337. Mark V. Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515, 1517-19
(1990).
338. This participatory, deliberative, problem-solving approach to dispute resolution is suggested by
Professor Carol Gilligan's landmark work on female moral development. GILLIGAN, supranote 37, at
16-23; see also Paul J. Spiegelman, Integrating Doctrine, Theory and Practice in the Law School
Curriculum: The Logic ofJake's Ladder in the Context of Amy's Web, 38 J. LEGAL EDuc. 243, 247
(1988). Professor Gilligan's studies indicate that women conceive of the problems posed by certain
moral choices as ones involving networks of relationships rather than polarized and prioritized rights
and duties; as susceptible to a variety of solutions rather than right and wrong answers; and as having
emotional implications that must be taken into account. See generally GILLIGAN, supra note 37.
339. Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangersfor Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545
(1991). See generally MacKinnon, supra note 7 (suggesting that male dominance skews the ability of
organizational representatives to reflect the views of mixed gender membership and prevents the
formation of consensus).
340. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
341. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
342. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
343. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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Law is none of these-and all of these. While the legal realists have
taught us to appreciate the reflection of all areas of inquiry on the
formation of judge-made law,344 such law, supported by the authority
and power of the state, is still something apart from them.
What contribution, then, can judge-made law in this separate sense make
to the discourse about the use of new technologies to destroy, create, and
perpetuate life? In the abortion cases, at least, its contribution to date has
been procedurally divisive and substantively inconclusive. This Article
suggests that the contribution that can be made through judicial review is
not the settlement of the substantive moral, economic, political, and social
issues that medical technologies pose, but the establishment of a judicial
process through which they can be worked out. Judges should not tell us
when, where, and how women may have abortions or how people may die,
but how we must decide these things for ourselves. Since our entrenched
system of judicial review requires judges to establish limits on a
legislative determination of these issues, the judicial branch must establish
for itself procedures by which these limits will be determined. This
Article also suggests that the Constitution may require, or at least instruct,
that those procedures be both participatory and representative. Courts have
a variety of doctrines and mechanisms available to expand participation
and to supervise representation in proceedings that invoke judicial review:
standing, mootness, class actions, intervention, amicus curiae practice,
special masters, magistrates, approval of consent decrees, and remedial
orders among others. While the abortion cases may present the very most
difficult issues to settle through a participatory, consensual process, courts
would do well to implement this process in order to help change the
emotionally charged conflict into simply heated discussion.
Were such a process to be implemented for issues on which consensus
might be reached, the function of the court would shift from awarding
victory to moderating and facilitating compromise. Litigation would
become less a forum for combat and more a forum for bargaining,
exchange, and conciliation under the supervision of a judge who sets and
enforces procedural rules to promote fairness. Consensual resolution of
individual disputes would govern the parties to the litigation as a matter
of contract and would provide an example that future litigants might
follow. Such a participatory, consensual model permits different bargains
to be struck in different courts by different parties, just as the originalist
model would permit different state legislatures to arrive at different

344. GILMORE, supra note 113, at 87-90.
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accommodations of the interests involved. Nonparties would be left to
pursue their interests in other courts or other forums. The judicial
resolution of the parties' unresolvable issues would mark the
constitutional boundaries for future bargaining. In turn, the virtues of the
process would create better informed and more highly respected
resolutions. As for those judicially imposed resolutions, the court has at
its disposal a number of dispositional devices that permit the substantive
issues to be resolved through process writ large in accordance with the
participatory representational principles applied at that level.345
Would a participatory process provide a "fairer" process? In order to
make that determination, one must know why the question is posed. We
must ask, "Fair for the accomplishment of what purpose or objective?"
Procedures that might be fair for the accomplishment of one purpose may
not be fair for the accomplishment of another purpose. If the objective is
to make social policy determinations through the judicial branch of
government, we need procedures that are fair with regard to the
accomplishment of that goal. Even if we assume that fairness entails
notice to persons affected and an opportunity to be heard, procedures that
provide those things in disputes between individual citizens may not
provide them in suits between masses of citizens and the state that are
brought for the purpose of making prospective social policy prescriptions.
This Article urges courts to tailor their procedures to the purposes of the
litigation at hand. If that litigation requires broad-gauged judicial
legislation, the court should use procedures that take into account the
information and values of affected persons, because the Constitution
instructs us that participation and representation in the determination of
generally applicable, social policy prescriptions are the legitimating
principles of our governance. If Roe and Casey have taught us anything,
it is that once the chasm between opponents has been defined, widened,
and solidified by the adversary process, it will be difficult to recapture the
middle ground.

345. See BURT, supra note 118.

